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POLICE INTERROGATION IN COLORADO:
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MIRANDA *
By

LAWRENCE S. LEIKENt

In this article, empirical research and analysis are presented which
deal with the effect of the Miranda decision on the actual interrogation "contest" and the ultimate resolution of that contest in the
courtroom. Interviews with suspects in the Denver County jail indicate
that the Miranda warnings do not impart a working knowledge of
their constitutional rights to the suspects and raise questions as to the
validity of the signe warning and waiver form which is used by the
Denver police as evidence of a "°knowingand intelligent waiver" of the
rights of the suspects. The data also indicate that the right to counsel
as a measure to protect the fifth amendment privilege can be frustrated
by the police by noncompliance with requests for counsel, by obtaining
"knowing and intelligent waivers" of the right (or evidence thereof),
or by both. Psychological tactics and strategies, including promises and
threats, still appear to be the major factors influencing the suspect's
decision to talk in the interrogationroom. The police and the judicial
responses to Miranda are analyzed in terms of the findings referred to
above, and the author concludes that the effect of Miranda on the
game of interrogation is effectively neutralized in its implementation.
Indeed, one of the latent functions of Miranda appears to be to aid the
police in overcoming their evidentiary burden with respect to proving
the suspect's knowledge and waiver of his constitutional rights. The
author further concludes that making the right to counsel nonwaivable
is a viable solution to the problems of effectively achieving the goals
implicit in the Miranda decision.
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INTRODUCTION

W

ITHIN each game there is a well-established set of goals whose
achievement indicates success or failure for the participants, a
set of socialized roles making participant behavior highly predictable,
a set of strategies and tactics handed down through experience and
occasionally subject to improvement and change, an elite public whose
approbation is appreciated, and, finally, a general public which has
some appreciation for the standing of the players. Within the game
the players can be rational in the varying degrees that the structure
permits. At the very least, they know how to behave and they know the

score.'
1

N. LONG, THE POLITY 142 (1962).
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Although the preceding passage was written as a means to
analyze governmental policies in local communities, it also provides
a point of orientation for a study of the police interrogation process.
If the process is viewed as "a game," the players can be viewed as
having strategies and tactics which are, of course, employed within
the framework of a body of rules. There may be some predictability
with respect to the nature of their roles. The players may be rational
in varying degrees, and their attitudes toward the process itself may
be an important determinant of the outcome. There may be various
publics which are concerned with the rules by which the game is
played and with which side prevails. The purpose of the following
study is to describe a few of the elements of "the game" of interrogation after the rules were changed by the historic decision of Miranda
2
v. Arizona.
To provide some background information with respect to the
issues in conflict and the rules of the game, the study begins with
a brief sketch of some of the ambiguous areas surrounding Miranda
and a few interpretations in those areas by state and federal courts
in Colorado. Within the framework of the general law governing
the interrogation process, a description of the procedures used to
implement the Miranda rules will complete the description of the
setting. Since almost all of the interrogations which will be explored
here occurred in the Denver Police Station, an effort will be made
to explain the procedures which are generally used by that agency
to convey the Miranda warnings.
Secondly, information which was collected through interviews
with suspects at the Denver County Jail during July and August of
1969 will be used to describe their roles within and attitudes toward
"the game" of interrogation, the extent of their knowledge
of the
rules, and the reasons for their decisions with regard to the exercise
of their rights. The attitudes and strategies of the police will be
presented through both a description of interviews with them and
observations of the manner in which they conduct interrogations. In
order to realistically appraise these descriptions and observations, each
of the sections will include a brief explanation of the methodology
which was used to collect the information.
The ultimate contest is often resolved in the courtroom. The
study returns to the courtroom where the focus is on the judiciary's
view of Miranda and the difficulty of reconstructing the interrogation
scene for the court. The study ends with some conclusions and recommendations with respect to the future of the interrogation process.
2 384

U.S. 436 (1966).
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DEFINING THE RULES OF THE GAME

A. Resolving Ambiguous Areas: Judicial Interpretation of the Rules
for Interrogation in Colorado
Miranda prescribes procedures to protect the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to
counsel. The case essentially holds that to protect these rights during
an in-custody interrogation (in the absence of other effective measures), the following warnings must be given to suspects: They must
be warned that anything they say may be used against them; that
they need not answer any questions; that they have the right to
counsel during interrogation; and that, if they are indigent, counsel
3
will be appointed to represent them.
A reading of the Miranda opinion seems to make it apparent
that the decision was made in response to what the Court considered
to be unfair police tactics in the interrogation room. The Court
quoted extensively from police manuals and texts "which document
procedures employed with success in the past, and which recommend
various other effective tactics."'4 Although the Court stressed that "the
modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather
than physically oriented," 5 it nonetheless concluded that "without proper
safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected
or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." 6 The warning
procedure required for apprising the suspect of his rights was designed
to combat and overcome the inherently compelling pressures and to
permit a full opportunity for the exercise of a suspect's privilege
against self-incrimination. 7
It is interesting to note that the Court realized the insufficiency
of a warning alone to protect the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination:
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his
Our aim is to assure that the indiprivilege by his interrogators ....

vidual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process. .

. . A mere warning given by
the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. 8

The Court therefore held that the right to have counsel present at
3

1d. at 467-73.

4Id. at 448-49. The primary texts referred to were: F.
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962);
5

INVESTIGATION (1956).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).

6 Id. at 467.

7 id.
8
Id. at 469-70.

INBAU &

J.

REID, CRIMINAL

C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
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the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the suspect's
rights and that he must accordingly be further warned that he has
the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during the interrogation. 9
When the suspect has been further warned of his rights, if the
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant "knowingly and intelligently waived" his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."0
Although one of de avowed purposes of the Miranda decision
was "to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow,"" it did not necessarily resolve all
of the questions dealing with interrogation room practices.
For instance, some ambiguity remains, at least in Colorado, as
to what constitutes "in-custody interrogation." In Miranda, the Court
defined in-custody interrogation as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.""2
In Mares v. United States,1" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that the Miranda warnings need not be given
if the defendant is not under arrest and is free to continue the interview or leave as he sees fit. 4 The court, however, did not address
itself to the question of whether or not the suspect himself realized
that he could leave the interview at will or whether his subjective
impression regarding his freedom to leave would have affected the
court's finding. Similarly, in United States v. Wainright,15 the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado chose not to follow
the "custodial" test of Miranda and, without any explanation, apparently based its decision on the "focus" test of Escobedo v. Illinois6
9

Id.

'Old. at 475.

11Id. at 442.
12Id. at 444.
13 383 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1967).
14 Id. at 813. The defendant asserted

that the trial court erred in receiving testimony of
an FBI agent regarding a false alibi which the defendant had given. Although the
testimony was apparently not given to establish the truth or falsity of what was contained
in defendant's statement, a hearing was held out of presence of the jury on the admissibility of this evidence. The agents testified that they gave the defendant full and complete
warnings of his rights. The defendant admitted full knowledge of his rights and showed
familiarity with criminal investigations and procedures. The court nevertheless held
Miranda to be inapplicable because the defendant was not under arrest and was free to
continue the interviews or leave as he saw fit. Id.
15284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968).
16 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The "focus" test as laid down by the Escobedo Court is that the
right to counsel attaches when "the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ...." Id. at 490 (emphasis
added).
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held that the defendant should have been warned of his rights
because the adversary process of criminal justice had been directed
against him as a potential criminal defendant as soon as he became
a subject of criminal tax investigation by the Internal Revenue Service. 17 While the court relied on both Miranda and Escobedo in its
opinion, 8 it failed to distinguish between them or to suggest why
it chose to apply the standards of the earlier case rather than those
of the later one.
Although there are numerous other ambiguities in the rules for
interrogation in Colorado,' 9 perhaps the most troublesome vagary in
the Miranda opinion (and the one most relevant to this study) is the
question of what constitutes a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of
constitutional rights. The problem here is ascertaining the factors to
be considered in determining whether or not there has been a Miranda
waiver and the weight to be given to each of these factors.
This is not a new problem since the same difficulty was encountered under Escobedo.2 ° A case decided by the Supreme Court of
Colorado under Escobedo points to some of the criteria which may
be used to define a "knowing and intelligent waiver." In Nez v.
People," the statements of a semiliterate Navajo Indian were held to
be inadmissable. Among the determinative factors were his limited
understanding of the English language and his ignorance of both
the legal processes and his constitutional rights.2 2
An additional variable which has been used in determining
whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver is the age
of the suspect. In the pre-Miranda, pre-Escobedo case of Gallegos v.
Colorado,2 ' the United States Supreme Court overturned a conviction
which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Colorado because
the age of the suspect had not been given sufficient weight by the
courts below. 24 The prosecution argued that the boy had been advised
of his right to counsel and chose not to exercise it; but the Court
found that
-it

[a] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have
any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible
only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not
equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences
of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know
'v

United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Colo. 1968).

181d.
19 See generally, Note, Legal Limitations on Miranda, 45 DENVER L.J. 427 (1968).
20 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964).
21445 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1968).
22 Id. at 78.
23 370 U.S. 49 (1962), rev/g 145 Colo. 53, 358 P.2d 1028 (1960).
24 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962).
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how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
25
constitutional rights.

In the pre-Miranda cases, one sees the courts evaluating such
factors as the previous experiences of the suspect with the criminal
process, his intelligence, his education and mastery of the English
language, his age, and other variables. In the Miranda opinion itself,
however, the Court declared that
[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on
information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with
authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable
individual knows he is
to overcome its pressures and to insure that the 26
free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.

It is not clear from this language whether or not fhese various
factors will continue to be given weight in determining the defendant's knowledge of his rights. Ostensibly, Miranda is an improvement
upon Escobedo since it requires that the warnings or their equivalent
be given before there can be "a knowing and intelligent waiver."
On the other hand, a strong case can be made that as a result of the
warning rules, these external considerations are subjected to less
careful scrutiny than they were given under Escobedo.2"
As illustrated by the Colorado cases, Miranda standards continue
to be ambiguous and difficult to administer in many instances. While
the United States Supreme Court was initially responsible for these
problems, it is apparent that the ambiguities can be dispelled more
quickly if the lower courts and the members of the bar confront them
directly. In any event, as the standards are applied to more factual
situations, further clarification of the rules would appear to be almost
inevltable.2 S
25

Id. at 54.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
27 This proposition is discussed in §§ II(C) (2) & IV(B) infra.
28 The argument for further clarification is not to be taken as a denigration of "creative
ambiguity," which could give the states wider latitude for experimentation and judges
broad discretionary powers in decisions based on the facts before them. Indeed, a cogent
argument can be made that the central problem with Miranda is its egregious emphasis
on specific warnings. From this point of view, Miranda's weakness is not too much
ambiguity but too little "creative ambiguity." For a case which has been implemented
more effectively than Miranda because of its 'creative ambiguity," see United States v.
Vade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
The Supreme Court of Colorado did in fact clarify somewhat the ambiguous but
important concept of what constitutes a "knowing and intelligent waiver" in the recent
case of Billings v. People, 466 P.2d 474 (Colo. 1970). The court approved Judge
Lewis' concurring and dissenting opinion in the recent case of Sullins v. United States,
389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1968). In the Sullins case, Judge Lewis indicated that "an
express declination of the right to counsel is not an absolute from which, and only from
which, a valid waiver can flow," (despite the fact that Miranda stated that "an express
statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an
attorney could constitute a waiver.") Billings v. People, 466 P.2d 474, 476 (Colo. 1970)
(emphasis added). In Billings, the Supreme Court of Colorado did not address itself
to the question of waiver of the right to counsel or the question of waiver of both fifth
26
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B. The Colorado Procedure for Implementing Miranda
1. The Judicial Role in Implementing Miranda and the Colorado
Rules Relating to Confessions
The ultimate contest is often resolved in the courtroom. However, within the framework of the general law governing the interrogation process, the judiciary is able to assert only a limited role in
enforcing the implementation of the Miranda rules within the interrogation room.
The Colorado procedure for determining the admissibility of a
challenged statement or confession is to hold a hearing, out of the
presence of the jury (when there is a jury trial) in which the court
determines admissibility as a matter of fact and law. The jury or
judge may then determine the weight to be given to the statement,
but a jury may not hear the statement before the court has made a
prior determination that the Miranda requirements were met.2 9
The judiciary also has some self-imposed responsibilities which
may overlap with the requirements of Miranda and affect its implementation. The Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure require that
any person who is arrested on a warrant shall be taken before the
nearest available county judge without unnecessary delay. 30 The judge
is to inform the arrested person, among other things, that he is not
required to make a statement, and that any statement made by him
may be used against him. The judge is also required to allow the
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel.3 1
Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the role of the judiciary
in Colorado is in many cases limited to a determination of the
admissibility of a statement or confession. For example, though the
county judge in the Denver Police Station often sees the defendants
the morning after they have been picked up and warns them of their
rights pursuant to Rule 5,32 the suspects who are charged with serious
crimes generally have been questioned the night before. Thus, the
suspect is dependent on the police both to warn him of his constituand sixth amendment rights. Rather, it appeared to conclude that an express statement,
"I understand," followed closely by a confession could constitute a waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination, without considering the question of waiver of the
right to counsel (which apparently had not been waived in this case). Having set forth
these guidelines, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether
or not there had been a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 476-77.
Quaere whether or not it is reasoning such as this which prompts the Denver Police
Department to include on its advisement form only a waiver provision for the
privilege against self-incrimination. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
For other recent cases clarifying Miranda, see Gilmore v. People, No. 23460 (Sp.
Ct. Court., April 8, 1970) (dealing with voluntary statements) ; Neitz v. People, 462
P.2d 498 (Colo. 1969) (illustrating the significance of the waiver form).
29
30
31
32

Compton v. People, 444 P.2d 263, 266 (Colo. 1968).
CoLo. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
COLo. R. CRIM. P. 5(b)(1).
Coo. R. CRIM. P. 5.
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tional rights and to contact an attorney for him if he chooses to
exercise his right to counsel during interrogation. In short, the only
decisive impact of the judiciary generally on the process is the decision
to admit or suppress the statement.
2. The Police Role in Implementing Miranda: The Warning
Procedure used by the Denver Police Department
Some aspects of the police role in the interrogation process will
be considered in greater detail later in the study. 3 The purpose here
is to define generally the procedures used by the Denver Police Department to implement the Miranda rules.
The most important function of the Denver police and detectives
in the implementation of Miranda is to read the standard advisement
form to the suspect and to attempt to secure one signature indicating
that he understands the rights that have been read to him and a
second signature indicating that he wishes voluntarily to talk to the
interrogator. Generally, the rights are read aloud to the suspect, and
he is asked whether or not he wants to sign. If he signs the form, it
34
it is immediately taken from him and he is not given a copy.
DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT ADVISEMENT FORM35
Name
Birthdate
Date
-Time
Location_
You have a right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court.
You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and have him
present during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before
questioning.
Do you understand each of these rights I have read to you?
Answer
Signature of Person Advised_
Knowing my rights and knowing what I am doing, I now wish to
voluntarily talk to you.
Signature of the Person Advised
Witnessed by
Signature of the Advising Officer
33 See text, § III inIra.
It is interesting to speculate on the importance of not giving the suspect a copy of the

34

signed waiver form and having the form taken from him immediately upon signing.

By the quick removal of the form, the police would seem to be able to place minimal
importance on the signing of the waiver provision and make it appear to the suspect that
the signing is a mere legal formality which the police and all those interrogated must
execute. This tactic appears to be consistent with the Denver police strategy of encouraging the suspect to forget the form and the rights advisement as soon as possible after
the signing so that the interrogation can get underway and the police can elicit the
information desired from the suspect. For a discussion of the significance of the waiver
form to the suspect, see text, § II(E) inira. For a discussion of the tactic of distracting
the suspect from the warnings, see text, at 38 infra.
35Denver Police Department, Form 369, June, 1967.
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There is a great emphasis on the reading of the advisement form,
and this procedure is almost never omitted during interrogations by
members of the Denver Police Department. The findings in this
study differ in this respect from those of the Yale study of the New
Haven Police Department, conducted shortly after Miranda had taken
effect. 6 At that time in New Haven, less than half the suspects had
received a warning which included more than half of the specific
warnings required by Miranda."
Of course, one reason for the better performance of the Denver
police in giving the warnings is that much more knowledge about
Miranda has been disseminated since the New Haven study and the
police have been better trained to meet its requirements. A second
reason for the greater percentage of warnings given by the Denver
police may be that the New Haven police were given separate advisement of rights and waiver of rights forms, 38 whereas the Denver

"advisement form" includes the provision for waiver of rights. 9
Arguably, the Denver police are induced to read the complete warning
regularly because the waiver of rights provision which they wish
signed appears on the same form.
In Denver, the suspect is often presented with an advisement
upon arrest. In some cases suspects sign the advisement form before
or as soon as they get into the squad car; in others, the warnings are
given for the first time in the interrogation room of the police station.
Police preoccupation with the advisement form and its waiver provision is demonstrated by repeated offerings of the form to suspects
40
who refuse to sign the first time the form is offered.
There is another, collateral role, in addition to advisement, which
some Denver police officers have undertaken in accordance with
Miranda. This involves permitting a nonindigent suspect who requests
counsel before or during interrogation to contact private counsel or
the public defender's office. The extent of compliance with these
requests will be considered later. 41 It is sufficient to say here that at
least some detectives consider compliance with such requests to be
part of their legal obligation.4 2
Like the judiciary, the Denver police have undertaken a limited
role with respect to the implementation of M'iranda. They have been
3

6Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519

37

(1967).

1d. at 1550-51.

38 Id. at 1551.
39 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
40 See text, at 30-31 & 39-40 infra.
41 See text, § 11(D) infra.
42 Interview with Bryan Morgan, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender,
Denver, Colorado.
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primarily concerned
and his talking with
form to the suspect
rights. Interrogators
II.

with the suspect's signing of the waiver form
them. In general, they read the entire advisement
but give him no other explanation of his legal
have also contacted lawyers for the suspects.

THE SUSPECT'S VIEW OF THE INTERROGATION PROCESS,

His

KNOWLEDGE, AND

His

DECISIONS

Despite the ambiguities which remain in the rules set forth by
Aliranda, and despite the inability of the courts and the apparent
reluctance of the police to aggressively implement the full import of
the decision, it is nevertheless quite clear that the historic decision has,
at least nominally, quite drastically changed the rules of the "game"
of interrogation. Not only is the suspect armed with his full fledged
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel present
during interrogation, he must in addition be given the knowledge with
which to exercise those rights. As the former Police Commissioner
of New York, Michael J. Murphy, said of Escobedo: "What the Court
is doing is akin to requiring one boxer to fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules while permitting the other to butt, gouge and bite.""3 The
purpose of the investigations which are reported below was to determine the actual effectiveness of the suspect's newly defined rights in
the face of what the United States Supreme Court referred to as the
-inherently compelling pressures ' 4 of the in-custody interrogation
process.
A. AMethod and Interpretation of Results
i. The Interviews

Interviews were conducted in the Denver County jail during July
and August, 1969, concerning suspects' most reo nt interrogations by
the police. Different suspects were interviewed at different stages
of the criminal process. Some had becn arraigned, but not yet tried,
some were in the process of being tried, and a few had already been
sentenced and were awaitinig transfer to another penal institution.
Fifty interviews were conducted in all: Forty-seven of the suspects
had been interrogated by the Denver police, two by the FBI, and
one by the Colorado Springs police. Almost all of the interrogations
occurred in the Denver Police Station.
Before each interview, the suspects were told that the interviewer
was a student doing research in the public defender's office and that
the purpose of the interview was to compile a study of the police
interrogation process. They were told that nothing that they said
43Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 n.3 (1966). It is assumed that the commissioner

assumed that it is the suspect who is allowed to butt, gouge, and bite.
44 Id. at 466-67.
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would either help or hurt them in the defense of their case but if
they did have a specific -message to be conveyed to the public defender
who had been appointed to defend them, that message would be
passed on. An effort was made to convince the suspects that the
interviewer was making an independent study; that they could express
their views on the competency of their counsel and of the public
defender's office in general as freely as on any other subject; and
that, unless they indicated to the contrary, the use of their statements
would be limited to the study.
Two problems were inherent in the interviews and the manner
in which they were conducted. The first was one of communications.
This was particularly acute in the determination of whether a suspect
had made a "statement" or "confession" during interrogation. For
purposes of this study a "statement" is defined as a suspect's remarks
which conveyed information relating to the alleged offense to his
interrogator and which the suspect viewed as nonincriminating at
the time he made it. A "confession" or "admission," as used here, is
a statement made with the realization that it might be damaging.
These concepts, however, could not always be applied systematically
during the interviews because of difficulties in communications. Some
suspects appeared able to apply the terms accurately to their conduct;
others could not. Those in the latter group were asked to describe
everything which they had said in the interrogation room and their
reasons for talking. The observer then classified their conduct himself.
The second problem in evaluating the results of the interviews
relates to the credibility of the suspects' responses. It is possible that
some of tht questions were leading and a few of the suspects might
have tried to make themselves look like innocent dupes and the police
like crafty ogres. The donger of suggestion was recognized and minimized as much as possible. For the most part, the suspects were very
willing to describe their experiences and appeared to be candid, outspoken, and truthful.
2. Nature of Sample
In order to evaluate the general validity of the results, a brief
description of the nature of the sample is in order.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the size of the sample
may create problems concerning the validity of the results. However,
it is felt that the conclusions which are suggested by the data are
consistent with each other, and, as will be pointed out, they are generally consistent with the results of other Miranda studies which have
been conducted on a much larger scale than the present study.
All of the suspects had one thing in common: A member of the
public defender's staff had been appointed to represent them during
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or as a result of their initial court appearance. In a few cases, because
of conflicts of interest in the public defender's office, the court had
subsequently appointed private counsel to represent them. In three
cases the suspects had ultimately secured sufficient funds to retain
private counsel. One suspect insisted that the court appoint private
counsel for him because he contended that a public defender had
spoken with him at the police station and given incompetent legal
advice.
Of the 50 suspects who were interviewed, 15 were white, 21 were
Negroes, and 14 were Spanish-Americans. The median age was 25
for the whites, 23 for the Negroes, and 24 for the Spanish-Americans. The median educational level for whites was 12 years - for
Negroes and Spanish-Americans, 10 years.
The median number of previous arrests for the Spanish-Americans
was by far the highest - 15; for the whites, 8; and for Negroes, 6.
The mean number of previous felony convictions for the SpanishAmericans was 1.23, for the whites, 1.27, and for the Negroes, 0.9.
A number of alternative hypotheses might be advanced to explain the
high arrest rate and the relatively low felony conviction rate of the
Spanish-Americans. It is possible that Spanish-Americans may be
arrested for misdemeanor violations more often than whites, or that
they are more often subjected to "investigative arrests" which terminate
without prosecution or conviction. If the latter hypothesis were proved,
then perhaps Spanish-Americans are being harrassed because of a
racial or cultural bias in the system.
Another interesting observation was that the Spanish-Americans
who were interviewed talked with the police with greater frequency
than did the whites or Negroes. In 84.6 percent of the cases, they
made oral or written statements, and in 46.1 percent of the cases
they made confessions or damaging admissions. In contrast, the whites
discussed the facts of the alleged crime with their interrogator only
51 percent of the time and confessed or made admissions in only
21.4 percent of the cases. Although the Negroes made some statement
in 71.4 percent of the cases, they, like the whites, confessed or made
a damaging admission in only 28.5 percent of the cases.
The high confession rate of the Spanish-Americans cannot be
explained satisfactorily by the data available here. It cannot be
explained by their median age because it was almost as high as the
whites, nor by their number of previous felony convictions which was
almost as high as the whites. Furthermore, their experience with the
criminal process appears to have been greater than that of the other
groups because their median number of previous arrests was almost
twice as high as the whites and more than twice as high as the
Negroes.
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Although it can be argued that their low level of education
explains the higher confession rate than that of the whites, this does
not explain the divergence from the Negroes who had the same
educational background. Although language or some other cultural
factor may present a plausible explanation for this data, these factors
were not explored in this study. The purpose here is merely to present
a general picture of the characteristics of the suspects who were interviewed for this study.45
A few additional characteristics of the sample should be pointed
out. Forty-eight of the suspects interviewed were male and two were
female. Their age ranged from 17 years to 65. The arrest range was
from zero to an estimated 60 previous arrests, and the previous
felony convictions went from zero to five. Most of the suspects had
been charged with at least one serious felony. Fifteen were charged
with robbery, 12 with murder, 12 with burglary, three with possession
of narcotics, three with rape, three with theft, one with arson, and
one with manslaughter. In some cases multiple charges had been
filed, but in order to simplify the outline, only the most serious
charge is described here.
B. The Suspect's General Knowledge of His Constitutional Rights
As previously stated, the purpose of these interviews was to
determine the actual effectiveness of the suspect's newly defined
Miranda rights in the face of the "inherently compelling pressures"
of the in-custody interrogation process. According to Miranda, not
only is the suspect to be armed with his full fledged constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during interrogation, he must in addition be given the knowledge with which to
exercise those rights. In this section, the extent of the knowledge
which is communicated to the suspect by the Miranda warnings will
be considered.
All of the suspects interviewed read or were read the rights
warnings. However, the transition from perception to understanding
may not be automatically assumed. In order to determine whether or
not the suspects "knew" at least the basic verbal substance of their
rights at the time of the interrogation, each suspect was asked whether
(at the time of the interview) he could recollect the content of the
warnings.4" If the suspects referred either directly or indirectly in
45The extent to which factors other than race may influence confession rates will be
considered in § II(C) infra.
46 As for faulty memory, public opinion experts have established that events occurring
within the preceding 12-month period are reliably recalled. See, e.g., Robbins, The
Accuracy of Parental Recall of Aspects of Child Development and of Child Rearing
Practices, 66 J. ABSTRACT & SOCIAL PSYCH. 261 (1963). It is assumed here that those
who could not recall the content of the rights warnings either did not initially understand what they were being told, even in the barest outline, or attached so little
significance to it that it was quickly forgotten.
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their answers to the right to counsel or the right against self-incrimination, even in a vague or incorrect manner, they were given credit for
remembering the rights to which they had referred. The way the
recollections were most commonly articulated by the suspects was that
"what you say could be used against you" and "you have a right to
a lawyer."
Forty percent of the suspects interviewed remembered both the
fifth and sixth amendment rights. Twenty-one percent remembered
the right against self-incrimination alone, and 8 percent remembered
only the right to counsel. Thirty-one percent could recall neither of
these rights.
It is possible, however, that the suspects' responses to this question
may understate their actual knowledge of their rights at the time of
interrogation. For example, while only about half of the suspects
remembered the right to counsel when they were asked to state their
recollections of the warnings, 73 percent indicated that they had
some familiarity with the right to counsel when a subsequent question
directed their attention specifically to that right. This discrepancy
may be in part explained by the small amount of importance attached
to the warnings by the suspects.4 7
In order to determine with more specificity the suspects' practical
understanding of their constitutional rights, several specific questions
about these rights were asked. The findings are consistent with the
proposition that many of them did not adequately understand their
rights, even if they were able to articulate crudely the basic verbal
substance.
For example, a number of the suspects knew that what they
said might be used against them, but they didn't know how it could
be used against them. Also, a number of those who remembered that
the right to counsel was somehow involved in the warnings thought
that the right attached only at the trial stage. (Twenty-seven percent
of all the suspects interviewed shared this misconception.)
When asked whether an oral statement could ever be used
against them in court, 45 percent of the suspects expressed the view
that it could not be. A few of them stated that they had thought
that the primary goal of the interrogators was to secure information
which the police could use in their investigation. Some of them were
anxious to give the police information because they felt that further
investigation of the facts might help to exonerate them. Since they
47 The significance to the suspect of signing the waiver provision, which appears on the

same form as the rights warning, is discussed in § II(E) infra. For a discussion of the
police tactic of distracting the suspect from the warnings and the waiver, see note 34
supra & text, at 47 infra. The conclusion which is suggested is that a number of suspects
may have had some prior knowledge of their rights, but that the rights warnings had
little effect in imparting such knowledge to the suspects.
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felt that only "a statement" could be admitted into evidence and a
statement had to be written out and signed by the suspects, they
had no reservations about talking.
Most of the 45 percent of the suspects who expressed the view
that an oral confession could not be used in evidence had been
extremely cooperative during interrogation, at least until they were
asked to sign a written statement. They apparently misunderstood
their relationship with the interrogator and misconstrued the function
of the interrogation process. Not surprisingly, most of them indicated
that if they had known that the oral statements could be used against
them in court, then they would not have revealed any information
to the interrogator.
The suspects were also asked the amount of information which
the law requires them to give the police. The question was asked in
such a manner as to call upon the suspects to supply an answer even
when they were not entirely certain of the validity of their answer.
Fifty-three percent stated that a suspect must give the police a means
to identify him so that they will be able to determine whether or not
they have the right man. The information generally included name,
address, age, and previous arrests, if any. Thirty-three percent indicated that the law does not require a suspect to tell the police
anything. Seven percent believed that the suspect must give the police
a means to identify him, that he has a duty to identify himself, and
that he also has a duty to identify physical objects with which the
police confront him. The remaining 7 percent indicated that the
suspect must tell the police everything about the alleged offense and
answer all of their questions.
There appears to be nothing very surprising about the suspects'
responses to this question. Generally, it is to the suspect's advantage
to identify himself. If he refuses, he may be deemed uncooperative,
the court would be informed of this, and in most cases he would have
little to gain from withholding this information. However, it is not
evident why some of the suspects felt that they had a special duty to
identify physical objects, and it is almost incredible that despite the
warnings a few of the suspects felt that one has the duty to tell the
police everything he knows about the alleged offense and answer all
questions.
C. The Decision to Talk
1. Effect of Knowledge Imparted by Warnings
The data reported above lend credence to the proposition that,
in actual practice, many suspects who are warned of their constitutional rights as required by Miranda do not gain an adequate understanding of their rights. Many cannot recall even the basic content of
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the warnings, and a substantial number of those who could recall
the warnings indicated a lack of any practical understanding of these
rights. For those who could remember the basic content of the
warnings, an attempt was made to test whether a relationship existed
between the recollection of these rights and the making of statements
and confessions by the suspects. One might expect that those who
possessed even a rudimentary knowledge of their rights would have
revealed less information to the interrogators than those who remembered none of the rights. However, the results were not entirely
consistent with this expectation.
TABLE I
Recollection of Warnings and the Making of

a Statement and/or Confession
Recollection of
Warnings

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

Recalled Right

71.4%

28.6%

100.0%

47.6%

(21)

(10)

52.4%

100.0%

Did Not Recall
Right to Counsel

85.0%
(17)

15.0%
(3)

100.0%
(20)

35.0%
(7)

65.0%
(13)

100.0%
(20)

to Counsel

TOTAL NO

(15)

(6)

(11)

(21)

(32)

(9)

(41)

(17)

(24)

(41)

Recalled Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination

80.8%
(21)

19.2%
(5)

100.0%
(26)

38.5%
(10)

61.5%
(16)

100.0%
(26)

Did Not Recall Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination

73.3%
(11)

26.7%
(4)

100.0%
(15)

46.7%
(7)

53.3%
(8)

100.0%
(15)

TOTAL NO

(32)

(9)

(41)

(17)

(24)

(41)

Recalled Both
Rights

70.6%
(12)

29.4%
(5)

100.0%
(17)

41.2%
(7)

58.8%
(10)

100.0%
(17)

Recalled One
Right

92.3%
(12)

7.7%
(1)

100.0%
(13)

46.2%
(6)

53.8%
(7)

100.0%
(13)

Recalled Neither
Right

72.7%
(8)

27.3%
(3)

100.0%
(11)

36.4%
(4)

63.6%
(7)

100.0%
(11)

(32)

(9)

(41)

(17)

TOTAL NO

(24)

(41)

*Number of suspects interviewed.

Assuming that a recollection of the content of the warning is a
reliable indicator of the suspect's knowledge of his rights at the time
of interrogation, Table I does not lead to the conclusion that mere
knowledge of Miranda rights causes the accused to talk less during
interrogation. Indeed, in a surprisingly large number of cases suspects
who could recall all or some of the content of the warnings revealed
more damaging information than those who could remember none.
For instance, those in the sample who recalled the right to counsel
were somewhat less likely to make a statement, but more likely to
make a confession than those who did not recall that right. Those
who recalled the privilege against self-incrimination were more
likely to make a statement, but less likely to make a confession than

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

those who did not recall the privilege. Finally, those who recalled only
one of the rights were more likely to make both a statement and a
confession than those who recalled both rights. Those who recalled
only one right were also more likely to talk than those who recalled
neither. A partial explanation for these results may be that many of
those who were aware of their rights had little practical understanding
of these rights. Another possible interpretation is that the limited and
often distorted information which was possessed by many suspects,
was not a meaningful asset to the suspects during the interrogation
process. At the very least the data suggest that whatever knowledge is
imparted to the suspects by the warnings does not seem to have a
significant impact on their decision to talk.48
2. Effect of Factors of "Imputed Knowledge"
The Miranda warning serves as something more than just a
device to communicate knowledge to the suspect. The fact that a
warning is given also serves (and was apparently intended to serve)
as evidence that the suspect did in fact have sufficient knowledge
with which to exercise his constitutional rights. In the Miranda
opinion itself, the Court declared that
[it would] not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with
authorities,
can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut
49
fact.

The speculative factors referred to by the Court are those factors
which were used prior to Miranda in determining the knowledge and
ability of the suspect to exercise his constitutional rights at the time
of interrogation. 5" Although it is not clear whether these factors were
to continue to be given weight under Miranda, the Court seems to
have implied that the fact that a warning was given would be better
evidence of the knowledge of the suspect of his rights than would
the speculative factors. The data reported above suggest that the
warning is in fact rather poor evidence that the suspect had sufficient
knowledge with which to exercise his constitutional rights because the
knowledge which is communicated to the suspect is superficial and
has little or no effect on his decision to talk. The data reported below
will examine the effect of these speculative factors of "imputed
knowledge" on the suspect's decision to talk.
One of these factors is the age of the suspect, the assumption
48 Similar results are reported in Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv.
1347, table 11 at 1377 (1968) ; and Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact
of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, tables 11, 12 & 13 at 1565-67 (1967).
49
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
50
Id. at 469 n.38. See also text accompanying notes 20-27 supra.
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being that older suspects are more likely to understand and assert
their rights in the interrogation setting than extremely young suspects." As shown in Table 2, older suspects in the sample were in
fact much less likely to confess and less likely to make statements
than younger suspects.
TABLE 2

Age and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Made Statement
Age

Yes

No

Made Confessiont
Total

Yes

No

Total

Younger Than
25 Years

75.0%
(21)

25.0%
(7)

100.0%
(28)

42.9%
(12)

57.1%
(16)

100.0%
(28)

25 Years
or Older

68.2%
(15)

31.8%
(7)

100.0%
(22)

18.2%
(4)

81.8%
(18)

100.0%
(22)

(36)

(14)

(50)

(16)

TOTAL N*

(34)

(50)

*Number of suspects interviewed.
tChi square significant at .10 level. Statistical significance will be reported only where p < .10.

The assumption with respect to age is clearly consistent with
the results of the sample, although no inference can automatically
be drawn that older suspects talked less primarily because of a
superior knowledge of their rights. Perhaps they were better equipped
psychologically to cope with the interrogation situation, or experience
or temperament may have been a significant factor.
Another prevailing assumption has been that those with more
education assert their constitutional rights more effectively, due to
greater knowledge of the law or greater understanding of the warnings. In a recent study of the interrogations of 21 draft protestors seven of whom were members of the Yale faculty or staff and 11
of whom were graduate and professional students52 - the authors
concluded that the suspects knew little or nothing about their constitutional rights during interrogation: "In spite of their superior
education, few of the suspects knew their rights in even the grossest
outline."' 3 The authors also found that the FBI warnings did not
in any satisfactory way communicate their constitutional rights to
4
them.
Arguably, this Yale study focused on an anomalous sample, and
for this reason the results of the study could be misleading. The
suspects, whose conduct was examined, were middle-class civil disobedients who openly defied the selective service law as a matter of
51 See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
52 Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protestors,
77 YALE L.J. 300, 305 (1967).
53Id. at 305-06.
54Id. at 310-11.
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conscience. They were proud of their activity and presumably could
be expected to communicate their experience readily.5"
Nonetheless, the Denver County Jail sample comes closer to
substantiating the views expressed in the Yale Law Journal than the
prevailing assumptions about the effects of education. The finding
presented in Table 3 was that those with more than 10 years of
school were more likely to make statements than those with less
than 10 years of school and were about equally likely to confess
to the charges. If the sample is representative, there would appear
to be little or no advantage to the suspect resulting from his superior
education. It is interesting to note that the Denver police detectives
feel that they generally get more information from educated middle56
class suspects.
TABLE 3
Education and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Years of
Education

2-10
11-14
TOTAL N*

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

63.6%
(14)
75.0%
(12)

36.4%
(8)
25.0%
(4)

100.0%
(22)
100.0%
(16)

31.8%
(7)
31.3%
(5)

68.2%
(15)
68.7%
(11)

100.0%
(22)
100.0%
(16)

(26)

(12)

(38)

(12)

(26)

(38)

*Number of suspects interviewed.

A third background factor which has been used by judges to
impute knowledge to a suspect is his number of previous arrests and
felony convictions. The assumption here was that if the suspect has
had a substantial number of previous experiences with the criminal
process, he will be more knowledgeable about his rights and more
willing to assert them. As indicated in Table 4, however, those with
fewer than eight arrests made about the same number of statements
as those with more, but those with less than eight arrests had a
slightly greater tendency to confess than those with more arrests.
As indicated in Table 5, those with fewer previous felony convictions
had a slightly greater tendency to make statements and confessions
than those with more previous felony convictions.
5s The

5

authors also contend that the educated middle-class suspect feels a taboo against
rudeness which allegedly makes him reluctant to tell the interrogator that he does not
want to talk. These suspects treat interrogation as a social situation, and they treat the
interrogator as if they are meeting a new acquaintance. For instance, one of the more
knowledgeable and courageous suspects who took part in their study, asserted his fifth
amendment rights and refused to talk with an FBI interrogator. Before doing so, however,
he apologized for invoking the fifth amendment and implied that he would have
preferred to speak with the interrogator! Id. at 315.
Interview with Paul Montoya, Lieutenant, Denver Police Department, June 22, 1969.
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TABLE 4
Previous Arrests and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Number of
Previous Arrests

0-8
9 Plus
TOTAL No

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

70.4%
(19)
71.4%
(15)

29.6%
(8)
28.6%
(6)

100.0%
(27)
100.0%
(21)

33.3%
(9)
28.6%
(6)

66.7%
(18)
71.4%
(15)

100.0%
(27)
100.0%
(21)

(48)

(15)

(33)

(48)

(34)

(14)

*Number of suspects interviewed.

TABLE

5

Previous Felony Convictions and the Making of a Statement or Confession
Number of Previous
Felony Convictions

Made Statement

Made Confession

Yes

No

Total

Yes

No

Total

0-1

69.7%
(23)

30.3%
(10)

100.0%
(33)

33.3%
(11)

66.7%
(22)

100.0%
(33)

2-5

64.3%
(9)

35.7%
(5)

100.0%
(14)

28.6%
(4)

71.4%
(10)

100.0%
(14)

(32)

(15)

(47)

(15)

(32)

(47)

TOTAL NO
*Number of suspects interviewed.

These relationships, except with respect to education, go in the
direction which is consistent with the prevailing assumptions, but the
relationships do not appear to be very strong. A few suspects may
be in a slightly better position to assert their constitutional rights
because of age or previous experience with the criminal justice
system; but there is no basis here to assert that they generally have
a significant advantage. Also, it is not clear whether the slightly
better performance of the suspects with more arrests and felony
convictions can be attributed to greater knowledge of their rights,
psychological advantages, more experience, a generally defiant attitude,
or a combination of these factors.
3. Effect of Promises and Threats: Inducements to Waive
Constitutional Rights
It can be argued that knowledge is not ordinarily the most
crucial variable in human decisionmaking. Most of our conduct and
a large part of our decisionmaking may be controlled more by such
factors as conditioning, instinct, and what we believe is expected
of us. If most human decisions are influenced more heavily by these
factors than by the thought processes, then it may be chimerical and
deluding to expect the suspect to capitalize on his knowledge of
rights. If anything, less rationality should be expected of him because
he is in a high-pressure, crisis-laden situation which is hardly con-
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ducive to rational decisionmaking. 57 Perhaps what is required during
interrogation under these conditions is close knowledge of the institutions and personalities of the criminal justice system, and few of the
suspects had or could be expected to have had the benefit of this kind
of knowledge.5"
If the knowledge communicated to the suspect by the Miranda
warning is inadequate to protect his rights and not a useful asset
to him during the interrogation, and if the knowledge, attitudes, or
temperament which come with age and experience have only a
slightly more significant impact on the suspect's decision to talk, then
perhaps the psychological pressures of the interrogation room of
which the Miranda Court spoke are still operative as the major factors
effecting the suspect's decision to talk. These psychological tactics
and strategies were clearly deemed by the Court to constitute compulsion within the meaning of the fifth amendment.59 Insofar as they
involve direct promises and threats, they also violate the common law
doctrine prohibiting promises and threats and later rules having the
same effect. ° The psychological tactics and strategies of the police
will be discussed in a later section of this article.6 ' This section will
discuss briefly, from the suspect's point of view, the promises and
threats which served as inducements to them to waive their constitutional rights and talk.
To the extent that the suspects' answers were credible in this
regard, the results of the interviews with the suspects at the Denver
County Jail indicate that promises and threats are frequently used
by the interrogators at the Denver Police Department as a means to
secure statements and confessions from the suspects and are occasionally used to induce them to sign the waiver provision of the
warning form.62 Half of the suspects who had been questioned at
the Denver Police Department (23 out of 46) described specific
statements made by their interrogators which can be classified as
promises and threats. For example, many of the suspects at the
Denver County Jail claimed that they had been told that if they
did not talk or sign the waiver form they would be charged with
more serious crimes. Specific illustrations of promises and threats
67Miranda-type warnings cannot "eliminate whatever 'inherently coercive atmosphere' the
police station may have." Interrogations,supra note 36 at 1613.
58 Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 655-56 (1967). See also Faculty Note, supra note 52.
59 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
60 Courts have often held that the use of promises and threats as inducements to confess
violates the voluntariness standard. 3 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 825-26 (3d ed. 1940);
Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 954-84 (1966).
61 See text, § III infra.
62 Specific examples of promises and threats reported by the suspects are presented in
Appendix A infra.
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reported are presented in Appendix A infra. Thirty-one percent of
the suspects (six out of 19)

explicitly mentioned the promises and

threats when they were asked to describe their primary reasons for
talking to the police. Specific illustrations of these and other reasons
for talking to the police are presented in Appendix B infra. At least
in these cases the influence of the inducements on the suspects'
decisions to talk appears to have been substantial.
The significance of the existence of promises and threats in the
interrogcation process cannot be overstated. First, the use of promises
and threats in interrogation clearly constitutes compulsion within the
meaning of the fifth amendment and can effectively preclude the
effective exercise of both the privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel in interrogation."3
Second, the use of such tactics violates the doctrine of voluntariness which has traditionally been applied in determining the admis64
sibility of a confession. As early as 1783 in King v. Warickshall,
an English court held that confessions which are obtained in consequence of promises or threats may not be admitted into evidence. 6"
In 1897 in Brain v. United States,"' the United States Supreme Court
stated that,
a confession in order to be admissible must be free and voluntary;
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor

obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the

exertion of any improper influence. . . .A confession can never be
received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any
threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner,
and therefore67excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has
been exerted.
Although the Court's later conclusion that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination "was but a crystallization of the

doctrine as to confessions," 6

has been called simply erroneous,6 9

nevertheless, promises and threats violate both the common law
doctrine of voluntariness and the more recent interpretations of the
fifth amendment. 7 °
One can gain additional insight into the effects of promises and
threats in the interrogation room if he compares their use to the
6aSee Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964)

and cases cited therein; F. INBAU &

REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 191-94 (1967);
THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 11 (1967). See also text, § II(D) infra.
64 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
65

1d. at 235.

66168 U.S. 532 (1897).
67

Id. at 542-43 (quoting from 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.)).

68Id. at 543.

69 Developments in the Law - Confessions, supra note 60, at 960.
70 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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widespread practice of plea bargaining. 7 In plea bargaining 72a
promise of leniency is traded for the suspect's act of self-conviction,
and there is a general consensus that this sort of bargaining must
be upheld.73 The prosecutor makes an offer to the defense attorney
that if the suspect is willing to waive his right to trial and plead
guilty, the severity of the criminal process will be reduced. In both
"the interrogation room bargain" and the normal plea bargain a
legal right is forborne for an apparent benefit to the suspect. The
cost to the suspect in some instances may be the same-if he makes
a very damaging statement to the interrogator in response to a
promise, in effect, he may be convicting himself.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between plea bargaining as commonly practiced and the sort of bargaining that occurs
in the interrogation room. The surface similarities between the processes are quickly dispelled when they are evaluated in terms of the
protections which they offer the suspect. In the case of plea bargaining
the suspect is ordinarily represented by counsel, who in most instances
71

7

7

The practice of plea bargaining is generally acknowledged as being one of the most
significant processes in our administration of criminal justice. For a detailed discussion
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
of the process, see D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION -THE
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). See generally materials cited in NEWMAN, Id. at
78 n. 1: M. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUsTICE, 24-29, 85-87 (1961) ; Dash, Cracks in the
Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385 (1951); Miller, The Compromise
of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927); Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 '(1956) ; Polstein, How
to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAC. LAW. 35 (1962) ; Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas
Considered, 32 J. CalM. L.C. & P.S. 506 (1942); Vetri, Compromises by Prosecutors to
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964); Comment, Official Inducements to
Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CHI. L. RE1. 167, 181 (1964).
The types of leniency take various forms. In Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain justice, 46 J. CIUM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956), the author
categorized the types into four main groups: (1) charge reduction; (2) sentence
reduction; (3) concurrent charges; (4) dropped charges. Id. at 787. Besides the four
major groups there are innumerable variations, some of which are listed in Vetri, Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964). The
author stated:
Many other types of agreements are made with defendants to induce a
plea. These include promises not to prosecute co-defendants, promises to
arrange for the defendant or co-defendant to be incarcerated in a particular
prison, promises to have the defendant or co-defendant tried in a juvenile court,
recommendations for pre-sentence investigations, . . . and agreements not to
oppose probation. Promise of immunity by the prosecutor can also be used
to induce guilty pleas. Immunity can be promised with respect to some crimes
in order to obtain a plea on another crime. Technically, immunity promises
come within the scope of a promise to dismiss charges in an indictment, but
often the immunity relates to crimes not yet charged.
Id. at 866 n.7.
Sheer pragmatic considerations such as costs, personnel, facilities, and time dictate
that the process must continue. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1957). The procedure is not without its problems, however, as noted by Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions 64 MIcH L. REV. 1469 (1966): "[I1t is common knowledge that plea bargaining
frequently results in improper guilty pleas by innocent people. For example, a defendant
falsely accused of robbery may plead guilty to simple assault, rather than risk a robbery
conviction and a substantial prison term." Id. (emphasis added). See Comment, Official
Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CHI. L. REv.
167, 181 (1964).
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is able to distinguish between good and bad bargains."4 Generally,
tie defense attorney will evaluate the prosecution's authority and can
more realistically appraise the credibility of the promised benefit.
Another protection for the suspect in this process is that the prosecution and the defense counsels often have a working relationship
which may act to deter the prosecution from fully exploiting the
mistakes of his adversary. Finally, after an agreement has been
reached and approved by the court, it becomes enforceable. 5
In contrast, the suspect who bargains in the interrogation room
has none of these protections. He may not even be cognizant that
he is in a bargaining situation and that the cost of the promised
benefit is the relinquishment of a constitutional right. In many cases
he cannot effectively distinguish between good and bad bargains and
cannot evaluate the credibility of the threat or promise. He probably
has no working relationship with the interrogator, 76 and his adversary
may exploit his ignorance with impunity. Most importantly, the
agreement which is reached in the interrogation room has not been
sanctioned by the court and is unenforceable. Proving that it ever
took place may be impossible for the suspect.
If the suspect is to have the kind of effective right to counsel
which was envisioned by the Miranda court, he should not be asked
to "make a deal" with his interrogator nor be frightened or threatened into doing so. He should not be treated as if he were his own
counsel, nor should he be distracted from his right to have counsel
present during the questioning. The interrogation room is a singularly
inappropriate place for bargaining and only the most exceptional
suspect is qualified to engage in the bargaining process. Furthermore,
when the suspect is induced (either consciously or subconsciously) to
bargain away his right to counsel, his fifth amendment privilege
77
becomes impaired and ineffectual.
The results of this study appear to indicate that despite the
stringent common law rule prohibiting promises and threats and later
rules having the same effect,78 police interrogators still resort to

these tactics regularly. The continued presence of promises and threats
74

A survey conducted by Newman reported in 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956)7
supra note 72, revealed that approximately 50 percent of his sample were represented
by counsel. Of the other half, almost 50 percent of them were recidivists and had at
least some experience with the plea bargaining process. That, to some extent, would
vitiate the necessity for them to have counsel to interpret and distinguish the "good and
bad bargains."
75
See, e.g., United States ex el McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963);
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 258 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ; People v.
Cassiday, 90 Ill. App. 2d 132, 232 N.E.2d 795 (1967).
76 "Local" recidivists, however, may be an exception to this condition. See Newman, supra
note 72, at 784.
77 See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
78 See note 60 & text accompanying notes 63-70 supra.
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in the interrogation rooms of the Denver Police Station can probably
best be attributed to the difficulties in proving that they were ever
made. The problems of proof and reconstructing the events of the
interrogation room will be examined later in the study.7 9
D. Suspects and the Right to Counsel
The need for counsel in the interrogation room to protect the
suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is apparent from the findings reported above. The knowledge imparted
to the suspect by the required warning appears to be insufficient to
protect the suspect from the psychological tactics and strategies of
the police - the 'inherently compelling pressures" of the interrogation room. Further, if promises and threats are to be employed,
they should be employed under the watchful eye of an attorney, or
mediated by an attorney who is familiar with the rules of the game
and more able to negotiate a conscionable bargain.
Because in Miranda the Court itself realized the insufficiency
of a warning alone to protect the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, it held that the right to have counsel present at
the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the suspect's
rights.8 °
The most apparent possible problem with the Court's holding
in this regard is that the means adopted to protect the right to counsel
in the interrogation room is the same device which was to be employed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination -a
warning
to the suspect advising him of his rights."' If a rights warning is
insufficient to protect one right (as the Court admits and this study
confirms), it is possible that a similar warning would be insufficient
to protect the other right.
In order to ascertain whether or not the warnings adequately
apprised the suspects of their right to counsel, they were asked whether
or not they were cognizant at the time of questioning that they had
the right to see counsel before questioning and have him present during questioning. A surprisingly large 73 percent indicated that they
were cognizant of the right to counsel, although only approximately
one-half of the suspects remembered the right to counsel when they
were asked to state their recollections of the warnings. Furthermore,
10 percent of the suspects who stated that at the time of interrogation
they did not realize that they had the right to have counsel sit in
during interrogation claimed that they asked to see an attorney before
79See text, § IV infra.
80
See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
81See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
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questioning anyway. They appeared to have picked up enough from
the warnings to attempt to exercise a right which they did not fully
understand.
Thus it appears that most of the suspects were aware of their
sixth amendment right as it applied to interrogation. (The data suggest, however, that this was due not necessarily to the warnings in
many cases, but to the suspects' prior knowledge of their rights.)
It might be inferred that they were capable of exercising the right
to counsel.
Yet, 67 percent of the suspects asserted that they had requested
the presence of counsel during questioning while only 6 percent indicated that they were given the benefit of counsel .1 2 Although it might be
wise to view this latter statistic with some skepticism (since a few
of the suspects who were interviewed prior to trial may have perceived
this information as directly related to the defense of their case), the
statistic suggests that the police are able to somehow effectively frustrate the right to counsel, despite the suspects' knowledge of their
rights and their attempts to assert them.
One obvious tactic which is readily available to the police to
counter the suspects' knowledge or attempts to assert their right to
counsel is to induce the suspect to waive his right to counsel while
at the same time obtaining sufficient evidence to prove that the waiver
was "knowing and intelligent."8 In order to elucidate to some extent
the nature of the suspects' waivers of their right to counsel, consideration will be given to the interesting and enigmatic decisions made by
the 16 percent of the suspects who stated that they knew that the law
gave them the right to counsel during interrogation, but they decided
not to exercise that right. Ostensibly, these suspects made "knowing
and intelligent waivers" of the right to counsel; but before reaching
that conclusion, one should look at the factors which influenced their
decisions.
It has been suggested that the reason suspects who know of the
right to counsel do not request the presence of counsel before interrogation is that they have had previous experiences with incompetent
lawyers.84 While many of the suspects were critical of the quality of
legal representation which they had experienced in previous cases,
none of them suggested that they preferred not to have counsel. Every
suspect interviewed appeared to feel that in most situations any lawyer
is better than none at all.
Of these three suspects (6%), one was questioned by the FBI and one by the Colorado
Springs police.
8 Other tactics available to the police are discussed in § III infra.
84 The suggestion was made by Professor Robert 0. Dawson, University of Texas School
of Law, as a possible hypothesis for this study.
82
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The reason cited by four of the suspects for not exercising their
sixth amendment right was that although they knew that they theoretically had a legal right to counsel, they felt that the police would
not call a lawyer even if they requested one. Their own previous experiences and those of their friends had taught them that it would be an
exercise in futility. One of the suspects indicated that he could not
afford his own lawyer and felt that the police would not call the
public defender's office for him. Although he was not certain that
the police never call lawyers for nonindigent suspects, he stated that
there was no chance that a lawyer would be called to assist an indigent.
An explanation given by three suspects was that calling a lawyer
would slow things up. Two of the suspects referred specifically to the
cramped and uncomfortable conditions (no showers) at the city jail
and felt that if they did not call a lawyer, they would get to the more
habitable county jail sooner. The other indicated that he thought he
would be released soon because the evidence against him was not
strong enough to prosecute, and waiting for a lawyer would delay
the process.
Two of the suspects contended that the reason they did not exercise the right to counsel was the fear that the interrogators would
think that they were "wise guys" and police discretionary powers
would be used against them. In one case the suspect asserted that the
interrogator tried to dissuade him from calling a lawyer by telling
him that although he had the right to a lawyer, he'd be smarter if
he didn't call one. According to this suspect, the interrogator said
that "a lawyer would be expensive; he'd tell you that you could beat
this charge, but you can't." Both of the suspects explicitly stated that
they did not want to do anything which would make the interrogators
angry.
The other three suspects had three distinct explanations for their
conduct. One felt that his conscience demanded that he talk immediately without waiting for a lawyer; so he didn't bother to ask for one.
One stated that he didn't expect to say anything under any circumstances. As a result, he believed, a lawyer could not give him any
additional protection at that stage. And finally, one suspect who was
told that he was being charged with assault didn't want to bother with
a request for a lawyer because the charges were not serious. (The
victim died the next day and the charges were changed to voluntary
manslaughter.)
All of these suspects except one had signed the waiver provision
and all of them knew about the right to counsel and when it attaches.
None had asked for a lawyer. Judges would probably find "knowing
and intelligent waivers" in each of these cases, but it is submitted that
most of them are inappropriate for such a finding.
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The waiver should not apply to the first situation where the suspects knew their "theoretical" rights but felt they would be of no
practical value. The second situation is not appropriate for the waiver
because an entirely collateral matter (the condition of city jail) determined the outcome rather than any intelligent consideration of the
options which were available. Where the suspects were obviously
intimidated by their interrogators, their decision could not be "knowing
and intelligent"; and the suspect who was told that he was charged
with assault rather than voluntary manslaughter was in no position
to exercise his rights because he had no realistic conception of the
consequences of his decision.
The theory of the waiver may be consistent with only a few of
the actual decisions. The suspect who thought he was not going to
say anything anyway and the suspect who thought that the police did
not have enough to prosecute, irrespective of the ultimate validity of
these assertions, may have given their decisions the kind of attention
that the Miranda court envisioned. Waivers arguably could be found
here.
Whether a "knowing and intelligent waiver" took place in the case
of the suspect whose conscience demanded that he talk immediately
is a debatable question. On the one hand, his mental processes were
never activated and there was no consideration of alternatives. On
the other hand, he indicated that under all circumstances conscience
would be his only guide and the presence of a lawyer would probably not have affected his conduct during interrogation. He deliberately chose to follow his conscience and stated that he would do so
again even if the consequences were a long jail sentence.
In most of these situations the suspects' knowledge of their rights
did not enable or encourage them to protect those rights in any meaningful way. To label their conduct "knowing and intelligent waivers"
merely because they knew their rights and did not attempt to exercise
them is to rely on a fiction that is questionable in light of the actual
decisionmaking process. Judicial standards must be applicable to specific factual settings and should not gloss over and obscure the events
which transpire in the interrogation rooms.
If the courts are incapable of determining the subjective factors
which actually influence the suspects' choices, then they should explicitly recognize their inability to do so. The problem may be that
"the knowing and intelligent waiver" test purports to be subjective
as well as objective, but it may be applied only objectively. One cannot
tell what went on in a suspect's mind by looking at his signature on
a form or even by asking him whether or not he knew his rights. The
decisionmaking process is much too complex to be treated with such
vacuous formalism.
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The treatment of the right to counsel should include the police
response to the exercise of the right as well as the decision to exercise
it. The suspect's description of the police conduct should be examined
critically. Its value is that it gives some insight into his attitudes toward the police and an account of what happened in the interrogation
room. That the account may be highly partisan does not suggest that
it should be dismissed summarily.
Eighteen of the suspects who indicated that they had requested
counsel before or during interrogation were asked to describe the
response of the police to their requests. One had been questioned by
the FBI, one by the Colorado Springs police in Colorado Springs, and
the remaining 16 had all been questioned by the Denver police at the
Denver Police Station. Both the suspect who was interrogated by the
FBI and the one questioned by the Colorado Springs police indicated
that interrogation ended immediately after their requests for counsel
were made. Attorneys were contacted, and, after they had arrived, the
interrogations were continued.
In contrast, most of the suspects who were questioned at the
Denver Police Department were much more critical of the treatment
which they received. Fourteen of them stated that interrogation continued after their requests for counsel; no counsel ever appeared, and
to their knowledge no effort was made to contact an attorney on their
behalf. Some claimed that they were coaxed to talk even after they
had unequivocally stated that they would not do so until they had
spoken with an attorney. Many of these suspects asserted that the
interrogators ignored their requests for counsel, and a few claimed
that the interrogators actively tried to discourage them from exercising the right by insisting that an attorney would be of no assistance
to them or it would "just slow things up."
The 15th case is deserving of a brief separate explanation. The
suspect alleged that he indicated at the inception of his first interrogation that he would not talk or sign the waiver provision without
first consulting an attorney. He stated that he didn't have funds to
retain his own attorney and asked the interrogator to contact one for
him. The questioning ceased immediately and he claimed that he was
assured that a lawyer would be called to speak with him. Four days
passed. No attorney came.
On the fifth day he was taken into the interrogation room
again.8 5 When the suspect stated that no attorney had contacted him,
85 In Miranda the Court stated: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at an), time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
Quaere whether or not a re-interrogation in this situation in and of itself constitutes
a violation of Miranda.
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the interrogator acted surprised.8 6 However, without making any effort
to contact one, he asked the suspect if he had changed his mind and
had decided to sign the waiver provision and talk. The suspect was
tired of sitting around the jail. So he wrote out and signed a confession for burglary. This was his first arrest and first interrogation
experience.
In only one case did a suspect who was questioned at the Denver
Police Department state that the police complied with his request for
an attorney. The questioning stopped immediately after the request.
It was not continued until after the suspect had had the opportunity
to consult with counsel.
While the suspects' descriptions may not be taken at face value,
there is some support for them. Two of the attorneys at the Denver
Public Defender's office stated that although calls regularly come
into the Public Defender's office in response to requests for the presence of counsel at lineups, the office is seldom called to furnish
counsel to be present during interrogations.8 7
There are two possible explanations for the willingness of the
Denver police to call the Public Defender's office to furnish counsel
for lineups and their reluctance to do so for interrogation. The first
is that the role of counsel during identification proceedings is passive,
whereas counsel at interrogation can act immediately to determine the
outcome. The suspect must appear in the lineup, and a lawyer cannot
advise him not to do so. If counsel feels that the lineup is unfair, he has
no means to correct that situation at the police station. Furthermore, at
the Denver Police Station, counsel at a lineup identification was not
until recently even permitted to hear the remarks of the witness when
he makes the identification, although knowledge of these remarks
would often benefit him in cross-examination."8 While counsel's role
at a lineup is exclusively observational, a lawyer can exercise an immediate and decisive influence over the outcome of interrogation by advising his client not to make a statement.
A second explanation for police willingness to contact counsel
for lineups and their reluctance to contact Miranda counsel is that the
86Joe Quinn of the Public Defender's Office suggests three possible explanations of this
situation: (1) The suspect was not taken before a county judge pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, with the intent or effect of gaining psychological advantage over the suspect. (2) The suspect was taken before a county judge for
a judicial advisement, but no attorney was contacted for him. (3) A call was placed to
the Public Defender's Office by a matron at the city jail, but because of heavy workloads, the attorney on jail duty for that day did not respond to the call. Interview with
Joe Quinn, Assistant Public Defender, May 22, 1970, Office of the Colorado Public
Defender, Denver, Colorado.
87 Conversation with Bryan Morgan, Assistant Public Defender and Interview with Joe
Quinn, Assistant Public Defender, August 14, 1969, Office of the Public Defender.
Denver, Colorado.
88Braxton v. Phillips, No. 7514 (Dist. Ct. Denver, Oct. 2, 1968) (Public Defender's
office obtained an injunction prohibiting police from conducting lineups unless and
until defense attorneys were allowed to hear the remarks of witnesses).
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judiciary has used much more stringent standards in overseeing the
implementation of United States v. Wade 9 than Miranda. If counsel
is not present at a lineup, the Colorado district court judges have
shown a strong inclination to exclude the identification from evidence. In contrast, the absence of counsel during interrogation is
ordinarily given little weight per se in determining the admissibility
of a statement.
The public defenders argue that efforts at interrogations by the
Denver police do not end merely because the suspect has expressed
his desire to see counsel before answering any questions."
At first blush it appeared that most of the suspects knew about
their right to counsel- it seems to follow that they can effectively
exercise it. On closer examination it becomes apparent that knowledge
of the existence of the right is not enough. The first difficulty is that
some of the suspects who knew about the existence of the right did
not try to exercise it. A consideration of the factors which influenced
their decisions leads to the conclusion that many of the decisions were
affected by the kinds of psychological pressures that the Supreme
Court hoped to exclude (or at least mitigate) from the interrogation
room through the implementation of Miranda.
A second problem is that, to the extent that the suspects' descriptions are credible, the Denver Police Department often frustrates the
exercise of the right to counsel even after the suspect has tried to
assert it. From the suspects' point of view, they were dependent upon
the police to protect their sixth amendment right, and the police exploited this dependency. Most of the suspects could protect their right
to counsel, if anywhere, only in the courtroom since the court could
suppress a statement by resorting to the exclusionary rule. Few of the
suspects believed that the right to counsel was of much value to them
in the interrogation rooms of the Denver Police Station.9 '
E. Knowing and Intelligent I'aiver of Constitutional Rights
After holding that the right to counsel is indispensable to the
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination (and that the
suspect must accordingly be further warned of the right to counsel),
the Court in Miranda held that if the interrogation continues in the
absence of counsel, a heavy burden rests upon the prosecution to establish a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of both the privilege against
89 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
90

See note 87 supra.

91 However, one sophisticated suspect, who was interviewed in connection with the Wash-

ington, D. C. study of Miranda, would rather protect his right to counsel only in the
courtroom. He observed, "I wouldn't want [a lawyer in the interrogation room]. That's
the worst place to have a lawyer because the police play it straight then. I wanted them
to make a mistake." Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 49, at 1378.
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self-incrimination and the right to counsel.9 The results of this study
suggest that knowing and intelligent waivers of the privilege against
self-incrimination do not occur very often among suspects because the
knowledge of rights imparted by the warning is not extensive and not
sufficient to allow the suspect to effectively exercise the privilege.
The data further suggest that knowing and intelligent waivers of the
right to counsel are not extremely prevalent among suspects because
a large number of them claim to have had this right frustrated by
the police, and many of those who admit to having waived the right
did so apparently because of psychological pressures. Yet the great
majority of suspects interviewed had signed the waiver of rights provision which is included on the rights warning form. Some of the
information collected in the interviews sheds light on the question
of why so many suspects were willing to sign the waiver of rights
provision. The suspects were asked whether or not the signing of the
waiver form (in either place on the form) could have any legal effect.
The purpose here was to determine the general impressions of the
suspect with respect to the nature of the form and the degree of significance which they probably attached to it during the interrogation.
The question was intentionally open ended and may have been somewhat ambiguous.9 3
To the extent that their responses to the question reflected their
actual impressions of the significance of the form, the suspects' perceptions of the form were for the most part astonishingly naive.
Approximately 60 percent of the suspects thought that under no circumstances could their signatures on it have any legal effect. 94
The majority of the suspects appeared to have substantially underrated the significance of signing the warning form. Fifty-four percent
of all of them stated that they signed both parts of the form including
the waiver of rights provision, and 21 percent did not even remember
whether they had signed the form or not. It was inferred from their
comments about the form and their conduct that they saw it as a
merely mechanical device - a formality. Relatively few of the suspects distinguished between the first provision which indicated only
that they had been warned and the second which indicated that they
92 See note 28 & text accompanying note
93

9

10 supra.
While its ambiguity may have been problematic for the suspects, it was felt that a
more specific and precise question with respect to the legal effect of the form might
lead the suspects to consider issues which they had not considered during interrogation.
The latter evil seemed to be greater than the former. As a protective measure, if the
suspects appeared to be bothered by the ambiguity of the question and seemed to associate any possible legal significance with the form, their responses were recorded in such
a manner as to indicate that they believed that a signature on it could have a legal effect.
The presence or absence of signatures on the form is very frequently given determinative
weight by the judges in Miranda hearings in deciding whether or not to admit the
defendant's statement. See text, at 44 infra & Neitz v. People, 462 P.2d 498 (Colo.
1969) (illustrating the significance of the waiver form).
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were voluntarily choosing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. When this distinction was brought to their attention, most
appeared to be confronting it for the first time.
Twenty-five percent of the suspects stated that they refused to
sign either any place on the form or one of its provisions. A few
indicated that the reason they refused to do so was because of possible
legal significance. However, it also appeared that these suspects tended
to be much less cooperative in general than the others. Their entire
response to the interrogation process was different. As indicated in
Table 6, those who refused to sign both provisions or only one provision were much less likely to make any statement or confession than
those who did not.
TABLE

6

Signing of Waiver Form and Making of a Statement or Confession
Made Statement*
Signed Waiver Form

Yes

Yes

81.0%

No

20.0%
(2)

(17)

TOTAL N.

(19)

No

19.0%

(4)

Made Confessiont
Total

100.0%

(21)

Yes

52.4%

(11)

80.0%
(8)

100.0%
(10)

10.0%
(1)

(12)

(31)

(12)

No

Total

47.6%

100.0%

(10)

(21)

90.0%
(9)

100.0%
(0)

(19)

(31)

tNumber of suspects interviewed.
*Chi Square significant at .002 level.
tChi Square significant at .025 level.

In sum, those who sign the waiver form generally do not understand the nature of their act, and those who refuse to sign are less
cooperative generally in their interrogations. The effect of a signed
waiver form on the judicial determination of "knowing and intelligent
waiver" will be considered later in this report. 5
Il1.

THE POLICE RESPONSE TO

Miranda: THEIR

ATTITUDES

AND CONDUCT IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM

Although Miranda may have been intended ultimately to effect
the nature of the suspect's role in the interrogation room, the decision
addressed itself directly to the conduct of the police with respect to
the suspect. Basically, the police are required to warn the suspect of
his fifth and sixth amendment rights as they apply to the interrogation process, and if the interrogation continues in the absence of
counsel, the prosecution must assume the heavy burden of establishing that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived both his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel." The purpose of these
95 Id. See also text, § IV(B) infra.

9 See text accompanying notes 3-10 supra.

1970

POLICE INTERROGATION IN COLORADO

requirements was purportedly to allow the suspect to overcome or
effectively counter the police strategies and tactics which are designed
to elicit a statement or confession from the suspect- the inherently
compelling pressures of the interrogation room. The purpose of this
section will be to examine the police response to the Miranda requirements in terms of their attitudes, goals, strategies and tactics in the
interrogation game.
A. Methodology
In order to gain insight into the police conduct of interrogations,
two brief, informal interviews were conducted with interrogators of
the Denver Police Department. More specifically, these interviews
were designed to elicit information with respect to the goals of the
interrogators and their attitudes toward the use of psychological tactics
and strategies to accomplish these goals. The purpose of the interrogation room observations which followed was to confirm the existence
of the goals, strategies, and tactics which were implied by the attitudes
of the police, and to examine the nature and effect of the strategies
and tactics in action. 7
Since it was possible for the observer to sit in on only eight
interrogations, the experience inside the interrogation room was quite
limited and serves only as a means to suggest some of the problems
which arise there. 8 Furthermore, the eight interrogations which were
witnessed may not have been entirely representative. None of them
involved extremely serious felonies, such as murder and rape. Among
the charges which had been filed on these suspects were assault on
a police officer, attempted burglary, robbery, and assault with a deadly
weapon. Also, two of the cases involved family disturbances. As a
result, it is possible that the interrogators did not press for confessions
as hard as in some other instances in which the charges were more
severe.
Before each of the eight interrogations the observer was introduced to the interrogator by his division chief as a student who had
a Ford Foundation grant to study the criminal justice process. In five
instances the interrogators were friendly and receptive and appeared
not be inhibited by the observer's presence. In three cases, however,
the interrogators appeared to be annoyed with the prospect of having
their work observed. Although none of them voiced an immediate
protest to their superiors, apparently two of them later expressed mis97 These investigations were conducted during July and August, 1969.
98 In Denver, unlike New Haven, the police and district attorney's office do not have an

open door policy with respect to observation by outsiders. They permitted the observations for only a short time and even then, with some reluctance. The position taken by
the district attorney's office was that the presence of an outsider in the interrogation
room interferes with the rights of the suspect.
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givings to their division chief about the wisdom of allowing the observations. Furthermore, unlike the New Haven study,99 the observations
at the Denver Police Station did not last long enough for the interrogators to become familiar with the observor and accustomed to his
presence. Thus, it is quite possible that their conduct during the questioning was inhibited by the presence of an outsider.
In each instance the observer and interrogator (in a few cases
two interrogators) entered the room together. They sat with the
suspect at a table and were similarly attired. The observer was introduced to the suspect only by name, and the suspect was not informed
that an outsider was present. Nor was the suspect asked whether or
not he would permit the observation. From all indications, the suspect
probably viewed the observer as another policeman. While the conduct of the interrogator may have been influenced by the presence of
a third party, it appears highly unlikely that there was any such imfluence on the suspect.
B. Police Attitudes Toward Interrogation
Some of the literature which has been written about the police
discusses their dissatisfaction with the judiciary - particularly the
United States Supreme Court.' 00 According to Albert Reiss and David
Bordua, the police view court decisions to dismiss charges against a
defendant as a rejection of their own decisions.'' The individual
policeman, being production-oriented, views an acquittal as his own
failure within the police system, or he may feel that the refusal of
the courts to convict rests on the most artificial of formalities.'
Finally, Reiss and Bordua contend that the displacement of the
policeman's position of authority when he testifies in court, "plus
the generalized lower prestige of police when taken together with
the institutionalized distrust of police built into the trial process
creates a situation where the police not only feel themselves balked
by the courts but perhaps, even more fundamentally, feel themselves
03
dishonored."'
The discussions at the Denver Police Station appear to confirm
the existence of the policeman's dissatisfaction with the judiciary. For
instance, one assistant division chief contends that in cases since
99For a description of the Yale study, in which the observers in the New Haven Police

Station gradually developed a close rapport with the New Haven police, see Interrogations, supra note 36, at 1531-32.
100 See, e.g., Reiss & Bordua, Environment and Organization:A Perspective on the Police, in
THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25, 32-40 (D. Bordua ed. 1967); J. WILSON,
VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 52 (1968).

101 Reiss & Bordua, supra note 100, at 33.
102 id. at 37.
10 3

Id. at 39.

1970

POLICE INTERROGATION IN COLORADO

Gideon,10 4 the United States Supreme Court has gone much too far
in extending the procedural rights of the suspects. He is particularly
critical of the court's extension of the right to counsel at the pretrial
stages because he feels that when it is exercised, it interferes with
"proper" law enforcement. He believes that the effect of having
counsel present is to suppress the truth, since lawyers generally advise
their clients not to say anything, and that the extension of the right
to counsel in the interrogation room is just one instance in which the
Supreme Court has displayed excessive concern with individual rights
and a great insensitivity to the needs of society.
A number of the interrogators were questioned informally with
regard to their goals and strategies during the interrogation period.
The interrogators uniformly appeared to be concerned with accomplishing two goals. The first was to get the suspect to sign the waiver
provision after warning him of his rights, and the second was to get
him to talk whenever possible. A few of them indicated that if a
suspect is reluctant to sign the form or to talk, then it would be permissible to give him some mild encouragement to do so. They felt
that various incentives might be legitimately used to accomplish their
objectives but did not specify exactly the kinds of encouragement
which are permissible. The interrogators unanimously believed that
the warnings must be given in order to have the statement admitted
into evidence at trial. However, once that duty has been fulfilled,
some of them felt that they have wide latitude in inducing the suspect
to waive his rights.
For the most part, they appeared to have adopted the same attitudes as the authors of the police interrogation manuals, but their
strategies were not as highly developed." °5 The manuals suggest a
systematic analysis of the suspect's emotional state and a concerted
intellectual effort to develop specialized strategies for manipulating
his emotions. According to the manuals, the interrogator's objective
should be to elicit incriminating statements after crumbling the defenses of the suspect."0 ' Among the tactics prescribed to accomplish
this goal are the following: calling attention to the subject's physiological and psychological symptoms of guilt, Mutt and Jeff routines,
building the subject up and tearing him down, bluffing, compounding
falsehoods, confusing the suspect with kindness, and other tactics
based on "indirect emotional subterfuge."'0 7
104

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

105 See

generally F. INBAU &

J.

REID, CRIMINAL

INTERROGATION

AND

CONFESSIONS

(1967); A. AUBRY & R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1965).
106AUBRY & CAPUTO, supra note 105, at 31.
107 For a comprehensive description of prescribed police strategies and tactics in the interrogation room. see generally INBAU, supra note 105, and AUBRY & CAPUTO, note 105, at
75-99.
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While the Denver police interrogators often appeal to the suspects' emotions through sympathy, kindness or anger, they seem to
rely more on "common sense" psychology than on the kind of systematic analysis and subtle psychological strategy which is suggested by
the manuals. Although their tactics are neither as specialized nor as
sophisticated as those presented in the manuals, they know how to
get what they want from the suspect during interrogation.
The strategy of one interrogator differed at least in one respect
from the police manuals. While the manuals indicate the crucial importance of a confession or admission,' 08 he was generally satisfied
when he could get any statement from the suspect which could be
used for impeachment in court. He further indicated that he is willing
to exert some pressure when he believes that he needs the evidence
for conviction but will "go easier" when there is sufficient evidence
to convict without it. When a confession is definitely needed for a
conviction, he is especially careful to encourage the suspect to sign
the waiver provision. Once he gets the waiver signature, he attempts
to induce the suspect to forget about the warnings by asking simple
questions which few suspects find objectionable such as age, address,
and phone number. Only after the suspect has been distracted from
his rights, does he ask about the facts of the alleged crime.
The interrogators all appeared to recognize the value of using
common sense" psychology in the interrogtion room. Although they
never spoke in terms of the complex psychological theories articulated
in the police manuals, they felt it was very important to be sensitive
to the particular forces which were working on the suspect.""9 They
stated that they thought sympathy tactics in many situations are especially successful in getting the suspects to talk. One indicated that he
likes to impugn the character of the victim in some crimes against the
person cases because this "helps the suspect justify his actions to himself and makes him more willing to discuss them." Another indicated
that he tries to present himself as the suspect's "friend" because he
often is able to get better results, particularly with inexperienced
suspects.
C. Observationsin the Interrogation Room
The purpose of the observations in the interrogation room was
to confirm the existence of the goals, strategies and tactics which were
implied by the attitudes of the police and to examine the nature and
effect of the strategies and tactics in action. In order to illustrate the
108 Cf. AUBRY & CAPUTO, Supra note 104, at 21.
109

For more subtle psychological strategies in the interrogation room, see generally AuBRY
& CAPUTO, supra note 105, at 75.
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findings, a few of the eight interrogations which were observed will
be described in some detail.
On June 26, 1969, a Spanish-American suspect was questioned
regarding an attempted burglary. The suspect was in his early twenties
and had a long list of previous arrests. According to the interrogator,
the police had insufficient evidence to give them "probable cause"
on this charge, but the suspect was also being held on another charge
-

failure to appear.

Without encouragement, the suspect signed the waiver form, but
after what appeared to be momentary indecision, he stated that he
did not want to talk. The interrogator appeared to be interested in
assisting the suspect and spoke in a friendly tone. He made the following statement: "You're in jail now; if you want to talk, the entire
matter might be cleared up before your case gets to court." The suspect repeated his statement that he did not want to talk. At that point
the questioning ceased, and he was returned to his cell.
On June 27, 1969, an interrogator questioned an Eskimo charged
with assault with a deadly weapon. The suspect was alleged to have
stabbed his wife with a knife. He had no previous experience with
the criminal justice system, no previous arrests, and signed the waiver
form without any encouragement.
Immediately after the suspect signed the waiver form, the interrogator stated, "I would appreciate it very much if you would tell me
exactly what happened last night." Again, the interrogator's tone was
friendly and familiar. He suggested to the suspect that he often has
problems with his own wife. The suspect admitted that he had come
home drunk but denied that he had a knife and denied knowledge
of the stabbing. Despite this denial, the detective asked, "Where did
you have the knife?" The suspect repeated his previous answer.
After the interrogation the detective stated privately that he often
repeats questions which have been answered negatively, because it
sometimes "trips the suspect up" and gives the interrogator "a psychological advantage." He also indicated that he seldom has difficulty
in getting suspects in family disturbance cases to talk, because they
are almost invariably vulnerable to sympathy tactics and want to get
their problems off their chest. In this interrogation the suspect appeared to view the interrogator as a friend, and despite repeated questions and denials concerning the knife, he did not appear to recognize
the adversary nature of the relationship.
On June 30, 1969, a Spanish-American youth was questioned with
respect to an aggravated assault charge which had not been filed at the
time of questioning. The youth had been arrested a number of times
before and had a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. Before
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the interrogation on the morning of the 30th, the suspect had twice
been warned of his rights. In each instance he had refused to sign
the waiver provision and had refused to talk. The interrogator asked
him for the third time whether he finally had decided "to cooperate"
by signing the form and talking. The suspect said that he had changed
his mind and was now willing to do so. He signed both provisions
of the advisement form.
In response to the interrogator's questions the suspect admitted
that he had had a gun on his person but denied that he had taken it
out of his pocket. The interrogator then asked the suspect the hypothetical question: "Would you ever shoot anyone?" The response was
that in some situations he would "possibly do so." The suspect also
volunteered the statement that the arresting detective had told another
detective who was present at the time of the arrest that he wanted
"to pin an aggravated assault rap on him and get him sent to jail for
a few years." When asked later why he did not record this statement
along with the others, the interrogator gave two reasons. First, "it was
a lie." Second, "it has no relevance to the facts."
In another interrogation which took place on June 30th, a suspect
charged with robbery refused to sign the waiver provision and asked
for a lawyer. The interrogator's response was that a lawyer wouldn't
help him and that he ought to be more cooperative. The suspect appeared to be intransigent, and the interrogator concluded that further
attempts to question him would be futile. The questioning ceased, and
the suspect was permitted to return to his cell.
The observations in the interrogation room of the Denver Police
Department were singularly unastounding - and certainly less dramatic than the practices described by the suspects at the County Jail.
Any possible legal defects involved (promises, threats, or even mild
encouragements) were so ambiguous or subtle that they possibly could
not be shown to have violated "due process" as that standard has been
traditionally interpreted.
However, certain observations can be made about the interrogators'
techniques. First, the interrogators seemed to be aware of and willing to
utilize various tactics to influence the suspect - to "encourage" him
to talk. One interrogator emphasized his own desire for the suspect
to speak with him. One suggested that it would help the suspect to
talk. Further, hypothetical questions were asked which were designed
to elicit incriminating answers.
A second observation is that the tactics used by the interrogators
were used not only to elicit statements, but were used also to accomplish the stated goal of obtaining waivers of rights from the suspects.
One suspect was presented with two additional warning forms after
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he had explicitly refused to sign the first, and he was asked three
times whether or not he wanted to talk. Another was advised that it
would be better not exercise the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Third, it appears that most interrogations are conducted "in private," without a witness present, and one of the interrogators recorded
only those parts of the suspect's statement which incriminated him
and omitted the exculpatory portion because "it was not relevant"
or "it was a lie."

That the use of these or any tactics at all was mild during the
observations, of course, leaves a significant question unanswered. However, there are two indications that an accurate picture of the use of
tactics and psychological pressures lies somewhere between what was
observed and what was reported by the suspects in the County Jail.
First, the cases were not very important, and a number of the interrogators explicitly stated afterwards that they did not care whether or
not the suspects talked. Second, there were some indications that a
few of the interrogators were inhibited by the presence of an outsider
and would have exerted more pressure in his absence. If this is the
case, then the practices described here may understate the severity of
the pressures exerted generally during interrogations at the Denver
Police Station.
IV. THE Miranda HEARING AND THE PROBLEMS OF PROOF

Thus far the focus has been on the interrogation room-an
attempt to describe and analyze the impact of Miranda on the roles
of the suspect and the interrogator in the interrogation process. However, the interrogation contest is often ultimately resolved in the courtroom. In Colorado the judge, during a private hearing in chambers.
makes a finding of fact and law with regard to the admissibility of
a statement or confession. If the court finds that the statement is
admissible, then it may be introduced into evidence, and the jury
determines the veight which will be given to it."' The Miranda
hearing thus serves as the only formal link between the events which
transpire in the interrogation room and the body of law designed to
control those events.
In order to examine to a limited extent the judicial response to
Airanda in Colorado and the relationship of that response to the
interrogation process, some Miranda hearings were observed.
A. Some Observations of a Miranda Hearing

In an article in the Columbia Lau, Review, Sheldon Elsen and
Arthur Rosett describe the events of typical Miranda hearings."' They
"0 Compton v. People, 444 P.2d 263, 266 (Colo. 1968).
M Elsen & Rosett, supra note 58.
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assert that in most cases the prosecution will contend that the suspect
waived his rights, that he did so without any inducements, and that

his waiver was "knowing and intelligent."11' 2 According to Elsen and
Rosett, when the defendant takes issue with these allegations of the
prosecution and the testimony is conflicting, the defendant ordinarily
has little chance. One of the defendant's disadvantages will be his
criminal record in most cases,' 3 and the court will take judicial notice
of it. A second disadvantage is that the judges recognize that confessions are generally accurate, and a third is that judges face political
pressure to convict. The result is that when the allegations at the
hearings are "contradictory, ambiguous, or ambivalent" (as they frequently are), the judges are likely to decide in favor of the law
14
enforcement officials.
Too few suppression hearings were observed in this study to confirm or disconfirm the interpretations of Elsen and Rosett as they

apply to Colorado. However, the hearings which were observed suggest some of the possible problems inherent in the judicial response

to Miranda, and one hearing will be described for purposes of illustrating some of these problems.
Donald Everett Carroll was charged with murder and was tried
in the courtroom of Judge Robert Kingsley in August of 1969.115
Carroll was questioned at the Denver Police Station one morning at
2:30 a.m. shortly after he was picked up at a bar. During the subsequent Miranda hearing, he claimed that he had been intoxicated at
the time of questioning because he had consumed "approximately
fifteen drinks and some pills" during the evening. His interrogators

admitted that the defendant looked "as if he had done a lot of drinking," when questioned, but they denied that he was intoxicated.
The prosecution and the defense agreed that Carroll had refused
to sign the first Miranda form presented to him and that he had
stated that he did not want to talk. Carroll claimed that he requested
an attorney at that point, but his interrogators denied that any such
request had been made. Moreover, both sides agreed that after he
refused to sign the first warning form, Carroll was kept in the interrogation room for approximately 15 minutes. The prosecution claimed
that after this period of time had expired, Carroll on his own initiative decided that he wanted to talk and would sign the warning form.
When asked by the defense why the defendant was still sitting in the
112 Id. at 658-59.
113The criminal record is relevant to show that the defendant has prior experience with the

criminal justice system and therefore, probable knowledge of his rights.
& Rosett, supra note 58, at 659.
115 People v. Carroll, No. 60679 (Dist. Ct. Denver, August 2, 1969), appeal docketed.
No. 24461 (Sup. Ct. Colo., Nov. 4, 1969).
114 Elen
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interrogation room 15 minutes after he had refused to talk, the police
answered that they were filling out some papers.
The arguments for the defense were as follows: Carroll was
intoxicated when questioned. He had consumed 15 drinks before questioning and testified that he was drunk. Under rule 5(A) (2) of the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure he should have been brought
before a county judge before questioning to determine whether or not
he was intoxicated. ." 6 The suspect requested counsel before questioning. His statement on the first waiver form indicated that he didn't
want to talk. Once he stated that he refused to talk, he should have
been removed from the interrogation room. Finally, he was not informed that he was charged with murder when questioned.
Against the objection of the defense the prosecution was permitted to introduce Carroll's criminal record into evidence. The defense pointed out that all of Carroll's previous arrests had occurred
before Miranda had taken effect.'17 Judge Kingsley admitted the
record into evidence.
The court's finding was that there was "a knowing and intelligent
waiver" and that the statement of the defendant was admissible into
evidence. The court found that the suspect was not intoxicated when
he made the statement, and that the police had no duty to take him
before a county judge to decide this question. Judge Kingsley did not
believe that the suspect asked for counsel and felt that a 15-minute
detention in the interrogation room after the defendant had indicated
that he didn't want to make a statement was justified. Finally, he
found that there was no duty on the part of the police to inform the
suspect of the nature of the charges before questioning.
From a defense perspective, the conclusions of the court may
have been disconcerting, but even more problematic was the mechanical and cursory nature of the MAh'anda hearing itself. As soon as the
police witness had testified, it became a practical certainty that Carroll's statement would be admitted into evidence. (Both the public
defender and the district attorney indicated privately that at that point
the result became a foregone conclusion.) As often happens in the
Denver district courts, Judge Kingsley scolded the police interrogator
momentarily, but in his decisionmaking, he appeared to ignore the
issue of proper police conduct and Miranda's bearing on that issue.
His consideration did not appear to go beyond the defendant's signatures on the advisement form, the police testimony, and the defendant's criminal record.
116This provision was changed in the new Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure which
became effective April 1, 1970.
11 Thus, it is argued, no inference should arise that his previous experience with the
criminal justice system had given him a prior knowledge of his constitutional rights
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As with most Miranda hearings, Carroll's hearing did not clearly
violate any strictly legal standards. However, within the context of
the research findings concerning the actual interrogation process, it
will be asserted that the Miranda hearing is generally, for the suspect,
a kind of ritualistic formalism with a vacuous result.
B. The Miranda Hearing and the Interrogation Process

It has been said about Miranda that central to the decision was a
dissatisfaction with regard to the way the lower courts find the facts
which occurred in the interrogation room. The concern was that they
gave dubious police testimony excessive weight, and the hope was
that by defining standards more clearly, Miranda would mitigate this
problem."" Even after the implementation of Miranda one sees the
lower courts still relying excessively on sources of information which,
to a large extent, are unreliable.
A strong case can be made that in Denver the prosecution has
a special advantage -the warning form used by the Denver Police
Department. If the judge, when given the form, sees that the suspect
has signed both the warning and waiver provisions (although the
only waiver provision that appears is for fifth amendment rights), the
defendant will ordinarily be hard pressed to convince the judge that
he did not understand his rights or that he was induced to sign
through promises or threats. The warning form often serves as
tangible evidence for the prosecution to support its allegations, and
some judges in Denver appear to treat the signatures on the form
as the creation of an almost conclusive presumption of waiver -

or at

least prima facie evidence that is difficult to rebut.'
While the
suspect may be given the opportunity to contradict the allegation of
waiver, normally his uncorroborated assertions would seem to be given
little credence and are summarily dismissed.
It is submitted that giving the signatures decisive weight is
entirely inconsistent with the spirit of Miranda. Any realistic analysis
of the events of the interrogation room leads to the conclusion that
the suspect's conduct itself is often inconsistent with an inference
of waiver. He may sign the waiver provision, and at the same time
request counsel; or he may state that he does not want to talk before
succumbing to the pressure of a persistent interrogator. Moreover, the
findings of this study indicate that often the suspect does not fully
understand the rights which he is alleged to have knowingly and
intelligently waived,'

and he -ften does not understand the sig-

118 Elsen & Rosett, supra note 58, at 649.
119 For an appellate case illustrating the significance of the waiver form, see Neitz v. People,
462 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1969).
120
See text, §§ II(B) & (C) supra.
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nificance of the waiver form which he signs. 2 ' Finally, the data
suggest that police interrogation tactics are often directed not only
to eliciting a statement or confession from the suspect, but also to
securing either a "knowing and intelligent" waiver, or legally sufficient evidence of such a waiver as that standard is defined by the
courts.' 2 2 It thus appears that the major evidentiary link between the
interrogation room and the courtroom is inherently unreliable. Developing accurately the events which occurred in the interrogation
room and the suspect's unique situation there may be difficult. Yet,
if the purpose of Miranda is to be fulfilled, the courts must take
the more difficult path.
In the Miranda hearings in Denver, as they are presently conducted, the defendant is frequently dependent upon the police to
support his assertions. The problem of the defense counsel then is the
objectivity and reliability of the police witness. As Miranda implies,
in many instances police cannot be relied upon to establish objectively
the events which transpired in the interrogation room. Their unreliability may be attributed to multiple factors. Few consciously lie, but
many may distort the truth because of what they perceive to be their own
interest in the case. Another reason for police distortions during the
Miranda hearings is that Miranda itself is heinous to them, and they
may feel that in Miranda the Supreme Court has called their credibility
into question. 123 It may thus be chimerical to expect them to describe
their own conduct and that of the suspect during questioning objectively.
A strong case can be made that the state should be compelled to
provide a more accurate and reliable record of events in the interrogation room than is presently provided through the testimony of
police officers. For instance, tape recording the entire interrogation
session might resolve the problems of selective recordation or inaccurate reconstruction of the events occurring in the interrogation
room. The defendant would then not be forced to depend on his
interrogator to testify that he requested counsel or that he was induced
to talk through promises and threats. Moreover, the recordings would
give the court a better basis to determine whether there has been "a
knowing and intelligent waiver." And perhaps most importantly, they
would give the court an opportunity to evaluate and control police
conduct in the interrogation room.
121 See text, § II(E) supra.
122 See text, § III supra. It appears that Colorado courts only require an express waiver of
the privilege against self-incrimination, although the Miranda Court seemed to contemplate an express waiver of both the privilege and the right to counsel. See note 28 supra
& text accompanying note 10 supra.
123 See text accompanying notes 100-103 supra.
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In addition, the police should be compelled to use scientific
testing equipment, which is normally at their disposal, for interrogation purposes. For example, if a suspect appears to be drunk (or
"looks like he has been drinking") they should give him a breathalyzer or blood alcohol test before asking him to sign a warning
form or questioning him. If the state ordinarily uses special procedures
to build its case against a suspect, those procedures should also be
used to enable the suspect to protect his rights.
If implemented, these reforms could go a long way toward
improving the Miranda hearing as a fact finding proceeding. Countervailing considerations, of course, should also be taken into account.
It may be arguable that the presence of the tape recorder would
interfere with the discretionary powers of the police and would
further damage their morale. Their conduct in the interrogation room
might be inhibited and possibly fewer statements would be elicited.
However, the conclusion is inescapable that if the Miranda hearing
is to serve any meaningful function, it must provide a better means
of establishing the events which transpired in the interrogation room.
CONCLUSION:

A

NONWAIVABLE

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

When the United States Supreme Court in the Miranda decision
changed the rules of interrogation to give the suspect a battery of
protections against the "inherently compelling pressures" of the
interrogation room, the game of interrogation became inordinately
subtle and complex.
First, the suspect was given the right to knowledge of his
privilege against self-incrimination- this knowledge to be given in
the form of a warning that he has a right to remain silent. 24 It
appears, however, that the knowledge actually communicated to the
suspect is often too abstract and incomplete to be of much practical
value to him in decisionmaking.' 2" Even the knowledge or the attitudes
and temperament which come with age and experience appear to
have only a minimal impact on the suspect's decision to talk.' 26 In
addition, Miranda notwithstanding, their interrogation room decisions
are often significantly influenced by promises, threats, and the other
psychological tactics and strategies which the Court was attempting
2 T
to neutralize.'
Second, realizing the insufficiency of the warning to protect
privilege
against self-incrimination, the Court extended the sixth
the
124The
2

rationale of the Miranda decision is discussed in § I(A) supra.

11(B) & (C)(1) supra.
text, § 11(C) (2) supra.
127See text, § II(C) (3) supra & Appendices A & B infra.

1

5 See text, §§

126See
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amendment right to counsel to the suspect in the interrogation room
to insure protection of the fifth amendment privilege.12 8 The most
apparent possible problem with the Court's holding in this regard
is that the means adopted to protect the right to counsel in the
interrogation room was the same device which was to be employed
to protect the privilege against self-incrimination- a warning to the
suspect advising him of his rights.1' Although the data in this study
revealed that suspects generally possessed an awarenes of the right
to counsel (probably a prior knowledge), the findings also suggested
that the police are able to frustrate the exercise of this right - either
by failure to comply with requests for counsel, by inducing waiver of
the right, or by both. 1 30
Third, the Court held that if the interrogation continues without
the presence of counsel, then a heavy burden rests upon the prosecution to establish that the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived"
his constitutional rights.13 1 A description of the ease with which a
legally enforceable "knowing and intelligent waiver" of constitutional
rights could be obtained from an unknowing suspect completed the
analysis of the impact of Miranda on the suspect's position in the
game of interrogation.'32
The response of the Denver police to Miranda was found to
be strict compliance with its formal requirements.13 However, this
was not found to be inconsistent with the strategy of directing interrogation room tactics against the suspect's weakest positions: (1) a
poor understanding of the warnings and his constitutional rights,
from which he is easily distracted; and (2) a propensity to sign the
waiver of rights form with little or no inducement." 4 Psychological
pressures, including promises and threats, were found to be used
to induce the suspect to talk and to waive his right to counsel in
interrogation.'3
The police strategies appeared to be structured around the
evidentiary problems posed by the legal framework of the interrogation game. One of their goals is to obtain tangible evidence of the
suspect's knowledge of his rights and tangible evidence of the
suspect's knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.1 1 6 The warning
"'8See text accompanying notes 8-9 supra.
129 Id.
0
13
See
131See
132 See
133 See
134See

text, § 11(D) supra.
text accompanying note 10 supra.
text, § 11(E) supra.
text, § I(B) (2) supra.
text, § III supra.

13 See text, §§ II(C)(3) & III supra.
136 See text, § 111(B) supra.
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and waiver form is effective in attaining this goal.137 A second implicit
goal appeared to be to avoid compilation of tangible evidence of
inducements to waive constitutional rights. 38 Privacy in the interrogation room and selective recordation of the interrogation is apparently
effective in accomplishing this goal. l3 9
The response of some of the state trial courts in Colorado
appeared to be conducive to the success of the police strategy. The
limited information collected suggested that judicial consideration in
a Miranda hearing often does not go beyond a consideration of the
signatures on the warning form, the police testimony, and the
defendant's criminal record1 4 - evidence which, in light of the findings of this study, was shown to be questionable at best.' 4 1 Thus the
impact of Miranda on the ultimate interrogation contest seems to have
been effectively neutralized. Indeed, one of the latent functions of
Miranda,as implemented in Colorado, appears to be to aid the police in
overcoming their evidentiary burden with respect to proving the suspect's
knowledge and waiver of his constitutional rights. 4 '
A suggestion for improving the evidentiary link between the
interrogation room and the courtroom was presented in the previous
section' 4 3 -mandatory
full disclosure of the events of the interrogation process. The implementation of this suggestion, however, does
not resolve the basic conflict between the ideals implicit in Miranda
and the apparent realities of the interrogation game. This would not
give the suspect the working knowledge or practical understanding
of his constitutional rights which the Court assumed was necessary
to the protection of those rights. Furthermore, there is no conclusive
evidence which suggests that if the suspect did have such knowledge,
it would be useful to him in combating successfully the inherently
compelling pressures of the interrogation room."'
Without adequate knowledge or some other means to successfully
combat interrogation room pressures, no waiver can be knowing and
intelligent (warnings and signatures as evidence to the contrary
notwithstanding). It was perhaps in deference to this proposition that
the Court held the right to counsel indispensable to the protection of
the fifth amendment privilege. " However, the Court appears to
13 See text, § IV(B) supra.
138 See text, §§ III(A) & IV(B) supra.
39

1

Id.

140 See text, § IV supra; Neitz v. People, 462 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1969).
141 See discussion of these findings in this regard in text, § IV(B) supra.
142See text, § IV(B) supra & text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra.
143 See text, § IV(B) supra.
'44See text, § II(C) supra.
14 See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
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have diluted this secondary protection beyond effectiveness by making
this right waivable as well- and as easily.' 4 ' As such, the right to
counsel in the interrogation room appears to be only another Pawn
with which to protect the King's Rook.' 47
A case can be made that a means to give the present fifth
amendment waiver standard more integrity is to make the right to
counsel nonwaivable. Arguably, with the opportunity to consult with
counsel before interrogation and with his assistance in the interrogation room, the suspect will be able to make the kind of "knowing
and intelligent waiver" of his fifth amendment right which was
contemplated by the Miranda Court. The reform should be evaluated in
terms of its effects on the rights of the accused as well as its impact on
traditional law enforcement functions.
The presence of counsel at every interrogation would immediately
satisfy the suspect's sixth amendment right and would give him a
better opportunity to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination.
The reform would solve most of the problems with respect to
Miranda's implementation which have been described in this study.
The suspect would have the benefit of greater knowledge of his
rights and of the consequences of his interrogation room decisions.
He would be less vulnerable to psychological manipulation. With
the assistance of counsel, he would have the opportunity to bargain
intelligently with his interrogator. Furthermore, the presence of counsel per se would probably inhibit the exercise of abusive pressures
within the interrogation room.
The presence of a lawyer at every custodial interrogation would
probably make the Mi.randa hearing a much more significant proceeding. Counsel could act as a witness and testify during the
hearing. His testimony would be given the same weight as that of
the police. When counsel testifies, the court will have more information and, as a result, a better basis for determining the events which
actually transpired. Also, if the court has the benefit of such testimony
regularly, it will be in a better position to control police conduct in
the interrogation room.
The principal argument against a nonwaivable right to counsel
is that it might interfere with certain law enforcement objectives.
Besides convicting perpetrators of crimes, these objectives are, among
others, identifying and implicating accomplices, clearing other crimes,
and recovery of stolen goods.' 4 8 In considering the probable effects
of the reform on these law enforcement objectives, one can safely
assume that the interrogators would not be able to elicit as many
See text, § 11(D) supra.
But see text accompanying note 43 supra.
148 Interrogations, supra note 36, at 1593-97.
146

147
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statements and confessions if a lawyer were always present, because
in most instances lawyers would advise their clients not to talk.
The first article on Miranda in the Yale Law Journal sheds some
light on the relationship between incriminating statements and convictions. The authors concluded that the presence of a lawyer during
interrogation can affect the suspect's probability of conviction in less
than 10 percent of the cases. The reason is that in about 90 percent
of the cases the police have enough evidence to convict even before
beginning interrogation.14 9
Even though the presence of a lawyer at every interrogation
would not affect conviction rates very substantially, it may be that
the reform would in some instances prevent the police from obtaining information which is now often available to them. For example,
a suspect, who might in the absence of counsel have revealed the name
of an accomplice whose existence was previously unknown to them,
may not release this information if counsel is present.
Similarly, a suspect who has committed multiple crimes (with
which the police had not associated him) may be less likely to clear
the books by confessing to all of them if counsel is present. However,
a persuasive argument can be made that efforts to clear the books
are too often "fishing expeditions" which should not be encouraged
50
anyway.1
An additional argument against a nonwaivable right to counsel
is that the public would have to bear the increased cost of providing
lawyers for the interrogations of all indigent suspects rather than for
the few who presently exercise the sixth amendment right. The cost
problem, however, has not been insurmountable in the case of lineups.
While the cost of the reform may pose a problem, further experiments with "station house counsel" may indicate that legal assistance
can be provided at the police station more economically than is presently anticipated.
In conclusion, although some law enforcement objectives might
be adversely affected by a nonwaivable right to counsel, it is submitted that the social cost of preserving the present rules for interrogation is greater than the cost of implementing the reform. As presently applied, Miranda is an expression of judicial mythology. It is a
case which impressively defines fundamental rights but does not go
far enough in providing practical remedies. A nonwaivable right to
counsel would enable virtually all suspects to exercise the rights in
the interrogation contest which they are already supposed to have.
The reform would be a step in the direction of making the Miranda
149 Id. at 1600.
15°Id. at 1595-96.
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"a working instrument of the law"

rather than

"a mere

declaration of intent."''
APPENDIX A
PROMISES AND THREATS
Suspects' descriptions of promises or threats allegedly made to them at Denver
Police Station (unless otherwise noted) as an incentive to talk; whether they
made statements; whether they made admission or confession.
(1) Threat: "If you won't talk to us, I'll file probation violation on you."
Statement-Yes; Admission or Confession-Yes.
(2) Promise: "If you tell us who else sells dope in Kansas City, then we will
let you go." Statement-Yes; Admission-Yes. Not at Denver Police
Station.
(3) Threat: "If you refuse to talk about this charge, then we'll file other
charges on you." Statement - Yes; Admission - No.
(4) Threat-promise: "If you won't tell us anything, then we'll definitely file
on you. If you talk, we may not. Other guy made statement that put all
of the blame on you. You'll be better off if you talk." Statement-No;
Admission - No.
(5) Promise: "If you talk, I'll see that your bond is low so that you'll be able
to get out." Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
(6) Threat-promise: "If neither of you admits that you own the heroin,
then we'll prosecute both of you for conspiracy. If you admit that you
bought the heroin and that it was strictly for your own use, then your
friend will be released." Statement
Yes; Confession
Yes.
(7) Promise (to wife): "If you admit possession, then we won't file on your
husband." Statement - No; Confession - No.
(8) Promise: "If you will cooperate, we will file only one of the charges
against you. Only one count will be filed. The others will be dropped."
Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
(9) Threat-promise: "If you don't answer questions, DA will bring first
degree murder. If you talk to us, then you'll probably get self-defense
or involuntary manslaughter. It will help you to make a statement."
Statement - Yes; Confession - No.
(10) Threat-promise: "If you do not sign form and answer questions, we will
charge you with being a habitual criminal . . . life in pen. If you admit
these ten burglaries, then we'll drop all but one and drop possession too."
Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes. (Claims he made confession which
was not true.)
(11)
Promise: "If you cooperate and talk, then we'll try to have the charges
dropped. The most time you'd get is a few months." Statement- No;
Confession - No.
(12) Promise. "If you admit to these burglaries, then we won't file additional
burglaries and habitual criminal against you. We'd also get you a law
bond so that you could get out of jail. Your bond will be lower if you
talk." Statement - No; Confession - No.
(13)
Promise: "I won't file the robbery charge against you if you talk to us
about the rape." Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
151Elsen & Rosett, supra note 58, at 645.
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(14)

Promise: "If you can tell me who's doing these robberies (someone else?)
then I won't file the second case on you. Help me and I'll only file one
charge." Statement -

(15)

(16)

(17)
(18)

(20)

Yes; Admission -

Yes.

Threat: "If you don't talk to us, we won't give your wife protection."
Claims he was physically coerced to talk (pushed around). Claims interrogator deliberately opened drawer in which guns were present.
Promise-threat: "If you admit to one aggravated robbery, then we'll drop
the other one. If you don't talk to us, we'll tell the DA that you were
uncooperative and that won't help you." Statement - No; Confession
No.
Promise: "If you tell us where some labs are and help us to bust one,
we will help you get a law bond." Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes.
Threat-promise (murder charge): "If you don't talk to us, we're going
to put your wife in jail and your baby son in an adoption home. If you
tell us what happened, we can go much easier on you." Statement -No;
Confession -

(19)

VOL. 47

No.

Threat (by South Carolina Police): "If you won't talk to us, then we'll
put you in isolation." Statement- No; Confession - No. No promises
or threats when questioned by Denver Police. Statement - No; Confession - No.
Promise-threat: "To make it easier on yourself, you should cop out to
burglary and we will drop the other charges. Don't be bone-headed.
If you won't talk to us, we'll file six or seven other charges against you.
If you admit to burglary, then we'll drop the rest." Statement - No;
Confession -

No.

(21)

"If you cooperate by making a statement, things will go much easier for
you in court. You'll be on the basketball court much sooner if you make

(22)

Promise-threat (murder): "If you tell us what happened, then we'll
probably be able to get you into a hospital or the worst we'll do is get
you voluntary." Suspect claims that he was physically harrassed in that
police would wake him up from his sleep a few times a night in order
to question him. Felt that if he refused to talk to them and sign statement
that he would be "slapped around." Suspect says: Statement-No;
Confession - No. Police contend that they have a statement which he
made.
Promise-threat: "I should think you'd be man enough to give us a statement and save Geraldine. You could help her. DA has agreed that
Geraldine had no foreknowledge of what would happen. The judge isn't
going to like it if you refuse to talk and cooperate. If you will give us
written statement, then we will release Geraldine." Statement -Yes;

a statement." Statement -

(23)

Confession -

(24)

(25)

Yes; Confession -

No.

Yes.

Ambiguous promise: "You are only being charged with assault with a
deadly weapon. You'll be much better off if you tell us exactly what
happened. You don't have to worry about prison. Most you can get is
a fine." Victim died the next day and the charges were changed to
manslaughter. Statement - Yes; Confession - Yes (assault with a deadly
weapon charge).
Threat: "If you are not the one who stole those bottles, then your wife
and mother-in-law are going to jail. Either you stole them or they did."
Statement -

Yes; Confession -

No.
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APPENDIX

B

REASONS FOR TALKING
Reasons suspects made statements, admissions, or confessions, as enumerated by
them.
(1)

Caught red-handed in building.

(2)

Fear of physical harm; worn down by persistent questioning; promise to
reduce severity of charges if he confessed.

(3)

Felt that truth would get him out of jail.

(4)
(5)

Was tired and wanted to cooperate with police.
Thought statements would help him because he thought they were
exculpatory.
Intoxicated when questioned; not informed that he would be charged
with murder at the time he made statement.
Wanted to cooperate; felt that asking for a lawyer would slow things up,
police had so much other evidence.
Admitted that he stole the goods because police had the stuff anyway.

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

(12)
(13)
(14)

(15)
(16)

(17)
(18)

(19)

To show that he was cooperative; misrepretation by police, they told him
he would be charged with misdemeanor - charged with felony.
Promise would free the other party if he confessed; confessed to get
friend out of jail.
Can't stand the city jail (can't take a shower there, crowded); felt that
if he refused to talk or ask for lawyer, it would slow things up and he
would have to spend more time there; claims that he was pressured into
waiving rights because of intolerable conditions at city jail.
Promise: If he talked, police would drop some of charges; if he talked
he would get out of jail sooner.
Talked to speed things up and get cops off his back.
Thought he was not making a statement when he was answering questions; thought police would use what he said to help him in their
investigation.
Made statement because she was upset, felt terrible and had to talk to
someone.
Thought statements were not incriminating, thought truth would help,
didn't realize cops might use his statement for impeachment in court;
promises and threats, use of sympathy tactics by police, police broke him
down by persistent questioning even after he asked for lawyer.
Threatened with being charged with habitual criminal, promise not to do
so if he talked.
Sick and tired of sitting around jail; friendly detective promised that
he wouldn't file aggravated robbery if suspect made statement; thought
if he talked to cops, he would be allowed to talk with parole officer
sooner.
Made statement that "he might have done it" because he thought he was
having friendly conversation with cop who was friend, didn't realize
that he was making a statement which could be used against him in court;
thought that there could be no statement except in writing and with
signature.

MEETING LEGAL NEEDS: A NEW
MALTHUSIAN DILEMMA
By ALAN MERSON*
In spite of its continued growth, the legal profession is being sorely
challenged. The population growth of our country has been far outstripped by an unprecedented acceleration of legal needs, Further, our
country's lawyers are demonstratingan ever increasing inability to meet
this deficiency. Focusing on noncourtroom settings, Professor Merson
suggests a new role for the modern lawyer within both public and
private institutionalsettings. He concludes by calling for a restructuring
of the profession directed towards providing less costly and more
efficient legal services in a manner which truly satisfies the heightened
demand.
INTRODUCTION

ESPITE a lawyer population which has more than kept pace
with the general population increase, 1 the legal profession finds
itself criticized for its inability to respond to critical needs, 2 increasingly
demeaned in the public esteem,' and pre-empted in its work by many
who are not lawyers.4 How can we explain this apparent inability of a
growing army of practitioners to meet the public need? Assuming, as
I trust we may, that today's lawyer is better trained and more fully
equipped to handle the traditional work of a private practitioner, the
single most plausible explanation for this paradox would seem to lie
in an unprecedented acceleration of legal needs far outstripping population growth. These unmet needs can be documented statistically. In the
*Associate Professor of Law and Director of Urban Legal Studies, University of Denver
College of Law; A.B. 1956, LL.B. 1962, Harvard.
U. S. POPULATION PER LAWYER
compiled by J. B. Regnell
Stanford University Law Library

1

Year

People per Lawyer

Year

1951
1954
1957

696
672
653

1960
1963
1966

People per Lawyer
632
637
625

Statistics for 1951-1963 are cited from Table II, National: Population-Lawyer Ratio,
1948-1963, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE 1967 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 12

(F. Weil, ed. 1968). The population/lawyer figure for 1966 is cited from UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1967, at 161 (hereinafter cited as ABSTRACT).
2 The current Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity was inaugurated in response to just such an attack. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY,
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (1965).

3 See, e.g., M. BLUM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968) ; N. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID
PROBATE (1967).
4 See, e.g., Comment, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Associations,

54 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (1966) ; Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices -and
Cures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 104 (1938).
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case of the less affluent members of our society, legal problems have
been researched to the point of redundancy. ' And in terms of satisfying
those needs, the poor may not have fared too badly, especially in
comparison to the plight of their slightly more affluent middle-class
neighbors. 6 But most Americans are not poor, and it is their needs which
tax the resources of the legal profession.
Beyond mere population growth, there appear to be at least three
factors influencing the expansion of legal needs. First, urbanization
and highly complex societal settings require more elaborate regulatory
mechanisms.7 New forms of social interaction give rise to new legal
needs. Second, as a more highly educated populace' gains increased
insight into law's role in and the ordering of life, a greater proportion
of the population demands legal services. Third, a new and enlarged
role for the lawyer, imposed by contemporary public and private
institutional settings, suggests a new set of legal needs quite different
in scope from those heretofore served by lawyers. This paper will
address itself primarily to the third of the enumerated causes, the
enlarged role of the lawyer, and the necessary expansion of legal
resources implied therein.
I.

THE EXPANDING ROLE OF THE LAWYER

Traditional legal work may in the future seem far less significant
than newer, more rapidly developing roles for lawyers inherent in
several contemporary public and private institutional settings. For
example, the needs of today's consumer for traditional legal services
may soon be rivaled by needs which reflect a clearer recognition of the
crucial part played by the administrative process in our lives. The
ability of the legal profession to respond to these changing needs
requires a much greater understanding of their precise nature and
character. Perhaps we can apprehend something of their profile.
A. PublicInstitutionalSettings
1. The Administrative Process
The granting and withholding of governmental largess through
the administrative process has an impact upon individual and corporate
5 The most recent studies have been summarized in UNIVERSITY RESEARC1- CORP., PARAPROFESSIONALS IN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (1968).

6 Sykes, Legal Needs of the Poor in the City of Denver, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 255, 265-66
(1969).
7 Holme, Paralegals and Sublegals: Aides to the Legal Profession, 46 DENVER L.J. 392,
396 (1969).
8 ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 114. For persons 25 years and older residing in the United
States, median school years completed rose from 8.6 in 1940 to 12.0 in 1966.
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conduct which may still be but dimly perceived.' With this impact
comes the very considerable stake lawyers have in the smooth functioning of the process. Thus, whether a citizen deals with his employer, the
public school, or various agencies of local, state, and federal government, he needs representation, usually the kind of representation a
lawyer is best equipped to provide.'0 Recognition of the inherent unfairness of not providing welfare recipients with legal representation
at administrative hearings is evidenced by the Department of Health.
Education, and Welfare's
recent decision to afford such representation
1
at all "fair hearings." '
Conversely, the administrators themselves require legal guidance
in properly performing their functions. Who today would deny the
12
importance of legal advice for school administrators at every level?
The need is no less critical for an administrator of welfare programs,
public housing, a municipal zoo, or indeed anyone who must reconcile
competing interests, public and private. The existence of a general
counsel's office for virtually every major agency of federal government is evidence of this need.
2. The Legislative Process.
A lawyer may be viewed today as an advocate, a planner, an organizer, and a negotiator. 3 In the administrative process we have seen
him as an advocate, a negotiator, and to some extent, a planner. But his
role as an advocate is certainly not limited to either the administrative
process or judicial settings. If lawyer and law are related, the lawyer's
role in the legislative process is no less significant. Presently, only a
limited clientele employs lawyers for the purpose of gaining access to
the legislative process. 1 4 There is an obvious need for representation of
a much wider range of interests. Groups or individuals who have been
previously deprived of representation in the legislative process,1 5 due
either to economics or ignorance, should be provided this service by
lawyers.
9

Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).

10 Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L.

REV. 511, 527
(1969).
11 Title 45- Public Welfare, 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1969). See Robb, HEW Legal Services:
Beauty or Beast?, 55 A.B.A.J. 346 (1969).
12 See generally, Symposium - Legal Aspects of Student-Institutional Relationships, 45
DENVER L.J. 497 (1968).
13

THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON LAW AND TIHE

CHANGING SOCIETY 2 (Mar. 17, 1968).

14 Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor, 1 LAW & SocY REV. 9, 13-16
(1966); Willier, Legislation to Help the Poor Consumer and How to Get It, in OHIO
STATE

LEGAL SERVICE ASS'N, COURSE ON LAW AND POVERTY: THE CONSUMER § 2.01

(1968).
15 See C. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 38-40 (1952).
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3. The Judicial Process.
The need for advocacy on behalf of a more broadly defined
clientele is nowhere more evident than in the relative paucity of socalled public interest lawsuits. Ralph Nader points out that
lawyers labored for polluters, not anti-polluters, for sellers, not consumers, for corporations, not for citizens, for labor leaders, not rank
and file, for, not against, rate increases or weak standards before
government agencies, for highway builders, not displaced residents,
for, not against, judicial and administrative delay, for preferential
business access to government and against equal citizen access to the
same government, for agricultural subsidies to the rich but not food
stamps for the poor, for tax and quota privilages, not for equity and
free trade." 6
Until recently, the permissible scope of litigation has been so narrowly defined that the prospects for representing a broader public
interest in the framework of a formal adjudicative proceeding have
been slim indeed.17 Today, however, with the relaxation of standing
requirements,'" public interest lawsuits become possible if a mechanism
exists for competent representation. In a recent California case, a
federally-funded legal services program insured the representation of
a large group of low income citizens of San Francisco in an action to
enjoin a poorly conceived urban renewal project."9 Hopefully, public
interest lawsuits will proliferate, as lawyers discover that some pro bono
lawsuits may be pro pecuniae as well. Within a 6 month period in
Colorado private attorneys have filed three important lawsuits relating
to environmental protection. °
B. Private InstitutionalSettings
1. Organization
The lawyer's skills as an advocate would be of little value within
a public institutional setting if at the same time he were not an
effective organizer within the private sector. This applies not only to
the organizational skills of a trial attorney but to the employment of
equally effective organizational techniques for enhancing the coalescence
of groups devoted to specific social, political, or economic goals. The
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 has spawned not only the Com1e
17
18
19

Nader, Law Schools and Law Firms, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1969, at 20, 21.
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1922).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
W. Addition Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (1968).
20 Defenders of Florissant, Inc. v. Park Land Co., Civ. No. 1539 (D.C. Colo. 1969) in
defense of ancient fossil beds; Colorado Open Coordinating Council v. Austral Oil Co.,
Civ. No. 1712 (D.C. Clo. 1969) opposing the Project Rulison underground atomic
explosion; Lamm v. Volpe, Civ. No. 1870 (D.C. Colo. 1969) seeking to enforce the
intent of the federal Highway Beautification Act with respect to billboard removal.
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munity Action Agencies directly provided for the legislation,"' but a
host of additional community organizations, including cooperatives,
tenants' unions, welfare rights groups, and neighborhood development
corporations. The organizational skill for this effort has been derived
largely from the Office of Economic Opportunity's Legal Services and
Vista Lawyer Programs.2 2 In an era of pluralism, it seems natural that
the legal profession is properly looked to for providing organizational
expertise.
2. Negotiation, Arbitration, and Conciliation
If the profession has thus far fallen short in providing its potential
clientele with effective advocacy and organizational skills, how much
more so has it failed to provide attractive alternatives to adversarial
litigation? The techniques of negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation
are surely to be prized in any highly complex, sophisticated society. 3
The courts daily concede their inability, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, to be the prime mechanism for dispute resolution. The
growing use of referees not only in bankruptcy, divorce, and juvenile
matters but in complex cases of every genre, e.g. natural resource allocation, attests to this. The lawyer is constantly looked to as a "tensionmanager,"" capable of employing the more informal non-adversarial
processes. As these processes grow in use, whether it be within the
National Labor Relations Board or a family counseling service, the legal
25
profession must increase its capacity to provide the necessary expertise.
3. Planning
It may well be the lawyer's planning function which best serves
to highlight the widening abyss between the promise and the performance of the legal profession. Planning, in the sense here intended,
encompasses everything from consumer counseling and debt management to estate and business planning. The lawyer's more affluent
clients already benefit from the type of comprehensive counseling which
the profession acknowledges to be the needed counterpart to a medical
checkup.2" Up to now, however, the overwhelming proportion of legal
2142 U.S.C.A. § 2701 et seq. (1970).
22 See Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services,
56 GEO. L.J. 742 (1968) ; Advocates of Change-A
Challenge for Lawyers, 4 VISTA
VOLUNTEER MAGAZINE 16 (Mar. 1968).
2 Ample evidence of this is afforded by the success of the American Arbitration Association
in bringing an increasing number of disputes within the ambit of arbitration. The A.A.A.'s
Mediation Center in Los Angeles and their co-sponsorship of the Hough Housing Improvement and Arbitration Project in Cleveland are two recent examples of their continuing activity. The Center for Teaching and Research in Dispute Settlement, located
in Madison, Wisconsin, is also pursuing new approaches to this expanding field.
2W.
MOORE, SOCIAL CHANGE 10 (1963).
25 See H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT (1970).
26 Brown, Corporate Counsel At the Forefront of the Practice of Preventive Law, 42
J. STATE BAR CALIF. 261 (1967); Brown, Legal Audit, 38 S. CALIF. L. REv. 431 (1965).
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services is of the "one shot" variety. Instead of a complete legal "checkup,'"'2 the typical client will usually get what he asks for, but precious
little else. Clearly, when money is not the object, the lawyer easily
perceives his preventive law function and the necessity for examining
his client's legal "health" from head to toe.28 Comprehensive counseling
of this sort requires patience, probing and a well structured interviewing
technique. No wonder that the economics of the profession now rule this
out for the vast majority of clients.
4. Education
The lawyer's planning function really incorporates an additional
role expected of the lawyer, but all to rarely articulated. This is the
lawyer as an educator or a communicator of useful information which
both his client and the public at large ought to know. There is a vast
amount of general legal knowledge which would enable a citizen to
conduct his personal and business affairs more intelligently. A successful preventive law program should educate the larger community about
the intricacies of purchasing a home, renting an apartment, obtaining
consumer credit, applying for a driver's license, making bail, and a
hundred other challenges of daily living.
There are, apparently, many instances in which individuals become
involved with the criminal law, particularly in the areas of misdemeanors and traffic offenses, with little realization of their legal
rights; and, similarly, many individuals seem to be unaware of their
legal rights in matters involving workman's compensation, unemployment benefits, and welfare payments .... More generally, however,
there is the difficult question of why there are so many legal needs
which go unnoticed. It is possible that the need for a lawyer is in
fact recognized, but is defined out of existence by the people themselves. It is also possible, however-and this seems more likelythat people are frequently ignorant of their legal rights and duties,
that they do not recognize the legal implications of a variety of situations or the fact that legal remedies are available for many of their
problems. And this is probably true of a great many people at all
29
socio-economic levels.
The public wants to know, but the legal profession has yet to devise
a satisfactory method for dispensing this knowledge.

II. THE REQUIRED EXPANSION OF RESOURCES
A. More Efficient, Lower Cost Service

If the volume of legal services is to grow in response to the foregoing needs, the legal profession must provide these services in a less
costly and more efficient manner. This can be accomplished in several
ways.
2 Brown, Preventive Law in OEO Legal Service Offices, 41 J.

STATE BAR CALIF. 295, 302

(1966) ; Sykes, supra note 6, at 33.
28Freeman, Role of Lawyers as Counselor, 7 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 203 (1966).
29Sykes, supra note 6, at 28-30.
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First, there must be the recognition and encouragement of specialization within the profession."0 Adam Smith's parable about the division
of labor could hardly be more in point.3 The public, it would seem,
may have a far greater appreciation than most bar associations for the
degree to which the profession has in fact specialized. The first question
often asked of a lawyer is "What kind of law do you practice?"
If lawyers ever fashioned themselves renaissance men, it seems quite
clear that public attitudes, as well as the economics of the profession,
will deny them this status today.3
Second, there must be far better use of advanced technology. This
may range from nothing more than a greater sophistication in current
office equipment, including typewriters,33 duplicating and copying
equipment, 34 dictating machines, 35 and the omni-present telephone,"6 to
37
the most advanced computer techniques for electronic data processing.
Indeed, experimentation is well advanced on the use of computers
for case law searching 38 and for performing such highly specialized
tasks as estate planning."9 Mass production technology and techniques
have already been applied to certain types of legal services which are
relatively unsophisticated and easy to render. Thus, the processing of
divorces constitutes a significant share of legal business, 40 and is
amenable to routine handling, 4 ' although still relatively expensive for
the amount of legal expertise required. The same is true for the socalled consumer bankruptcy and a host of small claims, including tort,
contract, and real property cases.4 2 In the latter instances, the amounts
at issue are frequently less than the legal fee exacted.
30

See generally STANDING COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE OF THE AMERIcA
BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAV'
OFFICE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 9 (1969); Greenwood & Frederickson, Specialization in the Medical and Legal Professions-Part
1, 5 L. OFFICE ECON. & MAN. 175
(1964).
31
A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS Bk. I, Ch. I, at 1-12 (1786).
32 See Cheatham, The Growing Need for Specialized Legal Services, 16 VAND. L. REV. 497
3

(1963).
See Mucklestone, Automatic Typewriters, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW OFFICE EQUIPMENT 123 (prepared by the Standing Committee on
Economics of Law Practice of the American Bar Association, 1967)
PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS).

(hereinafter cited as

See Stolper, Duplicating and Copying Equipment in the Law Office- Some Interesting
Uses, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 149.
35 See Habermann, Dictating Equipment, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 165.
36 See Mansell, The Telephone, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 137.
37 See Chatterton & McCoy, A New System for Legal Services Through the Use of Electronic
Data Procession, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 239.
38 See Wilson, Case Law Searching by Machine, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS, supra note 33
34

at 235.
39 See Paffendorf, Estate Planning by Computer, in PARTNERSHIP PROBLEMS, supra note 33.
at 283.
40
J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962).
4'Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
42 Bonfield, supra note 10, at 527.
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A third way to provide for more efficient, lower cost service,
would be to reduce labor costs. Much of a lawyer's routine work is
capable of more standardized performance by a subprofessional. 43 The
use of paralegal practitioners, those who work for 5 dollars an hour
instead of 35,44 would not only provide lower cost service for many
who do not receive it now, but a significant expansion of vocational
opportunities as well.45
B. Accessibility
A formidable obstacle encountered by the legal profession in
attempting to keep pace with growing legal needs is the relative
inaccessibility of lawyers- inaccessibility, not in a geographical, but
in a psychological and sociological sense. Many people "just don't
know" lawyers. 46 For that reason alone they may be reluctant to call
upon them. One should not underestimate the fears and misconceptions
about the nature of legal services which keeps many from seeking legal
advice. 47
In a very real sense, one of the profession's most urgent challenges
is to provide lawyers with the kind of exposure that will insure their
most widespread employment. This can be done both through better
communication of the lawyer's role and though new institutional
settings. Conceivably, some admixture of legal clinics, group legal
services, and legal insurance may serve to place the legal profession in
a better position to reach this larger clientele.4 8
supra note 40, at 52, 71, 72 et seq.
generally Holme, supra note 7.

43 CARLIN,
4See

4 R. YEGGE, W.

MOORE &

H.

HOLME, NEW CAREERS IN LAW 71

(1969) (hereinafter

cited as NEW CAREERS). Lest it be feared that the introduction of paralegals presages a
decline in the quality of service, the NEW CAREERS report continues:
Services provided by paralegals, though high volume and inexpensive, should
be of equal quality to similar services provided by lawyers. We have found that
lawyers often perform essentially paralegal functions. In breaking down and
standardizing these functions, the profession should make certain that they will
be executed as well - or better - by paralegals as by bored and unchallenged
lawyers. Of course, newly-created paralegals and sublegals would be obliged to
comply with existing legal ethics. The confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship would be maintained in contacts between client and sublegal, just as
the essence of the patient-doctor relationship is preserved in intercessions by
the nurse. The work of sublegals would be thoroughly supervised and checked
by lawyers, and lawyers would be called upon to execute court actions, in compliance with law, in cases where sublegals have done most of the routine preparation. This preceding requirement does not preclude the hope that in certain
standardized cases, such as uncontested divorce and bankruptcy, the law might
be changed either to permit paralegals to make appearances in court or that the
procedures might be made administrative and removed from court, reducing both
the cost of services and the needless waste of lawyer's valuable time. In addition,
changes in the Canons of Ethics, without altering the basic ethical responsibilities of the lawyer, might facilitate the use of paralegals and broaden their
potential responsibilities.
Id. at 72.
46 See Sykes, supra note 6, at 47.
47 PARAPROFESSIONALS, supra note 5, at 65, 66.
4NEW CAREERS,

supra note 45, at 48-50.
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CONCLUSION

In spite of its continuing growth, the legal profession is being
severely challenged. Lawyers are called upon to perform old tasks more
efficiently and new tasks with imagination and creativity. The profession must make it possible for the lawyer to fulfill his role as
advocate, organizer, planner, and negotiator in a manner which truly
satisfies the heightened demand for these services. If it does not, these
roles will nevertheless be performed- whoever the performer and
whatever the quality. The call then must be for nothing less than a
major restructuring of the profession itself. Only then can we provide
an acceptable response to a dilemma which grows with each passing day.

BROKERS' LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF
EXCHANGE AND
HARRY

N.

NASD

RULES

MACLEAN*

In this timely article, the author offers insight into an expanding
area of securities litigation: recovery for violations of rules promulgated not by the Securities and Exchange Commission but by nongovernmental self-regulatory bodies. MacLean summarizes the statutory
framework of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, discusses the
recent case law, and concludes with an analysis of the policy and

rationale behind the self-regulatory scheme.

V

INTRODUCTION

HEN the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari' in the case

of Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc..' it
left standing a decision upholding a cause of action against a brokerage firm based on a violation of a New York Stock Exchange rule.
The contra result was reached in Mercury Investment Co. v. A. G.

Edwards & Sons, Inc.,3 where the district court dismissed that portion
of the complaint alleging a violation by the broker of a rule of the
National Association of Securities Dealers.4 These two decisions
indicate the present state of judicial uncertainty concerning a vital
issue in the area of civil liabilities in the securities business.
While it is settled that civil actions lie for violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws and rules passed thereunder,5
there are many rules adopted by the self-regulatory agencies in the
securities industry which proscribe conduct falling far short of fraud.6
Simply stated, the issue is: Can an aggrieved customer sue a brokerdealer in federal court for violation of a rule of one of the self*Partner, Cunningham & MacLean; J.D., University of Denver, 1967.
1396 U.S. 838 (1969).
2 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969). Plaintiff sued a brokerage firm for inter alia violation of

the "know your customer" rule of the NYSE. See n. 38 infra for a discussion of the
"know your customer" rule.
3 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Texas 1969). Plaintiff sued for violation of the "suitability
rule" of the NASD. See n. 6 infra for discussion of the suitability rule.
4Id.at 1163.
5 See discussion of cases in III Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1763-97 (1961); VI Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATiON 3869 (1969 Supplement to Vol. III).
6 One example of such a rule is the NASD "suitability rule" which states that: "In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall
have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such
customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." NASD Rules of Fair
Practice, Article III § 2. A discussion of this rule in light of the standards and practices
of the brokerage community is found in Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of
Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L. J. 445.
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regulatory bodies to which that broker-dealer belongs? If so, can the
customer sue for a violation of any of the rules or just specific ones?
The ultimate disposition of these questions not only affects the civil
liabilities of broker-dealers but also the future role of the self-regulatory
bodies in the regulation of the securities industry. This article will deal
with these questions in terms of the statutory framework of the securities laws, an analysis of the case law, and an examination of the
function of the self-regulatory bodies. Finally, the effect that civil
liability under these rules would have upon the securities industry
will be considered.
I.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

It would seem logical to analyze the statutory structure of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in hope of finding a definitive answer
to the question of civil liability for violation of exchange or NASD
rules. This has been done in detail7 and the results do not appear
conclusive or even persuasive. The only statement that can be made
with confidence is that the Act does not contain a clear grant of a
private right of action for violation of association or exchange rules
and the courts which have found such rights have relied primarily on
policy grounds or interpretation of Congressional intent. 8 For these
reasons, this examination will consider only briefly some of the sections of the Act which have been relied on to give force to arguments
on either side of the issue.
Section 27 of the Act sets forth the jurisdiction and venue requirements for suits under the Act,9 and much of the statutory argument for imposition of civil liabilities rests upon an interpretation
of a particular phrase therein stating that the district courts shall
have "exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter
or the rules and regulations thereunder."' 0 It seems clear to at least
one author that the rules passed by the NASD and the exchanges
are "rules and regulations passed thereunder," and even if they
are not, they could be considered to be a "duty created by this
chapter."" It would seem equally arguable, however, that the phrase
"rules and regulations" refers only to such rules and regulations
7 Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied
Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 633, 635-50 (1966); Shipman,
Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange
Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of SelfRegulatory Requirements, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 925, 964-70 (1966).
8 See text, § II for discussion of the cases.
9

Securities Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).

10 Id.

11 Lowenfels,

Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 12.

16-19 (1966).
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passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to Section 23
of the Act' 2 and the "duty" mentioned refers to the duty of the
associations and exchanges to pass rules and enforce them through
disciplinary actions against their members. In any event, no authority
has been cited for the proposition that it was the intention of
Congress in the use of the above phrase to include the rules and
regulations passed by the registered securities associations and exchanges.
Secondly, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for the
registration of stock exchanges and national securities associations.13
It is argued that because of this registration requirement and the fact
that the Commission must approve the rules of the securities associations 1 4 and exchanges 15 prior to registration, these rules are, in
fact, the rules of the SEC. This idea is further supported by the fact
that the SEC must give prior approval to any change of existing
association rules16 and can abrogate the rules of the association if it
12Securities Exchange Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).

Section 5 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 78e (1964)) requires that all exchanges engaging in
interstate commerce must register under Section 6 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1964),
An exchange must file an agreement to comply and enforce compliance among its members
with the Act and of the Securities and Exchange Commission rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)
(1) (1964). Section 6(b) of the Act requires that for registration to be granted and to
remain in force the rules of the exchange shall "include provision for the expulsion,
suspension or disciplining of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade ....
.. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964). Section 6(c)
provides that nothing in the Exchange Act precludes an exchange from "adopting and
enforcing any rule not inconsistent with this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder .... .. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1964). Section 6(d) provides that the Commission
shall grant the registration if it appears that the exchange will be able to comply with
the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder and if "the rules of the exchange
are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors .... ..
15 U.S.C,
§ 78f(d) (1964). The Commission also has the authority to suspend or withdraw an
exchange registration, (15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1964)) and to alter or supplement
exchange rules in certain specific areas. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
The Maloney Act (15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964)) was passed in 1938 to provide
for comparable self-regulation in the over-the-counter market and provides for the
registration of national securities associations with the Commission requiring, among
other things, that:
-[T]he rules of the association [be] designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade . . . and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest .
15 U.S.C. § 780- 3(b)(8)
(1964).
In addition, the association must have adequate procedures for fining, censuring,
suspending or expelling its members for violation of its rules. 15 U.S.C. § 780- 3(b)
(9) (1964). The Commission has the authority to abrogate any rule of an association
if the requisite findings are made (15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(1) (1964)) and to suspend
the registration of an association if necessary in the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 78o - 3
(1) (1964). To date, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) is the
only association registered pursuant to the Act, and its membership consists of most of
the broker-dealers in the country. Many NASD members are also members of one or
more exchanges, and brokers who are not are still subject to regulation by virtue of the
1964 amendments. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(10) (1964).
14
Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 780 - 3(b) (1964).
15 Securities Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
16 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o3(j) (1964).
'3
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is necessary "to assure fair dealing by the members of such association ...or otherwise to protect investors or effectuate the purpose
of this chapter.' 1 7 Since suits can be brought for violation of SEC
rules, then they should be able to be brought for violation of NASD
rules.' This limited view of the NASD as merely an extension or
alter-ego of the SEC with little independent responsibility or initiative
would undoubtedly be contested by the NASD. 9 This view is also
contrary to the basic theory of self-regulation in the securities industry,
as explained in a later section of this article,2 ° which holds that it
is to the advantage of the regulators, the regulated, and the investing
public, for the regulated to assume primary responsibility for the
conduct of its members, with the residual power to override vested
in the SEC if such self-regulation is considered inadequate.
II.

THE CASES

Considerable confusion in the consideration of the case law in
this area can be avoided by distinguishing the cases involving civil suits
against stock exchanges. It is fairly well settled that a cause of action
against an exchange for failure to enforce its rules will be upheld.2"
This result is based on the reasoning that an investor may sue to enforce
a duty imposed by statute and is consistent with the opinion in J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak2 2 and other cases implying that one for whose benefit or
protection a statute is passed may sue for violation of the duty required
17Securities Exchange Act § 15A(k) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o3(k) (1) (1964).
18Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied
Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 633 (1966). The writer concludes:
"Where the SEC has such sweeping powers over association rules, these rules are virtually
rules of the SEC itself, and should grant the same rights to investors as SEC rules grant."
Id. at 636.
19In any event, the NASD has felt independent enough to sue the SEC in Federal cou:z.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n. 420 F.2d 83 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92, 438.
20 See text, § IIIinfra.
21 It was held in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 323 U.S. 737
(1944), that the New York Stock Exchange violated Section 6(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act when it failed to expel a member who had violated the rules of the
exchange in the conversion of its customers' securities (recovery was denied since
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that such failure was the proximate cause of their
injuries). In Butterman v. Walston & Co., 387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967) plaintiffs
alleged that the New York Stock Exchange violated its rules in not expelling a registered
representative of Walston & Co. In dismissing the complaint against the exchange on the
grounds that the exchange had no duty to enforce its rules unless it had knowledge of
the improper conduct, the clear implication is that the court recognized the right of an
individual to such an exchange for failure to enforce its rules.
377 U.S. 426 (1964). Borak, as a Case stockholder, sued the company to void a merger
and obtain damages alleging among other things violations of the proxy rules passed by
the Commission. The Court, in affirming the claim for relief, stated: "It appears clear
that private parties have a right under § 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14(a) of
the Act. Indeed, this section specifically grants the appropriate district courts jurisdiction
over 'all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liabilities or duty
created under the Act.' " Id. at 430-31. See Comment. Private Rights and Federal
Remedies: Herein of J.1. Case v. Borak, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1150 (1965).

1970

BROKERS' LIABILITY

by that statute. 23 The statutory duty involved here is to pass rules
promoting just and equitable principles of trade and to discipline
members for the violation thereof. Thus, this theory would allow a
suit against the NASD or an exchange for failure to pass or enforce
adequate rules or against the SEC for failure to abrogate or supplement existing ones.
The first case to deal directly with the issue of whether a
brokerage firm could be held liable to a customer for a violation
of an exchange or NASD rule was Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache. 4
The plaintiff in Colonial alleged a violation of Article XIV, Section 6 of
the New York Stock Exchange Constitution 2a and Article III, Section
1 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD. 26 The lower court dismissed the federal claim 27 indicating that violation of association
exchange rules do not give rise to suits in federal courts. The
second circuit upheld the dismissal, but only after analyzing the
rule thoroughly, creating a test requiring a judicial investigation
of the particular rule involved and its function in the over-all scheme
28
of securities regulation as provided for in the 1934 Act.
23 See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 934-36 (1961) and the cases and articles cited
therein. The statutory tort theory is explained by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

as follows:
"The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose
interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has
resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against that particular hazard from which
the harm results."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See generally Note, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 285 (1963).
24 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966). In Colonial, a customer brought suit against a brokerage
firm alleging that the firm violated an oral agreement not to sell the securities in
plaintiff's margin account unless necessary to meet the minimum margin requirements of
the New York Stock Exchange.
251 d. at 180. This rule states that: "A member . . . who . . . shall be adjudged guilty . . .
of conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade may be
suspended or expelled as the Board may determine." New York Stock Exchange Constitution Art. XIV § 6, CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide.
26 This rule states that: "A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade." National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Rules of Fair Practice Art. III § 1.
27 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache& Co., 358 F.2d 178, 180 (2nd Cir. 1966).
28 What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal civil liability for violation
of exchange or dealer association rules by a member cannot be determined on the
simplistic all-or-nothing basis urged by the two parties; rather the court must look to the
nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging
the implication of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion
than when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. Id. at 182.
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It is important to note that there was no specific reliance on an
interpretation of Section 27 of the Act in adopting this flexible test.
The court relied instead on its understanding of the regulation of the
securities industry and the function of self-regulation.29 The court
stated that "the difficulty [in determining civil liability] lies in the
scope of the unique statutory scheme of supervised self-regulation
by exchanges and dealers' associations. ' 30° However, the court then
adopts the rationale of the "substitute rule" stating: [W]e cannot
ignore that the concept of supervised self-regulation is broad enough
to encompass a rule which provides what amounts to a substitute for
regulation by the SEC itself."3 " The opinion then indicated that the
court would not say that there could never be a basis for implying
a private right of action based on an exchange or association rule."
The concept underlying the flexible test adopted by the court
appears to be that self-regulation is not really a separate approach
in itself but rather is merely one aspect of attempting to achieve
investor protection sanctioned by the SEC. If this concept is accurate,
there is no reason for denying association and exchange rules the
same status as those of the SEC.
The court then limited the effect of this concept by denying
civil liability for violation of the rules prohibiting conduct which is
"inconsistent with fair and equitable principles of trade. ' 33 In the
court's opinion, the scope of these rules includes "unethical behavior
which Congress could well not have intended to give rise to a legal
claim' ' 4 and that there was no reason to believe that merely by
requiring adoption of rules assuring fair and equitable conduct
"Congress meant to impose a new legal standard on members different from that long recognized by state law.' 35 Moreover, the
29Id.
30

at 181-82.

1d. at 181.

31 Id.

at 182. The rationale of the so-called "'substitute rule" is that the investor should not
be deprived of a private right of action in an instance when the SEC has not adopted
a particular rule in deference to the exchange adopting the rule. The court in Colonial
cites Lowenfels, Implied Liability Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
12, 17 (1966) commenting with approval: "The author points out that, doubtless because
of the exchange rules, the SEC terminated a rule-making procedure of its own." Id. at
182 n.4.

3 If an exchange or association rule plays an "integral

part in SEC regulation notwithstanding the Commission's decision to take a backseat role in its promulgation and
enforcement, (the court) would not wish to say that such a rule could not provide the
basis for implying a private right of action." Id.

33

Id.

34 Id.
35 Id.
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court states that to allow federal civil liability would disrupt the
present system of adjudication of customer claims.3 6
In the application of this test, the above considerations would
appear to exclude the "suitability" rule of the NASD 7 and
the "know your customer" rule of the New York Stock Exchange,"8
both of which deal with the recommendation of securities to customers
based on knowledge of the customer's financial situation. Phrases
such as "reasonable care," "due diligence," and "suitable" certainly
encompass negligence or unethical conduct, and the court in Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co.,"9 in applying the Colonial test to the suitability rule, rejected it stating:
Conceivably, a broker might honestly think that his "ground" for
believing his recommendation "suitable" is "reasonable" only to find
himself overruled in a lawsuit and found guilty of fraud notwithstanding his good faith. As pointed out by Friendly, J.,in Colonial,
p. 182, the practical consequences of allowing private federal damage
suits based on rules of this kind, and involving
judicial review of
40
market judgments, would be considerable.

The court also stated that the securities acts are essentially directed at fraud- not against mere negligence or errors of judgment
on the part of the brokers. 4 '
In Mercury Investment Co. v. A. G. Edwards & Sons,42 the court
dismissed the claim based on a violation of the suitability rule, relying
specifically on the Hecht interpretation of the Colonial test.
Adopting the reasoning of Hecht, the Court must conclude that Article
III, Sec. 2 of the N.A.S.D. rules seek to regulate a much broader
36The court then gives several examples in which this might be the case: The arbitration
procedures now in common use to settle disputes between brokers and customers could
be avoided whenever the customers chose to rely on a violation of "fair and equitable"
conduct rather than negligence or breach of contract. Id. Additionally, "mere recitation
of the statutory watchword by an aggrieved investor, would saddle the federal courts with
garden-variety customer-broker suits, [and Congress could scarcely have] contemplated
judicial creation of a new body of federal broker-customer law whenever a complaint
in what would otherwise be an action under state law alleged conduct inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade. Id. at 183. Finally, "if § 27 were read to include
exchange rules, the jurisdiction of the federal courts would be exclusive . . .and the
state courts would be altogether stripped of power to adjudicate claims so pleaded even
between their own citizens." Id.
37See note 6, supra.
38New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide
2405.
This rule provides in part that: "Every member organization is required through a general
partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock to (1) use due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account
accepted or carried by such organization and evey person holding power of attorney over
any account accepted or carried by such organization." Id.
39 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Calif. 1968). The complaint essentially charged "churning" or
excessive trading in plaintiff's account by the registered representative of Harris. Upham
and also alleged a violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lob-5 thereunder. Id. at 422.
40 Id.at 431.
41 Id.
42

295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Texas 1969). The plaintiff in Mercury sought damage against
the employee and brokerage firm for alleged violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, as well as the "suitability rule." Id. at 1161.
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spectrum of broker activities than is envisioned by security regulations.
Thus a violation of this N.A.S.D. rule per se does not give rise to
federal civil liabilities. .... 4
Interestingly, the Court did state that a violation of the rule would

44
be admissible as evidence of negligence.

This trend in interpreting the Colonial test to deny civil suits

based on rules that encompass unethical or negligent conduct appears
to be interrupted by two cases which allowed the claim without an
independent consideration of the issue, 5 and more importantly by
the court in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.4 6
The plaintiff in Buttrey, a trustee in bankruptcy of a brokerage
firm, alleged a violation of NYSE Rule 40517 in that defendant
Merrill Lynch allowed the firm to open cash and margin accounts
and to engage in speculative trading techniques without making

adequate investigation into the financial status of the firm when it
had grounds, by reason of past experience, to suspect that the firm

was not in good financial condition. In upholding the lower court's
refusal to dismiss this claim, the court relied in part on the reasoning
of Colonial, in part on the reasoning of Hecht, and in part on the
test set forth by Lowenfels,4 8 to reach a conclusion essentially distinct

from all three.4" The court "did not decide that an alleged violation
43

1d. at 1163.

44 "But the Court reiterates that violations of Art. III, Sec. 2, would be admissible as

evidence of negligence, if any." Id.
Avern Trust v. Clarke, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,441 at p. 98096 (7th Cir. 1969).
The plaintiff sued the brokerage firm alleging violation of the anti-fraud provisions and
Sections 1, 2 and 18 of Art. III of the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD in regard
to the purchase of securities from the firm in an underwriting. The lower court had
dismissed the claim based on a violation of the NASD rules, and the Circuit Court relied
on its holding on Buttrey in concluding that the lower court had erroneously dismissed
the claim. The court held, however, that the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the dismissal
since "the same theory was incorporated under the claim for violation of Section 15 of
the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o." Id. at p. 98,099. In Stevens v. Abbott,
Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968), the plaintiff sued the brokerage
firm and its employee alleging churning and excessive trading. With no discussion, the
court held: "The court finds that the defendants' conduct represents violations of the
rules of fair practice of the N.A.S.D.; that plaintiff's account was not properly supervised
in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 435 of the Rules of the New York Stock
Exchange; and that her account was not properly supervised as required by Rule 405 of
the New York Stock Exchange." Id. at 846-47.
46410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
45

47 See note 38, supra.
48 Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
12, 24-25 (1966). Simply stated, exchange rules which are promulgated for the direct
protection of the investing public should give rise to private actions against an exchange
and other private parties, while rules promulgated merely as "housekeeping" devices to
guide the membership should not." Id. In regard to NASD rules, Lowenfels urges the
same test. Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets:
Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 COR.NELL L.Q. 633, 650-54 (1966).
49 The Court agreed with Lowenfels in concluding that Rule 405 could fit under Section 27
as a "duty increased by this chapter," Buitrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (1969), and adopted his test that the determining factor is
whether the rule is "for the direct protection of the investors." Id. It joined with this
factor relied on in Colonial as to whether the rule "play[s] an integral part in SEC
regulation." Id. The court agreed with the opinion in Hecht that "mere errors in judgment
by the defendant might not support a federal cause of action .... " Id. at 143.
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of Rule 405 is per se actionable,"" ° but looked to the alleged conduct
of the defendant and found it "tantamount to fraud on the bank5
rupt's customers, thus giving rise to a private civil damage action." '
Consequently, under the Buttrey decision, whether a particular rule
of the NYSE can be the basis for a civil liability depends on the
nature of the alleged violation of the rule. If the violation is mere
unethical conduct, it appears that it would not give rise to civil
liability, while if it is "tantamount to fraud," liability will be imposed, 2 and this decision cannot be made until the case has been
53
heard on its merits.
The result in Buttrey is clearly in conflict with Hecht and
Mercury in that these cases denied liability under a rule if its scope
included merely unethical or negligent conduct. The Buttrey view
would presumably fail to satisfy author Lowenfels who urges civil
liability for violation of a rule if it was passed for the protection
of investors, 5 without any requirement that the alleged activity be
tantamount to fraud." Additionally, Buttrey essentially ignores the
considerations behind the rule by rule approach set forth in Colonial
5
to prevent excessive federal civil actions. 5
III.

THE SELF-REGULATORY SCHEME

Since it appears that there is no controlling precedent or clear
statutory mandate to resolve the issue of broker's civil liability for
violation of an exchange or association rule, it is logical to examine
the structure of the regulatory scheme and the roles and functions
of the self-regulatory bodies to determine if such liability is consistent
with the scheme.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for three distinct
but complimentary methods of achieving the protection of the public
investor in the securities markets. The first, of course, is the Securities and Exchange
50

Commission5"

which has statutory responsibility

1d. at 142.

51Id.at 143.
5

2 Id.

53"Until this case is actually tried, it will be impossible to ascertain whether defendant has
violated Rule 405, and if so, whether the violations justify the imposition of liability." Id.
54See note 48, supra.
5 See note 36, supra.
5 The Commission was established pursuant to Section 4(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1964).
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for enforcing the Act.5" Secondly, the Act provides for civil liability
for violation of several of its sections.5"
The third method of achieving investor protection is the regulation of broker-dealers through self-regulatory bodies registered with
the Commission. The courts in Colonial, Hecht and Buttrey all relied
on their understanding of the concept of self-regulation in reaching
their conclusions, and thus it is important to examine the rationale
behind the concept and the present understanding of its function in
the overall scheme.
According to the Report of Special Study of the Securities
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission,5 9 there are three
primary reasons for self-regulation in the securities industry:
(1) Expediency and practicality in recognition of "the sheer
ineffectiveness of attempting to assure [regulation] directly
through Government on a wide scale;" 6
(2) The value of the expertise and experience that members of a
complex and intricate industry can bring to bear; 6 and,
(3) The necessity of going beyond the reaches of the law and
regulating the ethical behavior of the member of the
industry.62
Coupled with these reasons was the assumption that the self-regulators would require a quasi-independent status to operate effectively.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,6 3 the only major judicial
exploration of the concept of self-regulation in the securities industry,
the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of the applicability
of the antitrust laws to self-regulation under the Act. 64 In its con57The Commission has the power to pass rules and regulations necessary to carry out its
function under the Act. Securities Exchange Act § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
To enforce the statute and the rules and regulations the SEC has the authority to: (1)
Seek injunctive relief in United States District Court, Securities Exchange Act § 21(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964) ; (2) Refer the matter to the Department of Justice with a
recommendation of criminal prosecution; Securities Exchange Act § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. §
78u(e) (1964) ; (3) Institute administrative proceedings against registered broker-dealers
to deny, suspend or revoke their registration, Securities Exchange Act § 15 (a) (3) 15
U.S.C. § 78o(a)(5) (1964).
58 Section 9 of the Act gives a cause of action to any person buying or selling a security
at a price affected by the manipulative actions described therein. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964),
Section 18(a) gives a cause of action to anyone damaged by reliance on false reports or
petition required by the Act to be filed with the Commission, the exchanges or the NASD.
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964). And Section 16(b) of the Act sets forth civil liabilities
relating to insider trading. 15 US.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
59H.R. Doc. No. 95 Pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Specia!
Study].
60Special Study, 693, quoting Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 514 (1934).
61 Special Study at 693-94.
62
1d. at 694-95.
63373 U.S. 341 (1963).
64 Id. at 342-43.
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sideration of the issue, the Court affirmed the principle that the
self-regulators must be allowed to take the initiative and be given
the primary responsibility for the regulation of their members' conduct. The government should retain a residual control but act with
restraint in employing it only when the exchanges and the NASD
65
fail to meet their responsibility.
The Special Study approves the principle of self-regulatory
autonomy with governmental oversights. The term "cooperative regulation"6 6 is used to express the idea that "the roles of the selfregulatory agencies and the Commission are essentially complementary,
and it would follow that self-regulatory agencies must enjoy such
degree of autonomy as will enable them to act as responsible, dynamic
partners in a cooperative enterprise."6 7
Stated very simply, if the self-regulatory bodies are to perform
their purpose, they must operate within a structure allowing them
to assume the initiative and responsibility for the task. They "cannot
be expected to exercise the full measure of responsibility if the
Commission is looking over their shoulder[s] and directing or secondguessing each individual action" 68 that they take.
The purpose of self-regulation thus conceived is to delegate part
of the regulatory function to a second regulatory body in the
securities industry, with its areas of responsibility and its powers
delineated. Its function of supervised independence is distinct from,
but complementary to, the role of the Commission. The correct balance
of government control and self-regulatory independence must be
maintained if the self-regulators are "to act as responsible, dynamic
partners in a cooperative enterprise,''" the ultimate goal of which is
investor protection.
The essential question then is what effect will the imposition of
civil liability for violation of the rules of these agencies have upon
65 The Court quoted in full Mr. Justice (then Commission Chairman) Douglas' remark that
the intention of self-regulation was one of "letting the exchanges take the leadership with
government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak,
behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would
never have to be used." Id. at 352. The quote is from W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND
FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940). The Court then quoted a Senate Committee report stating
that "[Tihe initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining to the
administration of their ordinary affairs remain with the exchanges themselves. It is only
where they fail adequately to provide protection to investors that the Commission is
authorized to step in and compel them to do so." Id.. citing S. Rep. No. 782, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1934). Mr. Justice Stewart in a dissenting opinion affirmed the principle
in his statement that "Ithe purpose of the self-regulation provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act was to delegate governmental power to working institutions which would
undertake, at their own initiative, to enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal
standards in a complex and changing industry." Id. at 371.
66 Special Study at 701.
67 Id. at 702.
68 Id. at 703.
6

9 Id. at 702.
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this balance of supervision and independence. One of the inherent
limitations in the concept of self-regulation is the potential reluctance
of the members of the industry to enforce their rules and discipline
themselves. The fact that the motivation of the industry may be one
of self-interest coupled with what the Special Study refers to as "the
weakness of human nature" 7 raises the real possibility that "selfregulators might not always be as diligent as might be desired, might
71
indeed use self-regulation as a device to avoid regulation altogether."1
One can only speculate what the effect would be on the rule making
of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange if they
were aware that in adopting a rule they were in effect creating new
grounds on which their members could be sued in federal court.
Common sense dictates that such a consideration would not exactly
encourage their taking the initiative in adopting new rules regulating
the conduct of their members, and it is not unlikely that it would
have a definite restrictive effect. The Special Study evidenced a
similar concern over the effect of the Silver decision on the effectiveness of self-regulation. The application of the antitrust laws to
"what the Exchange asserted to be a necessary exercise of its selfregulatory responsibilities [presented] a grave threat to the scope
and viability of self-regulation .... .I' The threat lay in exchanges
being "subject to the inflexible and potentially harsh sanctions of
ordinary lawsuits, particularly treble damage suits in performing
what they may in good faith regard as necessary self-regulation.""
The spectre of unlimited lawsuits against their members based on
their own rules would appear to pose a similar threat to the independence and integrity of the self-regulatory bodies. Whether the
regulators want to create a new civil liability should not be relevant
to the deliberative process in considering the adoption of a new rule.
Another basic principle of self-regulation is that it encompasses
and regulates the ethical behavior of the members. The use of the
phrase "just and equitable principles of trade" has been previously
mentioned as one of the primary statutory standards of self-regu0

7 Id. at 722.

71 Id. at 695. The Special Study is replete with instances of laxity in rule-making and

enforcement by the self-regulators. See, e.g., id. at 669-70. The most notorious example,
of course, was the condition of the American Stock Exchange in 1961 as detailed in a
Commission Staff Report. Staff Report on Organization, Management, and Regulation of
Conduct of Members of the American Stock Exchange. This report is contained in the
Special Study as Appendix XII-A, at 751. The conclusion of the report is harsh: "There
can be little doubt that in the case of the American Stock Exchange the statutory scheme
of self-regulation in the public interest has not worked out in the manner originally
envisioned by Congress. The manifold and prolonged abuses . . . make it clear that the
problem goes beyond isolated violations and amounts to a general deficiency of standards
and a fundamental failure of controls." Id. at 53, Special Study at 805.
2
7 Special Study at 707.
73 Id.
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lation, 4 and it is apparent from the history of the Act that it was
intended to place the obligation of passing and enforcing rules
governing legal but unethical behavior on the self-regulators.7 5
There were two major reasons for initially delegating the responsibility of regulating ethical conduct to the self-regulators: (1)
There was a growing recognition of the need to professionalize the
securities industry; and (2) it was clear that the government was
unable to establish and enforce ethical standards of conduct for that
purpose.6
The Special Study concluded that professionalization of the industry through promulgation and enforcement of high ethical standards "represents the highest of all goals of self-regulation" 77 and
the study recognized that "[a]lmost by hypothesis, this goal is beyond the reach of law and regulation in the ordinary sense. '"78
Two cases have recognized this role of self-regulation in refusing
civil liability for violation of the "suitability rule" on the basis that
it proscribed ethical as well as non-fraudulent conduct. 9
The combination of these principles of self-regulation yields the
conclusion that in order to effectively regulate ethical conduct in
the securities industry, the self-regulatory bodies must operate in a
structure of supervised independence. The issue of civil liability for
violation of these rules must be viewed in terms of the effect it would
have on self -regulation thus conceived and on the over-all regulatory
scheme. The results of lax self-regulation have already been seen."0
It is improbable that holding members of an exchange or association
civilly liable for the violation of their rules could have any sort of
positive or constructive effect on the performance by the self-regulatory bodies in promulgating such rules. It is more probable, rather,
74See note 13, supra.
75 As

one court has put it: "There is a large area for the operation of exchange rules on the
level of business ethics rather than law and in that sphere the statute leaves it to the
exchanges to carry on the necessary work of preventive discipline." Avery v. Moffatt, 187
Misc. 576, 55 N.Y.S.2d 215, 228 (1945).
7 Mr. Justice Douglas pinpointed the purposes of self-regulation in a speech in 1938:
"First, self-discipline in conformity to law
voluntary law obedience so complete that
there is nothing left for government representatives to do; -second. . . obedience
to ethical standards beyond those any law can establish." In explanation of the second
purpose, Justice Douglas said:
By and large, government can operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That
leaves untouched large areas of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of
government regulation but in fact too minute for satisfactory control; some of
it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the realm of ethics and morality.
Into these large areas self-government, and self-government alone, can effectively
reach.
Address before the Bond Club of Hartford, Conn., January 7, 1938, as cited in Special
Study at 694-95.
77Special Study at 695.
78Id.
79See notes 39 & 42, supra and accompanying text.

80See note 71, supra.
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that it could have an inhibitive effect similar to that envisioned by
the Special Study.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE TEST

Although to date most of the suits against broker-dealers for
violation of exchange or association rules have been based on the
violation of the "suitability" and "know your customer" rules, the
decision in the Buttrey case will most certainly lead to an examination
of the remainder of the rules for possible use as grounds for civil
action. The test proposed by author Lowenfels and partially adopted
by the court in Colonial and Buttrey requires a determination of
whether a particular rule was adopted for the "direct protection of
investors" or was merely a housekeeping rule. If the former, there
is a strong if not controlling reason for allowing the investor to sue
for a violation of the rule. However, what seemingly would be a relatively easy factual determination becomes more difficult in application
and in some instances leads to incongruous results.
For example, Rule 403 of the NYSE provides in part that no
member shall be directly or indirectly associated with or transact
business with "any bucket shop.''81 It is easily arguable that one of the
purposes of this rule is to protect the members of the member firm
by prohibiting the firm from dealing with bucket shops, which generally
are defined as firms engaging in questionable selling practices in
speculative securities.8 2 Assume that a NYSE firm purchases a security
for a customer at his request, and that the security can only be obtained
from bucket shops. The price of the security falls rapidly and the
customer sues the representative and the firm for violation of Rule 403.
Assuming that the court would somehow be able to fashion a definition
of a "bucket shop" should the customer be allowed to recover solely
on the basis that he could not have purchased the security if the firm
had obeyed the rule?83
For instance, one of the difficult areas which may arise concerns
rules adopted by the exchange which the Commission is without
81 New York Stock Exchange Rule 403, CCH New York Stock Exchange Guide 1i 2403.
82 See 1 IOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 39 (1961).

83 Another example would be Rule 346 of the New York Stock Exchange which generally
provides that a registered representative shall not engage in any other business without
exchange approval and must devote his full time during business hours to the business of
the member firm. New York Stock Exchange Rule 346, CCH New York Stock Exchange
Guide 2346. Here again, it could easily be concluded that one of the purposes of the rule
was to protect the customers on the theory that a representative would be better informed
and provide better service if he devoted all of his energies to the brokerage business.
Assume that an unexpected low earnings report for a security held by a customer was
announced on an afternoon when the representative was interviewing for a position with
another brokerage firm. Assume that the price fell rapidly and the customer could demonstrate that those who sold that afternoon did not suffer near the loss of those who sold, as
he did, the next morning. Should he be allowed to sue and recover solely on the grounds
that had the representative been in the office at the time of the announcement and
informed the customer, he would have sold sooner and not suffered such a loss?
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authority to adopt. Where such a rule is clearly promulgated for the
protection of investors, a customer could theoretically sue in federal
court on a rule which at least in some instances4 Congress has refused
to give the Commission the authority to adopt.
CONCLUSION

Since there appears to be no controlling or even persuasive statutory theory or case law regarding the question of civil liability for
brokers for violation of association and exchange rules, the broader
area of public policy must be relied on for guiding principles. The
primary goal of regulation in the securities field is the protection of
the public investor, and as stated earlier, Congress has attempted to
achieve this by a combination of civil liability, government enforcement,
and self-regulation. It is a relatively intricate regulatory scheme with
its over-all effectiveness depending in large measure on an integrated
balance of the three segments. Imposing civil liabilities for violation of
exchange and association rules raises the very real possibility of upsetting this balance -by affecting the vigor and motivation with which
the self-regulators perform their functions.
No case has been made that the ultimate goal of investor protection is being obstructed by inadequate civil remedies for investors
against brokers. In view of this, and in view of the possible consequences
of accomplishing this goal by further expanding civil liabilities, it is
urged that public policy does not require the imposition of civil liabilities for violations of self-regulatory rules. To the contrary, policy
considerations would seem to weigh against imposition of such liabilities
if self-regulation, particularly in regard to the ethical conduct of
the members, is to function effectively to achieve maximum investor
protection.

84

The Commission has never adopted rules regulating physical segregation of customers'
securities by brokerage firms, although it proposed legislative amendments in 1941,
1956 and 1959 requesting the authority to do so. However, the New York Stock Exchange
has adopted rules requiring segregation of customers' fully paid and excess margin
securities. There can be little question that these rules requiring identification of customers' securities were passed for the direct protection of investors.
Under the test, a customer could sue a broker for the losses resulting from the
broker's failure to properly segregate his securities in violation of the rule.

FACULTY COMMENT
FUTURE INTERESTS - The Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to a
Pre-Emption. - Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297 (Colo.
1969).
T

HE opinion by Mr. Justice Groves is noteworthy because of the
sophistication with which it applies the rule against perpetuities
to a pre-emption.
The document which is determined to be governing provided that,
"in connection with the purchase of said land. . . by the City and as
part of the consideration of the sale thereof by the Atchisons ....
The City hereby gives and grants unto the Atchisons the exclusive and prior right at the option of the Atchisons to repurchase
. ..the lands ...at the same price and upon the same terms and conditions upon which the City is willing to sell ... said real estate...
to any third person ....
1
The rights of the Atchisons under this agreement shall be deemed
not in tenancy in common but in joint tenancy in them and in the
survivor of
them, their assigns and the heirs and assigns of such
2
survivor."

It was held that the pre-emption thereby created was not personal
to the Atchisons; that it was therefore of unlimited duration; that it
was subject to the rule against perpetuities; that it was void for remoteness; and that therefore the summary judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
A large part of the opinion is devoted to the construction of the
documents and to a consideration of the argument that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment, but the part of the opinion
which is of the most general interest deals with the question of whether
the pre-emption is subject to the rule against perpetuities.
The opinion quotes Gray's statement of the rule, with its magnificently sweeping and misleading 3 phrase "[nJo interest is good," which
I Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 299-300 (Colo. 1969).
2

1d. at 300.

3The following "interests" have been held to be not subject to the rule: contractual
interests which do not create interests in other property, Caplan v. City of Pittsburgh,
375 Pa. 268, 100 A.2d 380 (1953) ; rights of entry for condition broken, Hinton v. Gilbert, 221 Ala. 309, 128 So. 604 (1930) ; possibilities of reverter, Brown v. Independent
Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950); options to renew
a lease, Ehrhart v. Spencer, 175 Kan. 227, 263 P.2d 246 (1953) ; options by lessees to
buy, Hollander v. Central Metal and Supply Co. of Baltimore City, 109 Md. 131. 71 A.
442 (1908). As to common law contingent remainders there is a quaere. See KALES,
ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS IN ILLINOIS § 662 (1920).
See also Barry v. Newton - Perpetuities -Contingent Remainders - "If at All," 32
DICTA 7 (1955), where attention is called to the inconclusiveness of erroneous language
like that found in the opinion of the case now under consideration: "the rule a'sainst
78
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by itself provides a superficial answer; but the opinion does not stop
there. It recognizes that ordinary options are subject to the rule and
that a pre-emption is an option, 'but goes on to observe that a preemption is significantly different from an ordinary option:
An option given to a person, his heirs and assigns, to purchase land
for $5,000 with no limiting term is void under the rule against
perpetuities. The reason is that, with such an option outstanding the
owner dare not place substantial improvements on the land, and the
likelihood of anyone purchasing it is remote. The reason for application
of the rule against perpetuities to a pre-emptive right to purchase at
an offeror's price acceptable to the owner is not supported by the same
thus making the case for
reasoning as found in the option example,
4
non-application much more arguable.

The opinion then presents an exhaustive array of the authorities
on both sides of the question: the lumpers (All options are options and
are subject to the rule.) v. the hairsplitters (There are two kinds of
options, ordinary and pre-emptive, and the pre-emptive options are not

subject to the rule.)
The opinion follows the hairsplitters and surpasses them. They
split options into two kinds and say that pre-emptive options are not
within the rule. The opinion splits the remaining half hair into three
parts and says that there are three kinds of pre-emptive options: (1)
those which are created in such a way that the owner of the preemption could be identified by referring to the record title; (2) those
which are "restricted to a limited term found to be reasonable, albeit
longer than a life in being plus 21 years;" 5 and (3) those in which the
owner calnnot be so identified, and which are not limited to a reasonable term.
The opinion holds that the third kind of pre-emptive option is
subject to the rule even though the other two might not be, and finds
that the pre-emption granted to the Atchisons is of the third kind,
and therefore void:
We have held that before us is an inheritable pre-emptive right
without limit as to time. It is in no manner connected with any land
owned by Mr. and Mrs. Atchison.... [T]here will be no land title
interezt of record to give any clue as to the identity of future successors

in interest to the pre-emptive right. We feel that at some point in the
infinite time at which [the City] might in the future conclude to sell
the land, ascertaining and locating the owners of the pre-emptive right
would be an unreasonable task. As a result, there would be a sufficiently
unreasonable restraint upon the transferability of the property as to
justify imposition of the rule against perpetuities. It may be said that
perpetuities . . .has been applied in Colorado to certain contingent remainder interests."
Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 299 (Colo. 1969). See Rocky Mountain
Fuel Co. v. Heflin, 148 Colo. 415, 366 P.2d 577 (1961) ;Barry v. Newton, 130 Colo.
4
5

106. 273 P.2d 735 (1954). As a matter of fact, neither case dealt with a remainder. In
Fuel Co. it was an option, and in Barry, a springing executory interest.
Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 301-02 (Colo. 1969).

ld. at 303.
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we are stating a rule against alienation and giving it a label of the rule

against perpetuities. Be that as it may, the result is the same."
The acceptance of this invitation to criticize the theory of the
opinion turns out to be unrewarding. Since the reason for excluding
pre-emptions from the rule against perpetuities is that land subject to
a pre-emption is more readily alienable than land subject to an ordinary
option,7 it follows that the degree of alienability is a logical basis for
holding that some pre-emptions are subject to the rule even though
others may not be.
The same considerations take most of the shock out of the statement that "our conclusion might be different. . if [the pre-emption]
were.., limited [to a] term found to be reasonable,' albeit longer than
a life in being plus 21 years. ' 8 How could such a long term be found
to be reasonable? This is again a matter of the degree of alienability
sufficient to take a pre-emption out of the rule applicable to ordinary
options. There is a difference between a pre-emption granted "to A and
his heirs and assigns" and one "for a period of 25 years." The recognition of this difference as a basis for determining which pre-emptions are
subject to the rule against perpetuities does not change the basis of the
opinion from the rule against perpetuities to the rule against restraints
on alienation.
The opinion is therefore based upon a very narrow proposition,
namely, that when
an inheritable pre-emptive right without limit as to time.... [I]s in no
manner connected with any land .. . there will be no land title interest

of record to give any clue as to the identity of future successors in
interest. .

.

. [And] [als a result, there would be sufficiently un-

reasonable restraint upon the transferability of the property to justify

the imposition of the rule against perpetuities. 9

In the petition for rehearing, plaintiffs in error insisted that this
proposition did not afford a sufficient ground for distinguishing the
case of Weber v. Texas Co.10 which had held that a pre-emption was
not subject to the rule. The Colorado court is of course under no duty
to distinguish cases from other jurisdictions and cannot be criticized
for relying upon what might be called the Colorado rule.
However there would appear to be some logical difficulty in
applying this Colorado rule to a pre-emption concerning Colorado land.
6 id.

7 Other remote interests which have been held valid because of greater alienability are:
(1) those found in a revocable trust, Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461

(1958); (2) those subject to a general inter vivos power of appointment, Appeal of
Mifflin, 121 Pa. 205, 15 A. 525 (1888); and (3) those subject to the power of a
tenant in fee tail, Barber v. Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago Ry. Co., 166 U.S. 83.
108 (1896).
8
Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 303 (Colo. 1969).
9Id.
1083 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 561 (1936).
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An essential part of the rule is that "there will be no land title interest
".."The Colorado recording act provides that -[aIll ...
of record .
agreements or other instruments 'in writing ... encumbering or affecting the title to real property.. . may be recorded. .
This language
would seem to be broad enough to make a pre-emption itself recordable
in Colorado, and if within the recording act, then not within the Colorado rule.
In the introductory part of the opinion, unusual stress is laid upon
the fact that the phrase "if at all" is an important part of the orthodox
statement of the rule against perpetuities."l However, on the facts of
this case the inclusion or exclusion of the phrase would have made no
difference, and the Justice's remarks must be attributed to his inability
to repress his amusement at the spectacle of a professor admonishing
14
the court.
By T.G.M.

11Atchison

v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 303 (Colo. 1969).
§ 118-6-9 (1963). As a matter of fact, this pre-emption was
recorded. Brief of Plaintiffs in Error at 7, Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297
(Colo. 1969).
1 For an indication of the ease with which this sometimes crucial phrase is inadvertently
omitted, see Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act § 1, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 75-76
(1956). See also The Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act - "If at all," 11 PRAC. LAw.
No. 4, at 73 (1965), and this sentence by W. Barton Leach himself- "By classical theory
a future interest is void unless there is 'absolute certainty' that it will vest within
the period of perpetuities." Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts, and Prac12 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.

titioners Can Do About the Follies of the Rule, 13 U. KAN. L. REV. 351, 352 (1965).

14Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297, 299 (Colo. 1969).
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INTRODUCTION

SEVERAL

years ago, a book by Michael Harrington 1 stirred the
conscience of America to the plight of the one-sixth of the nation's
population living in poverty.2 In a land of enormous economic prosperity, it seemed somehow incongruous that so many Americans could
be without adequate food, clothing, lodging, and other essentials of
mid-twentieth century life. President Johnson declared war on poverty,
and the crisis of America's cities in the early and middle 1960's focused
national attention on the ghetto ills that were traceable to abject
poverty. Almost as a stepchild of the urban crusade, poverty in rural
America captured only limited attention, even though every major study
of urban poverty concluded that the mass exodus of Americans from
rural areas to the cities exacerbated if not spawned many of the urban
problems. For instance, the President's Advisory Commission on Rural
Poverty stated in its 1967 report:
It is a shocking fact that in the United States today, in what is the
richest nation in history, close to 14 million rural Americans are poor,
and a high proportion of them are destitute. By their poverty they are
deprived of freedom to share in our economic abundance.
We can no longer permit public policy to ignore the rural poor.
For if we do, we shall see a continuing movement of rural people to
our central cities. As the summer of 1967 illustrated, the slums and
I M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962).

2In December of 1965, the Office of Economic Opportunity estimated that 34,300,000
Americans were included in its definition of poverty. FACTS ON FILE, INC., WAR ON
POVERTY 2, 3 (1967).
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ghettos of the city breed hatred and violence,
which is no solution to
the problems of either city or country. 3

In the legal profession, legal aid for the urban poor increasingly
drew the attention of judges, lawyers, legslators, and law students; and
the Legal Services Division of the Office of Economic Opportunity,4
established in 1965, began funding neighborhood law offices in lowincome ghetto areas. 5 The first efforts were thus aimed at extension
of free legal services to indigent residents in urban ghettos, and the

need for similar services in rural America was only belatedly recognized.6
Extensive field studies of the legal problems of the urban poor
have been made in Denver, Colorado, 7 and Peoria, Illinois.' Only
very recently, however, have similar analyses been performed in a
rural setting. With the generous financial assistance of the American
Bar Foundation, the Denver Law Journal undertook in 1968-69 an
extensive empirical study of the legal problems of the rural poor in
two selected counties in the San Luis Valley of southern Colorado,
Conejos and Costilla Counties. While rural poverty permeates much of
the state, the worst conditions are found in these two counties, and the
characteristics of the area - a largely Spanish-American' 0 population
living in and around small villages and wedded to an agricultural society
facing severe economic depression- are typical of rural poverty in
many of the Western States.

The paramount purpose of this empirical project was to ascertain
how the rural poor in the two sample counties react to and resolve
legal problems confronting them. The authors of this study made no
attempt to define, categorize, enumerate, or record a statistical fre3 THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY COM-

MISSION ON RURAL POVERTY 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND].
4 The legal services programs of the OEO are authorized by the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2781-91 (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2809 (Supp. 1968).
5 See Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office - OEO's Special Grants in Legal Services,
56 GEo. L.J. 742 (1968); Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal
Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REv. 805 (1967). See generally P. WALD, LAW AND
POVERTY (1965).

One of the first programs in a rural area was the "Judicare" legal aid system established
in 26 rural Wisconsin counties. See Schlossberg and Weinberg, The Role of Judicare
in the American Legal System, 54 A.B.A.J. 1000, 1001 (1968). See also Spitz-Jensen &
Laitos, A Critique- Lawyers, Rural Problems, VISTA and Failure, 15 STUD. LAW. J. 4
(March 1970) ; WiRrz, Youth's Protest: Individualism & the Role of the Lawyer,
40 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1967).
7 Skyes, Legal Needs of the Poor in the City of Denver, 4 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 255 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Sykes].
8 American Bar Foundation, Peoria General Community Survey (1966). (Unpublishedavailable from the A.B.F.)
9 Note, The Legal Problems of the Rural Poor, 1969 DUKE L.J. 495.
10 The term "Spanish-American" is employed throughout this study to refer to the separate
and identifiable cultural group which is also variously referred to - both in the literature
and by certain segments of the group itself - as Hispano, Chicano, Mexican, MexicanAmerican, and Spanish-surnamed. See, LA RAZA: FORGOTTEN AMERICANS xiv, XV (J.
Samora ed. 1966).
6
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quency of occurrence among the indigent population for every type
of legal problem. Not only has that task been commendably performed elsewhere," but the limitations of manpower resources and
time militated against a frontal assault on all aspects of the legal
needs of the rural poor. Rather, an attempt was made to investigate
and to analyze the processes of legal problemsolving among the rural
poor and the relationship of those processes to the formal legal system
as it operates in the two sample counties under observation.
Any accurate responses to this central inquiry necessarily required
an evaluative disposition of several secondary questions: First, how
does the formal legal system and the rural bar respond to the various
types of legal problems encountered by the rural poor? An attempt
was made to evaluate the response in terms of the resources of the
legal community itself and in terms of the effectiveness of the response in resolving the various types of legal problems faced by
the rural poor. Second, as an alternative to the formal system, how
do informal processes operate to resolve the problems of the rural
poor? The answer to this question involved an analysis of informal
problemsolving by the indigents themselves and by "confidants" who
are known to and trusted by the indigent residents of the rural communities. Finally, and most important, to what extent are the solutions
employed by the indigent class in the sample counties effective in
resolving their legal problems?
This examination of the formal and informal legal systems indicates
that the current solutions to legal problems employed by the rural poor
are either inadequate or insufficient. The data suggest the need for a
modernization and integration of the existing systems with a view
towards furnishing the rural poor with the legal tools needed to deal
effectively with their environment. Before presenting the results of the
inquiry, however, a description of the methodology utilized and the
demographic and social background of the two-county area surveyed
is in order.
I. METHODOLOGY

The empirical research for this project consisted of three separate
phases. The first was an effort to determine the attitudes of rural
Colorado attorneys toward the legal problems of their indigenous
poor. Unstructured interviews with local community leaders in Conejos
and Costilla Counties comprised the second phase of the project,
which was conducted contemporaneously with the third phase of the
project -the
survey of the rural poor themselves.
n See Note, supra note 9.
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At the outset of preparation of the field research of this project,
a lengthy and detailed questionnaire was drafted. The written questions were so framed as to discover the types of legal problems confronting the poor residents of the sample counties and the reactions
of each indigent questioned to such enumerated problems. This questionnaire was generally modeled after those used in the Peoria study' 2
and the Denver study.'" Following a pilot test in the Denver area,
it was determined that a structured questionnaire approach was not
well suited to the particular goal of this project; it was too rigid,
and it limited the full exploration of the problemsolving processes
of the indigent class. Since the selected emphasis for the empirical
research vitiated the necessity for accurate statistical data on what
legal problems are encountered by the rural poor, individually or
as a class, in favor of how any specific legal problem is typically
resolved, if at all, it was felt that the administration of questionnaires - in particular, the simultaneous recordation of responses by
the interviewing team - would inhibit rather than encourage in-depth
inquiry. Moreover, without an a priori knowledge of all possible legal
problems that might be named, especially any particularly parochial to
residents of the sample counties, any attempt to draft an all-inclusive
questionnaire sufficiently detailed to insure that mention would be
made of all problemsolving techniques and resources would result
in lengthy, burdensome, and stilted interviews. It was for this reason
that the field research described below was based on a generally unstructured, informal interviewing technique.
Before the field research itself was undertaken, however, an
attempt was made to determine the attitudes of rural Colorado attorneys generally toward the legal problems of their indigenous poor.
The tool selected for this inquiry was a formal, structured questionnaire sent to all members of the Colorado Bar Association residing in selected communities representing a cross-section of rural
Colorado. More than 20 communities, ranging in population from
500 to 15,000,14 were selected, including at least one community from
every geographically defined rural area in the state. All members of
the Colorado Bar Association in the San Luis Valley received the
questionnaire. A total of 105 questionnaires were mailed and 51 were
returned. The questionnaire is printed in full as an Appendix to this
article, and the statistical conclusions drawn from the responses are
interspersed throughout the remainder of this report.
12 See

Peoria Survey, supra note 8.
Sykes, supra note 7.
14Almost all of the communities were of less than 5,000 population, but a few larger towns
were selected in order to insure that the sample included attorneys from all rural areas
of the state.
13 See
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Unstructured interviews with local community leaders in Conejos
and Costilla Counties comprised the second phase of the project.
Among those so interviewed were businessmen, priests, public school
officials, judges, attorneys, 15 OEO personnel (including VISTA volunteers), middle-class farmers and ranchers, and state and local governmental officials. The term "community leaders" is used to denote
that class of residents within the two counties whose income, age,
education, hierarchical social position, or political power invests them
with an aura of influence vis-a-vis the members of the impoverished
class. This influence - and the acquisition of knowledge by these
local leaders relating to problems confronting the indigenous poor is directly proportional to the degree to which the community leader
functions as a counselor, advisor, and repository of information to
the indigent citizenry. The aim of this second project phase was to
probe the class of community leaders for general information respecting the legal problems of local indigents, to determine the degree
to which the poor seek out and utilize the assistance of nonattorney
community leaders when confronted by legal problems, and finally
to subjectively assess the effectiveness of these leaders in performing
their self-designated tasks as confidants 6 to the poor.
The interviewing sessions were conducted by two-man teams from
the Denver Law Journal. Each interviewed leader was initially informed that his interviewers were law students at the University of
Denver conducting a study of the legal problems of the rural poor
in Colorado. The interviews were informal and conversational, the
object being to maintain flexibility in the course of the sessions so
that specific answers could beget still further specific inquiry and
all avenues of exploration could remain open. No notes were taken
during the interviews. Instead, each interviewing team recorded its
observations on paper following each interview, and these notes were
later expanded into final tape recorded reports.
As an initial impetus, each community leader was asked a few
general questions to elicit his awareness of legal problems confronting
the poor. For attorneys and judges the ensuing inquiries adhered
generally to the broad outlines of the attorney questionnaire. At an
appropriate point in the conversations, however, each attorney or judge
was specifically asked to subjectively evaluate the existing legal
services in terms of their responsiveness to the legal needs of the
15 In addition to the elderly attorney still practicing in one of the two counties (see text
accompanying note 118 infra), several lawyers in adjacent counties to the north were
interviewed.
16 The term "confidant" is defined and the role of the "confidant" is discussed at some
length in § IV(A) intra.
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rural poor. The scope and direction of interviews with all other
local leaders was related to the respondent's occupation and community status; questions asked of businessmen, for instance, would
differ in large degree from those asked of priests. The central theme
of each interview, however, was a probe of the respondent's participatory role in promoting legal problemsolving for the poorer
residents of the community. Specifically, each leader was asked
whether he had recently been approached by any local resident seeking
his advice. If the response was affirmative, the interviewers asked
whether the resident was an indigent 7 and what was the nature of
the problem. If the description of the problem appeared to have legal
overtones,"8 the leader was asked to detail his response to the request
for advice. At this juncture, the interviewers mentally noted whether
the respondent had referred the indigent to an attorney, offered his
own advice, or recommended some other source of assistance. Finally,
each leader was examined about his knowledge of the availability of
free legal services in the immediate or surrounding area and the
existence of other aid programs for the poor, including those established by state and federal governments.
With few exceptions, the community leadership was responsive
and cooperative. Often, VISTA volunteers or other previously interviewed community leaders served to introduce an interviewing team
to still other leaders, thereby encouraging a favorable initial rapport
between the interviewers and respondents. Indeed, most subjects readily
acceded to sessions scheduled on short notice, with the informal atmosphere often generating a plethora of narratives depicting local
color but of little substantive value to this study. On the other hand,
much of the really pertinent and valuable information solicited during
these interview sessions may not have been obtainable through a structured questionnaire approach. A few respondents were wary of the
subject matter inquiry and hesitated to openly express their opinions
or to fully detail specific information, apparently because of fear of
17 Unless specifically requested, no attempt was made by the interviewers to define the
term "indigent." Instead, reliance was placed on the community leaders' general awareness of who among local residents would be denominated as improverished. The reasons
for this reliance were threefold: First, the leaders were never asked to name the individuals who sought their advice; second, even if names were mentioned, the process of
independently corroborating the accuracy of poverty classifications would have been unduly
time-consuming and burdensome; and finally, it was felt that any incidence of inaccuracy
by those who are presumed to know their own community and neighbors would be
minimal.
18 At this stage of the questioning the interviewers carefully refrained from positing
leading questions; that is, the questions were so framed as to avoid suggesting a legally
oriented response. For example, the interviewers rather than the respondent determined
whether any problem presented for advice or resolution to the particular leader possessed
legal overtones, hopefully mitigating against any pat-and perhaps untruthfulresponse that all "legal" problems were referred to attorneys.
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disclosure to the local community. Assurances of anonymity by the
interviewers generally produced a fruitful interview, although the
latent hesitancy could not be fully dispelled. The information subsequently obtained was evaluated in light of the respondent's attitude. Additionally, two local government officials were openly
hostile toward the interviewers, regarding them as nosy student
agitators from the big city who were trying to stir up trouble among
the local poor. When confronted by such an attitude, the interviewers
courteously terminated the sessions.
The third phase of this project, the survey of the rural poor
themselves, utilized the same technique as that for the community
leadership survey- informal and unstructured interview sessions
conducted by student interviewers from the Denver Law Journal. In
each of the two sample counties, two communities, one with a population of approximately 1,000 and the other with approximately 300
residents, were selected as target areas. A total of approximately 100
indigent residents were interviewed in these four areas.' 9
Most of the respondents interviewed were selected by references
from local VISTA volunteers or welfare caseworkers who were well
acquainted with many local impoverished residents, and whose aid
in introduction to prospective respondents was invaluable. 20 Similarly,
several interviews followed from references to local indigents by
businessmen, priests, and others, and a few respondents furnished
leads to still other prospective respondents. Thus, the selection of the
sample was essentially accidental, 2 ' although an attempt was made
to insure a fairly representative choice.
Most of the interviews were conducted in a respondent's home,
although a few sessions with working men were held in local cafes
or even bars, and one particular gathering of 10 women serving as
19 A small number of indigents residing on farms in the outlying areas of the two counties
were also interviewed. These respondents were selected on the basis of their being known
by VISTA volunteers. Since the vast majority of the indigents in the sample counties are
nonfarm residents, see note 37 infra, the principal interviewing was directed toward
indigents living in the target area communities.
2 The VISTA volunteers or welfare caseworkers sometimes sat through the interview
sessions, although they were asked in advance not to volunteer any information nor to
assist the interviewees in responding to questions posed. In short, they were requested
to maintain a "silent" presence.
21 Technically, an accidental sample is a nonprobability sample in which one simply reaches
out and takes the cases that fall to hand, continuing the process until the sample reaches
a designated size. C. SELLTIZ, M. JAHODA, M. DEUTSCH & S. COOK, RESEARCH METHODS
IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 516 (Rev. ed. 1959). The three principle criticisms of this technique relate to problems of evaluating bias, id., problems of applying statistical analysis
to the data, and problems of generalizability. Id. at 537-45. However, the purpose of this
study was not to discover valid statistical relationships, but rather to gain insight into
and analyze a particular process within a particular set of communities. The generalizability of the findings should be considered according to specific circumstances too
numerous to mention here. A comparison between the results of this study and those of
the Duke study, supra note 9, may be be helpful in this regard. See note 180 inf ra.
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an advisory "outreach" group to a local Community Action Program
were interviewed en masse in the CAP office. Where possible, the
interviewers arranged sessions with the husband of a married couple.
The length of the interviews varied, but few exceeded one hour. With
few exceptions, prospective respondents were courteous, cooperative,
and helpful, although it became clearly evident early in the field
research that many indigents in this particular region were quite
sensitive about their impoverished condition. The Spanish-American
indigent in the sample counties is still basically a proud individual,
and, particularly with the male members of the cultural group, the
degrading aspects of poverty cut deeply into the male ego - or
machismo, as it is called.2 2 Consequently, the interviewers avoided
as much as possible any direct inferences or references to poverty which
might have alienated the respondent. Each respondent was informed
only that his interviewers were students at the University of Denver
Law School studying the legal problems of area residents. 3
About 90 percent of the respondents interviewed were SpanishAmerican, the remainder being Anglo. Their ages ranged from 19
to 77; most were middle-aged. All respondents had lived in their
particular local community for at least 6 months, and a substantial
majority had lived in the general area since childhood. About 20
percent had completed high school, and these were principally women.
With few exceptions, the indigents interviewed stated that they
affiliated, regularly or irregularly, with the Roman Catholic church. 4
Each respondent was asked at some appropriate point early in the
session to state the size of his or her family residing in the home and
to roughly estimate the annual earnings of the family. Where answers
22 The word defines a Mexican-American cultural trait which is multifaceted, and whose
exact meaning cannot be translated. The following characteristics are included in the
meaning: (1) Masculinity and manliness; (2) Ego; (3) Honor and pride. The aphorism
"a lo hecho-pecho" (to face that which is done) is used to indicate a machismo attitude.
See also LA RAzA: FORGO-rrEN AMERICANS 145 (J. Samora ed. 1966).
23 On occasion, respondents asked an interviewing team from whence came the money to
support the field survey. During the summer and fall of 1968, unconfirmed rumors
circulated among the citizenry of Costilla County that a study of the town of San Luis
for the purpose of ascertaining its tourism potential had been heavily funded with federal
tax money and the participants in the project had frittered away this funding by high
living and expensive travel between Boston, Massachusetts and San Luis. The project's
conclusions are found in a rather short report, The Lazy Eight: OEO Project San Luis,
A Proposal to Restore Historic San Luis, May 1, 1967 (unpublished proposal available
from the Lazy Eight, 96 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, Mass.) These rumors engendered
a latent hostility to "outsiders" who might spend government funds while "using" the
indigenous populace as subjects for neat academic reports, while the real needs of the
impoverished class - jobs, income, food - remain unsatisfied. Consequently, any respondent who queried his interviewers about this topic was told that there was outside
funding for travel and incidental expenses, but the amount so allocated was small indeed
and came from a private, rather than a governmental, source.
24 This personal and background data was obtained from observation and simple questions
asked at some point in the conversation - generally, very early in the session.
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to these questions clearly revealed that the respondent could not be
classified as an indigent, 25 the sessions were terminated.
The sessions themselves were conversational and informal. The
questions posed, other than those dealing with background data, were
of two general types.
The first category of questions was flexibily designed to probe
actual experiences of each respondent in recognizing, confronting, and
reacting to problems having legal implications. 26 A series of broad,
general questions were initially framed in order to stir the memory
of the respondent and to delineate the boundaries for the ensuing
discussion. Each respondent was asked whether he or any member
of his family had ever encountered "problems" with (1) the local
welfare agencies, (2) public school officials, (3) employers, (4)
landlords, if any, (5) local merchants in the purchase of goods or
commodities, (6) traveling salesmen, (7) local or state police officers
or sheriff's deputies in matters criminal, (8) finance agencies in the
25

An accurate definition of the term "poverty" is difficult.
"Poverty" is controversial word. Not everyone agrees on what it means. This
applies to experts as well as laymen. In the opinion of the Commission, poverty
is partly inadequate income, but it goes much deeper than that. Poverty afflicts
the mind and the spirit as well.
THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3. at 7. Low income is widely employed as a
poverty index. An individual is considered poor if his personal income or total family
income inadequately provides for his family's subsistence. The poverty line is said to be
the minimum level of income needed to provide the individual and his family with the
kind of living standard that society considers a basic human right. Id. Translating this
concept into a dollar and cents figure of annual income, however, has engendered varied
opinions. See generally POVERTY IN AMERICA: A BOOK OF READINGS (L. Ferman, J.
Kornbluh, & A. Haber eds. 1965). Certainly, the poverty line must be relative, depending
upon geographical location, number of members in the family, and a comparison of the
local standard of living with that in other geographic areas. "The figure of $3,000 as
the poverty line is useful as a rough approximation, though it cannot be applied univer.
sally or indiscriminately." THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at 7.
Although acknowledging the considerable statistical literature on poverty levels in
general, see, e.g., M. ORSHANSKY, THE POOR IN 1965 AND TRENDS, 1959-65 (U.S.
Dep't of HEW, Feb. 16, 1967); M. ORSHANSKY, RECOUNTING THE POOR -A
FIVE
YEAR REVIEW (Social Security Bull. 1966); H. LAMALE, POVERTY: THE WORD AND
THE REALITY, Monthly Labor Review, July 1965, at 822-27, the revised income poverty
guidelines of the OEO were adopted for purposes of this study:

Family Size

3
4
5
6
7
8

Nonfarm

Farm

Family Size

$2,500
3,200
3,800
4,200
4,700
5,300

$1,700
2,200
2,600
3,000
3,300
3,700

9
10
11
12
13

Nonfarm

5,800
6,300
6,800
7,300
7,800

Farm

4,000
4,400
4,700
5,100
5,400

OEO Instruction # 6004-1 (Dec. 27, 1968).
26 As in the interviews with community leaders, the interviewing team carefully refrained
from asking leading questions suggesting a solution through traditional legal resources,
which might thereby encourage the respondent to prevaricate in order to show his or
her ability to recognize legal problems and unhesitancy in going to an attorney's office.
The determination of a problem as involving legal ramifications was mentally noted by
the interviewers.
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securing of loans, (9) any other governmental official, such as the
county tax assessor, (10) the respondent's spouse or children in
matters relating to divorce or child custody, and (11) any other
person- neighbors, friends, relatives, or fellow community residents
-as
to possible squabbles over money, inheritances, boundary disputes, nuisances, vandalism, and so forth. If a particular problem in
any area was mentioned, further probing followed in order to determine the nature of the controversy, how the respondent or family
member reacted to it, and the ultimate disposition, if any.
The second broad category of questions dealt with any actual
personal contact which the respondent may have had with an attorney. If the particular respondent indicated that he or she or a
member of the family had ever seen an attorney concerning any
problem (other than as a defendant in a criminal matter) the particular incident, and others that may have followed, were probed in
depth. Included were questions such as (1) whether the respondent
was referred by a third party to the attorney, and if so, by whom,
(2) what was the charge for services rendered and what was actually
paid, (3) whether the problem for which legal advice or assistance
was sought was actually solved to the satisfaction of the respondent,
(4) whether the respondent ever returned to the same attorney with
any subsequent problem, and (5) what the respondent subjectively
thought about the attorney contact. The responses made were mentally
noted and then recorded on paper following the session, to be further
expanded on tape that evening.
II.

DEMOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

The initial impression of a visitor to the two-county area under
study is one of sleepy small town, 19th century rural Americana,
where almost everyone is related to everybody else2 7 and the Catholic
Church is the dominant fixture in the community. Indeed, the SpanishAmerican populace which resides there is a proud people-proud
of their long heritage and proud of their language. Almost all of the
Spanish-American residents, particularly in the older age groups, are
bilingual, speaking not only English but a form of Spanish substantially unchanged since the 16th century Spanish settlement of the
27

A comprehensive study of the Lariat Barrio (a Spanish-American low-income settlement
located on the fringe of Monte Vista in Rio Grande County only 13 miles north of Conejos County) revealed that 91 of 150 families were closely interrelated, and 39 additional
families were interrelated to a distinguishably lesser degree. Only 20 families had no
other relatives in the community. E. Ahrens, A Socioeconomic Status Study of A SpanishAmerican Barrio in Monte Vista, Colorado 48, May, 1968 (unpublished master's thesis
on file in Adams State College Library, Alamosa, Colorado) [hereinafter cited as E.
Ahrens]. Although no similar statistical study of the familial interrelatedness in the
Spanish-American population of Conejos and Costilla counties has been made, informal
estimates made during the field survey were of proportions similar to the Lariat study.
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San Luis Valley, but including a smattering of words transmogrified
from English.2 8 But underneath this placid facade is a deeply rooted
'culture of poverty"2 incapable of measurement by mere statistical
characterization. It is a condition, a feeling of hopelessness instilled
in those caught up in the widening circle of economic degradation.
It has many causes, the sum total of which etches a definition of the
quality of rural life.
The provision of medical, dental, and general health services are
among [the severely limited services available in rural communities],
as are cultural advantages such as libraries and museums which provide the incentive to continued individual developent. Also less
available are the entertainment and recreational advantages of urban
living. While it is certainly reasonable to suggest that many of these
"advantages" are compensations for the tensions and pressures of
urban life and that the qualities of rural life may outweigh their
absence, it is useful to remember that the complex organization of the
industrial society is the force which has made it possible for many
to attain an economic sufficiency. Without the necessary familiarity
with this type of society, much of the rural population in America
finds itself bound to old ways. The old ways are often the ways of
30
marginal living and lifelong deprivation.
In Conejos and Costilla counties the chief provocation of this
'culture of poverty" is the depressed agricultural economy. With the
unemployment rate already much higher than the national average
and increased agricultural mechanization threatening to spiral it even
higher, 3 and with the future economic picture as bleak as it is,32
28A brief historical account of the settlement of the San Luis Valley is presented in E.
Ahrens, supra note 27, at 8-9. With regard to the Spanish language heritage, see generally LA RAzA: FORGOTTEN AMEICANS 5-24 (J. Samora ed. 1966).
29 THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at 8-9.
30
Gibson, Rural Poverty in the Northeast, 15 KAN. L. REv. 469, 473 (1967).
31
Part of the plight of the rural Hispano in Colorado has been the mechanization of farms and ranches, leaving few permanent, year-round jobs available.
One farm near Fort Morgan, Colo., employed 22 in 1947 on a year-round basis.
Last year, that same farm employed three.
In other areas, it has become a tougher problem.
At Del Norte [the seat of Rio Grande County), in southwestern Colorado,
a large community within the town has been built up by deposed farm and
ranch workers.
Huber, Rural Hispanos Poorest in State, The Denver Post (Special Supp.), May 13, 1969,
at 7, col. 3-4.
32 Other than increased state and federal aid, funneled either through the present welfare
system or through some other conduit which would by pass or replace the creaking
machinery of the welfare state, the only localized hope for economic improvement in
the region lies in increased industrialization or tourism.
Industrial parks have been created near the outskirts of Alamosa and Monte Vista
in Alamosa and Rio Grande counties. The Lazy Eight: OEO Project San Luis, A
Proposal to Restore Historic San Luis, May 1, 1967 (unpublished proposal available
from the Lazy Eight, 96 Mt. Auburn St., Cambridge, Mass.) At present, however,
nothing approaching a major industry sufficient to ease the high unemployment and
provide year-around jobs has located in either site, although a skiwear manufacturer
considered, then abandoned, a plan to locate a skiwear clothing plant near Monte Vista
in 1968. Neither Conejos nor Costilla counties have any zoned industrial areas.
Tourism, particularly among sportsmen and recreational enthusiasts, continues to
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a feeling of helplessness is engendered which has been capsulized by
one Spanish-American woman: " 'We can't get ahead here,' says Mrs.
Gomez. 'There is no way for us to improve. Our only hope is to
move on.' "33
A. Geography and Populalion
Conejos and Costilla counties lie adjacent to each other in south
central Colorado. As the two most southern counties in the San Luis
Valley, 4 they are bounded by steep mountain ranges to the east and
west and by the State of New Mexico to the south. Several small
communities and villages dot the landscape in the two counties,
principally along the few major highways in the region."5 Almost
all of the residents in the two counties surveyed who can be classified
as living in poverty3 6 reside in or near these small communities, rather
than on farms, working as seasonal farm laborers.3 "
burgeon in the San Luis Valley, though notably not in the poverty-stricken areas of
Conejos and Costilla counties. One study of Costilla County noted that
[olne of the very real possibilities for economic development in this county is
that of tourism. In developing this industry they should review their historic
resources, cultural uniqueness, historic buildings, and other physical elements,
scenic areas, reconstruction possibilities, etc. that may be made attractive ...
Costilla county is rich in tourism resources, but it will require a high level
of imagination, community consciousness, and cooperative effort of all the
people, as well as considerable outside capital to develop it. If they do, however, it will provide increased income for those now in business and many
new jobs for others.
Andrews, Family Composition and Characteristics of an Economically Deprived Cross
Cultural Rocky Mountain Area, ROCKY MT. Soc. Sci. J. 122 (April 1966). For a
detailed proposal for re-creation of the original town of San Luis, originally settled
in 1651, see The Lazy Eight: OEO Project San Luis, supra.
3 Huber, supra note 31, at 7, col. 2.
34 The San Luis Valley region is an area in south central Colorado encompassing 8,202
square miles of land. It includes, in addition to Conejos and Costilla counties, the
counties of Alamosa, Mineral, Rio Grande, and Saguache. The Valley is part of an
ancient lake bed, forming a level surface which rises gradually into steep mountains
to the west, east, and north, ranging in elevation from 7,000 to 14,317 feet. The region
represents 7.9 percent of the land area of Colorado - an area roughly equal to the State
of Massachusetts - but the population of 39,600 in 1964 represented only 2.0 percent
of the total state population. Of this land area, nearly 52 percent is National Forest
land, 41 percent is agricultural and grazing land on the floor of the Valley, and 2.4
percent is mineral land. COLORADO YEARBOOK 1962-1964, at 833 (1964). For a lengthy
and detailed history of the San Luis Valley, from early man to the present, and including
an accurate analysis of the present occupance patterns, see D. Lantis, The San Luis
Valley, Colorado: Sequent Rural Occupance in an Intermontane Basin (1950) (unpublished doctorate thesis on file in Adams State College Library, Alamosa, Colo. ). See
generally 1 SAN Luts VALLEY HISTORiAN, Nos. 1-3 (1968-69); H. Skogland, A Histor,
of the San Luis Valley (1941) (unpublished master's thesis on file in Adams State
College Library, Alamosa, Colo.).
35 In order to preserve the confidentiality of interviews in the two-county region, names of
communities will not generally be given in this report.
36 See note 25 supra.
37 In
detailing population composits of various counties in Colorado, the Office of
Economic Opportunity stated: "Among the poor population, the largest proportion of
families were white residents of rural areas, though not occupying farms. In 1960, this
category of poor families represented 88.2% of all poor families in Conejos County."
For Costilla County, the estimate was 87.1 percent. OEO COUNTY REPORTS (unpaginated) (1968) (emphasis added).
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The counties are characterized by a low population density. While
Conejos County occupies a land area of 1,274 square miles, its population in 1966 was estimated to be 8,300, down from 8,428 in 1960.
Costilla County occupies 1,220 square miles, and the population in
1966 was estimated to be 3,700, down from 4,219 in 1960. Thus, the
density of population in 1966 was 6.5 persons per square mile in
Conejos County and 3.0 in Costilla County, representing a population
density lower than 86 and 92 percent respectively of all counties in
38
the United States.

The population of the two-county area can also be described as
primarily Spanish-American. Conejos and Costilla counties have the
highest concentration of Spanish-American residents in Colorado 9
- 72.6 percent of the total population in Costilla County and 53.1
40
percent in Conejos County.
B. Economic and Labor Conditions

The economy of the entire San Luis Valley, including the two
counties under study here, is dominated by farming and ranching.
The Valley is principally noted for its commercial fresh vegetables,
potatoes, malting barley, sheep, and cattle. 41 In 1964, 53.4 percent
of the total acreage in Conejos County and 52.8 percent in Costilla
38The statistics are drawn from COLORADO YEARBOOK 1962-1964, at 842, 846 (1964)

and OEO COUNTY REPORTS (1968) (unpaginated). Historically, the population trends
of the two counties can be seen from the following chart:

1870
1880
1890
1900
1910

Conejos County

Costilla County

2,504
5,605
7,193
8,794
11,285

1,779
2,897
3,491
4,632
5,498

Conejos County
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960

8,416
9,803
11,648
10,171
8,428

Costilla County
5,032
5,779
7,533

6,067
4,219

A. Carson, Summary of the Second Phase of the San Luis Valley Project, Lazy Eight
San Luis Valley Project, Monte Vista, Colorado, April 1, 1967 (unpaginated)
(unpublished statistical summary available from the Colorado Migrant Council, Denver,
Colorado) [hereinafter cited as Lazy Eight Project].
39 The rural Spanish-American represents the state's largest single minority ethnic group
-about
100,000 in number, plus more than 80,000 in the Denver metropolitan area.
Huber, supra note 31, at 7, col. 1. But, "the greatest concentration of Spanish-surnamed
citizens by county exists in the southern part of Colorado .... ." The STATUS OF
SPANISH-SURNAMED

CITIZENS IN

COLORADO,

REPORT

TO

THE COLORADO GENERAL

ASSEMBLY 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ASSEMBLY REPORT].
40 ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 39, at 8-9.
41 The value of total crop production in Contejos and Costilla counties over the most recent
3-year period for which statistics are available is as follows: Conejos - $5,912,820 in
1965, $6,318,107 in 1966, and $4,956,028 in 1967; Costilla-$4,126,140 in 1965,
$4,714,852 in 1966, and $3,146,215 in 1967. In 1966 there were 27,800 head of cattle
and 47,100 head of sheep on farms and ranches in Conejos County. In Costilla County
the figures for the same year were 8,300 and 15,600, respectively. COLORADO DEP'T
OF AGRICULTURE, COLORADO AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, BULL. No. BUL-1-67, at 8, 18,
30-32, 74-75 (1967); COLORADO DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, COLORADO AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS, BULL. No. BUL-1-68, at 7-8, 15, 31, 71, 73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 1968].
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County was in farmland. The larger farming operations are found
in greater abundance in Conejos County than in Costilla County, and
consequently a proportionately greater number of indigent SpanishAmericans live and own small farms in the latter.4 2 Of much lesser
importance are other industries and trades in the area. Neither county
has a major, nonagricultural industry. Conejos County has one flour
mill, two meat packing plants, and three perlite mills. None are of
significant size. Several lumber sawmills are located in each county,4 3
near the mountains on both sides of the Valley, but, again, none are
42

Agriculture in the south and east central sectors of [Costillo) county is
largely in small plots many of which do not qualify under the census definition
of a farm. This division is associated with the original Spanish type settlement
patterns of the area. Some of these small units have been consolidated into
farms, but many small pieces still remain and are held by descendants of the
original settlers.
Andrews, supra note 32, at 124. The following chart shows the acreage and sales of
the farms in Conejos and Costilla counties.
Conelos County
TOTAL FARMS
IN ACRES
AVERAGE SIZE OF FARMS
NUMBER OF FARMS IN SIZE:
50 or less acres
50 to 99 acres
100 to 259 acres
260 to 499 acres
500 to 999 acres
1,000 or more acres
FARMS BY ECONOMIC CLASS
COMMERCIAL FARMS
Class I (sales of
$40,000 or more)
Class II (sales of
$20,000 to $39,999)
Class III (sales of
$10,000 to $19,999)
Class IV (sales of
$5,000 to $9,999)
Class V (sales of
$2,500 to $4,999)
Class VI (sales of
$50 to $2,499)

421
1,030.3

Costilla County
191
2,148.0

46
40
108
86
67
74

69
25
34
23
14
26

329

117

49

15

34

6

58

11

61

22

60

28

67

35

Lazy Eight Project, supra note 38. The high figure for the average acreage of farms in
Costilla County is the result of "three large ranches extend[ing] along the east and
north sides of the county. These ranches include a segment of the Sangre de Cristo
mountain range and some valley land and occupy between 300,000-400,000 acres."
Andrews, supra note 32, at 124.
The small plots tilled by indigent Spanish-Americans in Costilla County "are of
little value and even less profit." Huber, supra note 31, at 8, col. 2. Furthermore, the
farming background of the population in Costilla County has been steadily declining
in recent years, a fact explicable by the increased mechanization and consolidation of
farms coupled with the generally depressed farm economy. Fewer young people raised
on farms are willing to eke out a bare subsistence from the land as their parents have
done. Andrews, supra note 32, at 132.
43 Lazy Eight Project, supra note 38.
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of significant size. Each community in the region has a few retail
and service trade businesses. In 1962 only 476 persons were employed
in all manufacturing, wholesale, retail trade, and service trade industries in the two counties.44
The prosperity of the San Luis Valley is heavily dependent upon
the prevailing economic condition of its major industry- agriculture.
In recent years that condition has been anything but rosy. The smaller,
less efficient farms have found themselves in a precarious position
as the economic price-cost squeeze that has affected the entire nation's
farming industry continues unabated. The resulting consolidation and
increased mechanization of farms have wrought social upheaval,
dwindling populations, and fewer and fewer jobs.
Mechanization will benefit [the Western farming] region as a whole,
but in the short run major adjustments are required for individuals
and families with skills for which demand is being curtailed sharply.
The implications for these people are underemployment and continued
low incomes. Thus, mechanization and increased productivity often
have the immediate effect of threatening the livelihood of those least
able to withstand such shocks, Eventually, they may be absorbed in
other sectors of the economy, but this alternative offers little comfort
to people with comparatively little education, few skills, and limited
45
resources presently at their disposal.

In the San Luis Valley, even large farms have been brought to the
edge of financial disaster. In a Denver Post article of November
1968,46 leading farmers and ranches in the Valley uniformly expressed the view that the status of the local agricultural economy
was not quite as austere in 1968 as in the severe slump of 1967, but

that the price-cost squeeze still hurts. All indicated that "something"
must be done soon to improve the economic picture. The cause of
the outcry is the very low profit margin for farmers and ranchers.
The prices for crops and livestock on the open market fluctuate
markedly from month to month and year to year,4" but, in general,
these prices have not risen as rapidly as production costs and wages.
For example, one life-long potato grower in the Valley stated that
the cost of producing 100 pounds of potatoes was then about $2.50.
Another dollar is added for processing, so that a grower must receive
44Forty-seven were employed in Costilla County and 429 in Conejos.

COLORADO YEARBOOK

1962-1964, at 843, 847 (1964).
45Mittelbach & Short, Rural Poverty in the West-Status and Implications,. 15 KAN.
L. REV. 453, 460 (1967). See also note 31 supra.
46 Baker, San Luis Valley Outlook Termed Not Rosy, The Denver Post, Nov. 24, 1968, at
31, col. 1.
47 The fluctuation in prices brought by potatoes sold at market is amply shown by
statistics from the Colorado Department of Agriculture. On April 15, 1965, a hundredweight of potatoes brought $5.30, while the price on September 15 of the same year
was only $1.62. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS1968, supra note 41, at 60.
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$3.50 per hundredweight in order to break even. At the time of the
interview, russet potatoes were bringing $3.50 per hundredweight,
while red McClure potatoes, for which the Valley is widely known,
were bringing only $1.50. The livestock industry was reported to be
in similar straits. The president of the San Luis Valley Cattlemen's
Association reported:
I've been in the cattle business in the valley for 30 years and it
has become harder to make a profit each year ....The average cattleman in the valley is in bad financial shape- if things don't change

in a few years a lot of them will go out of business.

We have the same problems as the farmers. Our costs continue
to rise, but we don't get as much of an increase in the price we receive for our cattle.

What particularly hurts the farmers and ranchers is that, while the
prices for the products they sell are severely depressed, the prices
for the family commodities and farm equipment they must b-uv
steadily increase as the nation's cost of living index rises in an
inflated economy. One grower stated: "Last year was the worst since
Depression days. We received Depression prices for our potatoes,
but we paid inflated prices for everything we had to buy."
With its major industry facing economic doldrums, unemployment in Conejos and Costilla counties is chronic and severe. The
Colorado Manpower Coordinating Committee has classified the counties as two of the five Colorado counties which exhibit "substantial
and persistent unemployment." 4' 8 The burden of this high unemployment rate is carried largely by the Spanish-American segment of
the local populace. From 1960 census figures of Colorado counties
with Spanish-surnamed populations exceeding 2,500, the Colorado
Commission on Spanish-surnamed Citizens arrived at this conclusion:
The figures show that the percent of all unemployed which is
Spanish-surnamed, in most counties, significantly higher than the per48

COLORADO

MANPOWER

COORDINATING

POWER PLANS FISCAL. YEAR

COMMITTEE,

COLORADO COOPERATIVE

MIAN

dubious distinction.

County

Conejos

Costilla

Annual
average

Annual

Annual

Year

average
workforce

average
unemployment

rate
unemployment

1963

2,655

299

11.3%

1964

2,456

220

9.0%

1965
1966
1967
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

2,215

216
223
212
144
108
116
109
115

98-,
9.7,
9.4%

Id. at 1-44 to 1-45.

-

1969, at 1-43 (1968). The following table bears out this

2,299
2,248
1,256
1,121
918
847
897

11.5%

9.6%
12.6%
12.9%
12.8
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cent of the labor force which is Spanish-surnamed. In the total of these
counties the unemployed is almost twice the labor force percent. In
some counties, notably Conejos, Costilla, Huerfano, Las Animas, Otero,
Pueblo, and Weld, the difference is remarkably large, indicating some
significant local factors contributing to unemployment. It is difficult to
isolate these factors but in view of the fact that these are counties with
long histories of Spanish-surnamed populations with employment traditions in agriculture, it would be difficult to believe that existing jobs
were being denied these people. Rather it would seem that traditional
49
agricultural jobs are disappearing in these areas.
The vast majority of the indigent residents in the two-county

region do not live on farms. Rather, they live in and around the small
communities.5" The employment pattern of these community residents

shows that many are employed as seasonal farm laborers. Few hold
white collar jobs. In 1960, 27 percent of the employed in Conejos
County and 24 percent in Costilla County held what can be categorized as white-collar jobs, compared to the national average in
1960 of 41.1 percent. 1 In a survey of 150 residents of the nearby

Spanish-American barrio5 2 of Lariat in Rio Grande County, the total
working force was 114, with 36 indicating no profession, unemployed, or retired. The occupational pattern of the 114 persons in

the working force is set forth in Table 1.
TABLE 153

Occupations of Residents of the Lariat Barrio
Number of
Residents in
Occupation

Percentage of Residents
in Occupation of Total
Work Force

Farm Laborer

50

43.10

Carpenter
Mechanic
Miller

11
10
9

9.48
8.62
7.76

Domestic

6

5.17

General
Heavy Equipment Operator
Other
TOTAL

4
4

3.45
3.45

22
116

18.97
100.00

Occupation

49 ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 39, at 27 (emphasis added). The 1960 census figures

from which the Commission drew its conclusion reveals that 45.52 percent of the
labor force in Conejos County was Spanish-American, while 74.66 percent of the unemployed in the county were of that ethnic grouping. For Costilla County, the percentages
were 65.63 and 90.59 percent. Id. at 28.
s See note 37, supra.
51 OEO COUNTY REPORTS (unpaginated) (1968).
52A barrio is, in normal parlance, a Spanish-American ghetto. In the sparsely populated
rural area, however, a barrio is, more specifically, the separate and distinct community of
Spanish-Americans living adjacent to a small Anglo community.
53 E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 73. The discrepancy in the totals stems from the author's
original table.
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None of the above jobs were high-income occupations. According to
the author of the study,
[e]ven when potentially higher income professions such as construction worker, mechanic, plumber, mason and heavy equipment operator
are listed, those so employed are working on the minimum, or apprentice, wage level ....

The few marginally upper-income jobs, especially

those of a specialized nature, and also the farm labor group itself, are
largely seasonal. This means, then, that from three to five months of
the year, most, if not all, of the labor force of the Lariat community
54
become unemployed.
Reminiscent of John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath, migrant
laborers still toil under a hot autumnal sun harvesting potatoes,
lettuce, and spinach in the San Luis Valley." Especially during peak
harvest time, the demand for seasonal agricultural laborers cannot
be fully met by local residents, and migrant workers, principally
Spanish-Americans, but also including a sizeable portion of Navajo
Indians, are recruited from New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas."
Until 1963 a portion of the seasonal agricultural farm labor demand
was provided by "braceros" - hard-working Mexican nationals xxho
entered into the United States temporarily and furnished a relatively
cheap labor pool for large farming operations. But with the congressional abolition of the bracero importation in 1963, 5 7 migrant
agricultural workers have all been of United States citizenship. It is
virtually impossible to accurately determine the number of migrant
laborers entering Colorado annually, but reliable estimates have indicated that this influx is steadily decreasing each year as the demise
of the bracero program and increased mechanization and consolidation
5
of farming operations take their toll. s
54
55

Id. at 72-74.
REPORT TO THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MIGRATORY

(1962) [hereinafter cited

LABOR IN COLORADO

45

as MIGRATORY LABOR REPORT].

56 Id. § 68, at 55. The peak periods of demand for migratory laborers are in July and
September of each year. During 1961 and 1962, between 36 and 40 percent of the
agricultural laborers employed during these peak periods were local residents and the
remainder were presumably migrants. Id. at 51.
5 Congress refused to extend the Agricultural Workers Importation Act (Mexican), 7
U.S.C. § 1461 (1951), thus causing the legal importation of Mexican laborers to cease
as of December 31, 1964. Id.
8

In 1962 it was estimated that 15,000 migratory laborers were employed in Colorado in
a normal crop year. This figure placed Colorado twelfth highest in the nation and
fourth highest in the Rocky Mountain and West Coast states in volume of interstate
migratory laborers employed. MIGRATORY LABOR REPORT, supra note 55, at 1. In 1966,
however, it was estimated that only 7,830 migrant laborers were employed in the state.
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL FARM LABOR REPORT 8 (1966).
For further explanation of the cause of this decline see Chase, The Migrant Ftrm
Worker in Colorado-The
Life and the Law, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 63 (1967).

1970

RURAL POOR IN COLORADO

The migrant laborer, at least until recently,59 was the epitome
of the forgotten American, facing unique social, economic,6 ° and legal
problems. "This group rivals any other in our society in being isolated
from the benefits of economic growth and progress.''61 The special
legal problems facing migrant laborers in Colorado- including the
San Luis Valley-have been extensively discussed in an article appearing in the University of Colorado Law Review,62 and they are
consequently not extensively analyzed in this study, except as they
bear on legal problems confronting the general indigent population in
Conejos and Costilla counties.
59On May 20, 1966, the Colorado Migrant Council was formed and established as a nonprofit corporation in the State of Colorado, to initiate and operate programs to assist
migratory and other seasonally employed agricultural workers and their families. Shortly
thereafter, the Council was awarded funds from the migrant branch of the Office of
Economic Opportunity. The initial program was composed of the following components:
(1) Infant Education Program; (2) Itinerant Tutor Programs; (3) Night Adult Education; (4) Day Adult Education. Approximately six months after the initial funding,
the Council received approval of additional grants to provide extended services to farm
workers and their families. These included Summer Head Start and Vista programs.
The Council is currently composed of 40 members, one-third of whom are direct
representatives of the poor. A staff of approximately 25 persons is employed at the
central administrative office in Denver, Colorado. More than 150 persons conduct educational programs for the Council. During the summer, when agricultural activity is high,
the staff increases to more than 300 persons in order to at least partially meet the educational and child care needs of the migrant and seasonal farm workers. COLORADO
MIGRANT COUNCIL, COLORADO MIGRANT COUNCIL PROSPECTUS (undated).
In addition to the Council, the Migrant Children Education Act, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 123-29-1, et. seq. (1963), was enacted to provide migrant children with the
educational tools which can enable them to escape the cycle of poverty that has entrapped
their parents.
60 One significant breakthrough that adds another span in bridging the hiatus between
the migrant and the more affluent society was the recent establishment of a federal
minimum wage increasing to $1.30 per hour in 1970 for agricultural employees. Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(b), as amended. (Supp. 1969).
Employers can, however, avoid the dictates of the act by employing less than 500
man-days of farm labor during the peak harvest calendar quarter, and the fraudulent
"contractor system" of migratory employment still siphons off money due to the
migrants into the pockets of the contractor who recruits the labor crews from out-ofstate, furnishes them with often inadequate housing, and acts as a middle man between
the farmer and the migrants on wage payment.. See Chase, supra note 58, at 48, 59.
Another span was provided by the recent Supreme Court decision holding residency
requirements for state welfare assistance-a complete barrier to almost all migrant
laborers- violative of the fourteenth amendment. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). Shortly after that decision, three cases were filed in the United States District
Court in Denver challenging the legality of Colorado's residency requirements, principally
the one-year requirement for AFDC payments, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-11-4
(1963). The Rocky Mountain News, May 10, 1969, at 5, col. 4; The Denver Post, May
10. 1969, at 26, col. 6.
61Shriver, Rural Poverty- The Problem and the Challenge, 15 KAN. L. REV. 401, 403
(1967).
62 Chase, supra note 58. The author is a professor of law at the University of Colorado,
and the first portion of his article details his experiences during one summer when he
worked, lived, and traveled with migrant laborers following the harvest demand around
the state. See also Parkinson & Harper, The Law and Migrant Agricultural Workers,
38 DICTA 341 (1961). See generally PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEW.
MIGRANT HEALTH PROGRAM,

CURRENT OPERATIONS AND ADDITIONAL

NEEDS (1967)

Rummel, Current Developments in Farm Labor Law, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 371 (1968)
Note, Migrant Farm Labor in Upstate New York, 4 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. I
(1968).
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C. Income and Age
Of the 63 Colorado counties, Costilla ranks lowest and Conejos
third from lowest in average annual income level of residents$1,816 and $2,097 respectively. 8 The correlation between the high
percentage of Spanish-American populace and the low income index
is not unrelated. With few exceptions throughout the state, the rural
Spanish-American is indigent. A study of the Spanish-American population of Colorado, commissioned by the 45th General Assembly of
the state legislature, reported:
The clearest generalization that can be made about the Spanishsurnamed population of Colorado is that it exists in a state of poverty,
or near poverty. This conclusion is inescapable from the latest complete
data derived from the 1960 census, and other research. In view of the
inflationary pressures in our economy since 1960 and the continued
decline of unskilled and agricultural employment opportunities, there

is no reason to assume that the economic condition 64
of the Spanishsurnamed population has improved in recent years.
In the two counties, as well as in the State, the Spanish-American
families constituted a greater proportion of those families with incomes of less than $3,000 per year in 1960 than families of any other
single ethnic group. The percentage of Spanish-American families with
less than $3,000 annual income was 65.10 percent in Conejos County
and 81.25 percent in Costilla County. 5 Under the sliding scale
standards of poverty developed by the Office of Economic Opportunity, the poverty line for a nonfarm family of four in Conejos
County stood at $3,026 in 1966, and at $2,989 for Costilla County
for the same year. By these standards, 6 750 of the 1,675 families
residing in Conejos County in 1966 were considered poor, and 374 of
the 698 families in Costilla County were in the same category. In both
instances, the incidence of families in poverty was twice the percentage for the total state population. 7
The age distribution of the residents in the two counties is
skewed in the direction of those under 18 years of age; 47.5 percent
of the population of Conejos County and 47 percent of the population
in Costilla County fall into that category.6 8 Young adults coming of
age are migrating to cities in Colorado and other states in pursuit of a
more productive and exciting life. Remaining behind are the very
young and the very old. An intensive study of the nearby Lariat
63 ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 39, at 18 (Table 4).

64 ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 39, at 16.
65 id. at 18. The median income of Spanish-American families was $2,436 in Conejos
County and $2,105 in Costilla County, while the median income of all families in the
counties was $3,063 and $2,375 respectively. Id.
66 The family size of four is used as illustrative. Many families in the two counties were
of larger size.
67
0EO COUNTY REPORTS (unpaginated) (1968).
68 COLORADO YEARBOOK 1962-1964 (1964).
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barrio69 revealed that only 16 percent of the community population
°
was composed of the 18-30 age group.7
In general, the Spanish-surnamed Coloradan is migrating, like all
Coloradans, from the rural areas to the urban areas. Although the total
population of Colorado increased 32.4 percent between 1950 and 1960,
the urban population of Colorado increased 55.5 percent. The slight
increase of 2.1 points in the percent of the Spanish-surnamed population in Denver county indicates that the Spanish-surnamed may be
71
urbanizing at even a higher rate than the general population.

The migration of young adults from the rural counties7 2 results
in a "concentration of Spanish-surnamed in the younger age groups.
In most countries this population concentration reaches its peak in the
teenage group. This has special implication to education and youth
problems. It is also safe to generalize that within the next 10 years
the number of Spanish-surnamed citizens eligible to vote, as a percent
of the total voting population, will rise appreciably and this may have
73
significent political implications."11
D. Housing, Education, and Welfare
Rural housing conditions in the two counties exemplify the general statement of Mr. Richard Margolis of the International Self-Help
Housing Associates: "In rural America there are more inhabited houses
not fit to live in than in the slums of all our cities put together." 7 4
For a definition of the word barrio, see note 52 supra.
70E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 37.
71 ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 39, at 7, 14. The 2.1 percentage growth figure does
not reflect the absolute growth in Spanish-surnamed population during the period, but
rather the increase in the relative percentage of the rapidly growing total population of
Denver County. See also E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 48-53, for a complete analysis
of recent population mobility in the Lariat community. This migration of rural
Americans to the urban centers has been cited as a significant factor in the disintegrating
processes of urban ghettos. The immigrants have "exchanged life in a rural slum for
life in an urban slum, at exorbitant cost to themselves, to the cities, and to rural
America as well." THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at ix.
72 While the population loss as noted in the census in Costilla County from 1950 to 1960
was 1,848, the net loss from migration was 3,211 during the same decade. This latter
figure reflects the much greater number of births than deaths during the decade, a
condition which lessens the actual figure for migration. Andrews, supra note 32.
73 ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 16, at 7. In Denver, the increasing numbers of SpanishAmericans has already resulted in political implications. Led by a fiery, 40-year-old
former prizefighter named Rodolfo (Corky) Gonzales, the Crusade for Justice has been
established to provide a focal point of ethnic cohesion bordering on separatism. The
stated goal of the organization is to "instill a sense of pride and of belonging in Hispano
youngsters." Hispanos: The Sleeping Giant, The Denver Post (Special Supp.), May 13,
1969, at 2, col. 1.
74 R. MARGOLIS, SOMETHING TO BUILD ON 28 (1967). Statistics for 1960 reveal that of
the 2.1 million rural housing units in the western United States, 700,000 were substandard. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF HOUSING:
1960, Vol. 1, States and Small Areas, United States Summary, Final Report HC (1)-t
(1963). The continued existence of such deplorable conditions is not alone attributable
to the indigency of the inhabitants. Other factors exert influence, among which are
the fluctuating seasonal demand for low-cost rural housing, the lack of any incentive
for the moneyed interests to invest in the construction of rural housing in light of rural
migration to urban areas, the general nonexistence of adequate building and housing
codes in rural areas or the inadequate enforcement of those that exist, and the public's
lack of concern with housing problems among the rural poor. Mittelbach & Short, supra
note 45, at 464.
69
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There were 2,716 housing units in Conejos County in 1960, 2,020
of which were occupied - 1,513 by owners and 507 by renters. In
Costilla County for the same year 1,388 housing units existed and
1,006 were then occupied, 746 by owners and 260 by tenants. 5 Many
of the homes in the region, particularly those owned or occupied by
indigent families, are constructed of logs, adobe, or a combination
of the two. 76 The houses are often small, 77 and the large families,
typical of low-income Spanish-Americans in the area, tend to create
crowded housing conditions. From the 1960 census, only 41.6
percent of all housing units in Conejos County were said to be in
sound condition, with all plumbing facilities. For Costilla County, this
figure was an astonishingly low 18.8 percent.7 8 Fully 76.4 percent
of all housing units in the state were so categorized. 79 Particularly
lacking in most small villages in the two counties are community-wide
water and sewage facilities. Running water and inside toilets are the
exception rather than the rule. A few of the larger communities have
in recent years incorporated water and sewage districts, but the initial
installation costs have inhibited many indigent homeowners from
hooking into the main systems. 80 Without such community-wide utility
75 Lazy Eight Project, supra note 38. A recent and cursory survey performed by VISTA

volunteers in one of the small communities in Conejos County found 42 occupied
housing units within the recently incorporated water district, which corresponds closely
to the geographical definition of the unincorporated community. Of these 42 units, 37
were owner-occupied and only 5 were rented. Of the 142 occupied housing units in the
barrio of Lariat, 104 were reported to be owner-occupied and 38 renter-occupied, and
the median number of rooms per unit was only 3.7. E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 55.
7 Of the 142 housing units surveyed in Lariat, for example, 62 were constructed of logs,
34 were of adobe, and 12 were of logs and adobe. Twenty-three more were frame
houses, 7 were frame and log, 3 were frame and adobe, and only one was made of brick.
E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 55.
77
The median number of rooms per housing unit is 4.1 in both counties. Lazy Eight
Project, supra note 38.
78 Lazy Eight Project, supra note 38. A separate group of VISTA volunteers in Costilla
County surveyed the housing conditions in eight small villages within the county in
which resided 179 families. According to their analyses, 34 percent of the housing
units were deemed to be in good condition, 35 percent in fair condition, and 20 percent
in poor condition. San Luis, Colorado, VISTA Volunteer Survey, May, 1968 (unpublished and unpaginated) (hereinafter cited as VISTA Survey]. No explanation is given
for the missing 11 percent. From the study of the Lariat barrio of 142 occupied housing
units, 33 were characterized as being in fair condition, 37 as poor, and 72 as being in
bad condition and in need of replacement. E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 55.
The import of these statistics is not their literal accuracy. The criteria employed
in evaluating the housing units in the studies mentioned are not specified and, moreover,
are probably influenced by subjective considerations. The statistics are significant only
in their general indication of sub-par housing conditions in the region.
It should be noted that the negative conclusions of existing housing conditions
should not be equated with filth and disorder inside the homes. The Lariat barrio surveyors, making a subjective judgment of the quality of housekeeping in the housing units
surveyed, reported that 85 percent of the homes were clean and orderly. "Because of
these findings, the myth which claims that these people are all dirty and have chosen to
live that way, is a fallacy. In fact, the Lariat women must be commended for the measure
with which they maintain clean homes." Id. at 56.
79 E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 58.
80 In only one of the eight villages surveyed by VISTA volunteers in Costilla County was
city water available, and only 52 percent of the families had availed themselves of this
service. VISTA Surve.', supra note 78.
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systems, most residents in large areas of both counties still obtain
their drinking water from wells 8 and still use outside toilets.82 Often
the water source and the outside toilets are located in close proximity
to each other, presenting very real health hazards of concern to local
civic leaders.
In education, the President's National Advisory Commission on
Rural Poverty has generally observed that
rural adults and youth are the product of an educational system that has
historically shortchanged rural people. The extent to which rural people
have been denied equality of educational opportunity is evident from
both the products of the educational system and the resources that go
into the system. On both counts, the quality of rural education ranks
low.83

This general observation by the Commission is particularly apt
in Conejos and Costilla counties. In the first instance, the resources
going into the local educational systems8 4 are not on a par with the
rest of the state. Both counties are plagued with very low taxable
property bases, especially in those school districts where the lack of
industrial development of any kind is particularly acute. This factor
alone inhibits the necessary capital growth of the local public school
systems. s As a direct result, the local and county financial support
81 In the eight villages surveyed in Costilla County, 46 percent of all families obtained
water from deep wells (50 or more feet) using pumps; 50 percent utilized an open
or shallow well source; 3 percent reported using water from a nearby river or stream;
and 9 pecent-all in one village -used
city water. Since some families obtained water
from more than one source, the total percentage exceeds 100. VISTA Survey, supra
note 78. Prior to the recent extension of city water services from Monte Vista to the
Lariat barrio, there were 99 wells in the latter community, with several families utilizing
the same wells. Sixty-five were deep wells and 34 were shallow. E. Ahrens, supra note
a, 58. (Quaere whether one can tell the depth of a well by the length ot the handle
on the pump.)
82 From the Costilla County VISTA Survey, only 42 percent of the families had some form
of indoor toilets. VISTA Survey, supra note 78. In Lariat, the figure was 23.3 percent. E.
Ahrens, supra note 27, at 58.
83 THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at 41.
84 There are presently five school districts in the two counties, three in Conejos and two
in Costilla. Each district has one high school and several elementary and grade schools.
88 One study of Costilla County relates the historical development of the public school
system in the county - which mirrors the early development in Conejos County- and
notes the difficulties caused by a low tax base.
A particularly difficult problem area is the school system [in Costilla
County]. Considerable change and improvement has occurred in the schools
since World War II. Prior to the war there was a parochial school system
located in [one of the small towns). Tuition was charged, and the teachers
were largely nuns. There was a small public school operating which attracted
those who could not afford tuition. As time went on this public school grew
and seemed to reflect the changing income structure of the area.
At last there was a move to consolidate the small public schools scattered
over the county. Early in the decade of 1950-60 the many small school districts
formed a federation of districts and joined in a common high school. . . . The
parochial schools closed and their facilities were turned over to the public
school system. . . . After a few years the school districts of the county consolidated into two districts, one in the north end of the county and the other in
the south. Each district now operates its own high school and other grades. ...
The northern district includes the railroad that crosses the county and a
main highway, which made a great deal of difference in the tax income. It
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of the public schools is lower in these two counties than in any
other.8" Concomitantly, state financial support as a percentage of all
school revenues is the highest in the state.8 7 Public school facilities in
the two counties range from an ill-equipped, one-room country schoolhouse to the more modern facilities at a recently constructed high
school building. Perhaps the most important ingredient of a quality
education, however, is the caliber of the teachers. On this count, the
rural schools in Conejos and Costilla counties are not generally well
endowed.88 While it is by no means easy to identify the intangible
factors that distinguish a higher from a lower quality faculty, one
very tangible factor must be the level of teacher salaries. As the
President's Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty stated: "Because
of low teacher salaries, rural schools are not able to attract and hold
the better teachers. ' 89 Accepting this premise as valid, there can be
also included the major industry in the county, a lettuce and potato packaging
and shipping plant ...
The southern school district had almost no industrial development and
depended heavily on state funds available for special problem areas. Major
problems of this district include the low tax base of the area and the need
for almost all new facilities, as well as improvements in all other aspects of
the school program.
Andrews, supra note 32, at 126-27. For the school term 1967-68, the total assessed
property valuation per average daily attendance (ADA) of students in Conejos
County was the lowest in the state-$4,632, and third from low in Costilla County
-$5,947.
COLORADO DEP'T OF EDUC., COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON PUPIL PERSONNEL, SCHOOL FINANCE, COLORADO SCHOOL DIsTmTs,
1967-1968, a, 2-15 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as SCHOOL FINANCE INFORMATION].
86 In Conejos County, the local financial contribution to the public educational system as
a percentage of the total school revenues in the county stood at 19.7 percent in 1967-68.
In Costilla County, that percentage was 23.5 percent. On the other hand, Ehe highest
percentage existed in Denver County, where local funding provided 79.6 percent of
county school revenues.
The county financial support as a percentage of the total school revenues in
Conejos County for the school term 1967-68 was 11.3 percent. The figure for Costilla
County was 9.1 percent. Only three other Colorado counties had a lower percentage
of county support- Denver, Jefferson, and Lake counties- and none of these have
county public school fund levies as do all other counties. SCHOOL FINANCE INFOR,ATION, supra note 85, at 31-43.
87Conejos County received 59.1 percent of its total county school revenues from state
sources in 1967-68. Costilla County received 42.6 percent. State contributions -and,
to a lesser extent, federal contributions (Costilla County received 24.9 percent of its
total county school revenues from federal sources, the highest in the state, while Conejos
County received 9.9 percent)- tend to lessen the gap in financial resource input
between the poverty-stricken counties and the more industrialized counties with higher
tax bases from which to draw school funding. Id.
88 In at least one school district, it was reliably reported that several of the teachers had
two or less years of college education.
8
9THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at 41. The ethnic composition of the faculties
in the public schools of the two counties under study apparently mirrors the ethnic
composition of the population in the immediate area. One study of Costilla County
noted:
The personnel of the two school districts showed some ethnic differences
and followed somewhat the pattern of the population of the districts. The
northern districts had both Anglo and Spanish name teachers, while the southern
district, as near as was observed, had only Spanish teachers.
Andrews, supra note 32, at 127.
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little doubt that the students in the public schools of Conejos and
Costilla counties are not exposed to the quality of teaching generally
associated with many urban schools. The average annual salaries
for teachers and administrators are the lowest in the San Luis Valley
and compare unfavorably with the remainder of the state."
The product of the educational system in the two countiesin terms of the educational achievement level of the adult population
- is also very low. From the 1960 census, the percentage of persons
over the age of 25 in Conejos County who had attended school for
eight years or less was 57.7 percent. For Costilla County, the percentage was 68.6 percent. Among Colorado's 63 counties, these figures
ranked 59th and 63rd respectively. Again from the 1960 census, the
median number of school years completed by persons aged 25 or over
in Conejos County was 8.7. For Costilla County, the median was 7.8.
Only 29.3 percent of the over-25 age group of Conejos County had
completed high school, and for Costilla County, that figure was 27.9
percent. 1 The student dropout rates for the public schools in the
two counties are slightly below the average for the San Luis Valley
90 For the school term 1968-69, the annual average salaries -not
to be confused with
starting salaries -for
the five counties in the San Luis Valley, Denver County, and
statewide are shown in the following table. The figures for Denver and statewide vary,
depending upon the grade level taught.
County

Average Annual Salary

Conejos

$5,509

Costilla
Mineral

5,521
5,742

Saguache

6,093

Rio Grande
Alamosa
Denver

6,251
6,581
7,400-8,600

Colorado statewide

6,900-7,300

Telephone interview with Colo. Dep't of Educ., Statistics and Data Processing Div.,
May 22, 1969.
91 Lazy Eight Project, supra note 38. A study of poverty submitted to the Colorado Migrant
Council reported that
as one examines older and older males in the population, especially among the
Spanish surname persons, the [educational achievement] level drops steepiy.
This is in part a result of an inadequate educational system in the past, and in
addition the perceptions on the part of the rural population that formal
education was not always necessary to be a successful wage earner and citizen.
Report on Colorado Poverty to the Colorado Migrant Council, Dimension: Education.
at 1-2 (1968) (unpublished). The low level of educational achievement among the
indigent residents of the two counties was also documented during the field survey
portion of this project. One woman resident of a very small community who was
employed as a cook by the public elementary school stated flatly that she had achieved
the highest educational level among the permanent residents of the community. She had
completed the 10th grade.
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and the entire state,92 and even further below the national average. 3
Yet, the dropout rate is significantly higher among Spanish-American youth,9 4 and it is this group which especially needs to escape the
existing culture of poverty in Conejos and Costilla Counties by the
avenue of an adequate education. There are no colleges or technical
schools in the two counties, but a 4-year state supported institution Adams State College - is located in Alamosa County north of Cos92

The projected dropout rate for the schools in Conejos County was 17.9 percent. The
rate in Costilla County was 22.5 percent. Letter from Harold L. Hoyt, Consultant,
Division of Guidance Services, Colo. Dep't of Educ., Feb. 5, 1969. For the San Luis
Valley the rate was 21.9-24.0 percent, and for the entire state of Colorado. 22.8-24.0
percent. Colo. Dep't of Educ., Div. of Guidance Services, Colorado Public School
Dropout Data 1967-68 (Fifth Annual Report), October 1968, at 7-8 (unpublished
bulletin available from the Colorado Department of Education). The term "projected
dropout rate" is explained as follows:
The projected dropout rate indicates the cumulative effect of dropout that
occurred in one year. It is comparable to the results of longitudinal dropout
studies and also comparable to national statistics which indicate the percentage
of pupils who drop out. It answers the question, 'What proportion of our
pupils would be dropouts under the current holding power conditions?'
A minimum projected dropout rate is calculated by considering all unknown withdrawals as transfers.
A maximum projected dropout rate is calculated by considering all
unknown withdrawals as dropouts.
The true dropout rate is between these minimum and maximum rates.
Id. at 3. The above percentages given for the San Luis Valley and for Colorado are
minimum-maximum figures. All of the figures are based upon grades 7-12 during the
school year 1967-68.
93 The Presidents Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty stated that 28 percent of rural
nonfarm youth and 23 percent of rural farm youth aged 14 to 24 drop out of school
before high school graduation. THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at 41.
In general, the Colorado Commission on Spanish-Surnamed Citizens observed that
an evident "drop-out" problem exists among Spanish-surnamed youth. This
is indicated by a disproportionate percent of Spanish-surnamed adults who have
less than a high school education. This point is made clearer by looking at the
various age groups in school at a given point in time. . . . It can be seen that
the percent of Spanish-surnamed children, ages 5 to 15, in school does not
differ significantly from the . . . total population. But in the age groups after
15 years of age the Spanish-surnamed percent drops off markedly.
AssEMBLY REPORT, supra note 39, at 54. See also M. MANUEL, SPANISH SPEAKING
CHILDREN OF THE SOUTHWEST 53 (1965). Based on 1960 census statistics in which
the percentage of Spanish-Americans in the population over age 25 for Conejos County
was 48.66 percent and for Costilla County was 68.18 percent, the Colorado Commission
on Spanish-Surnamed Citizens noted the following percentages of Spani~h-Americans
in selected educational level groupings of the total residents over 25 in the two counties:
Years of School
Completed

Percentage of Population Group which is Spanish-American
Conejos
Costilla

4 or less
5 through 8

82.19%
60.12%

80.855
-5 10%c

9 through 11
12-High school graduation

34.00%
20.15%

56.44%
-A4.23%

ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 39, at 50. The fact that the percentage of elementary-

school-educated Spanish-Americans is greater
Spanish-Americans is less than their normal
.af the two counties gives credence to the
American youngsters to drop out of school at

and the percentage of high-school-educated
ethnic incidence in the general population
observation of the procilivity of Spanisha higher rate than their Anglo counterparts.
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tilla County, and a 2-year vocational school is presently in the planning
5
stage for location near Monte Vista in Rio Grande County.1
The number of recipients of public welfare assistance in both
counties is very high. The percentage of Costilla County's population
in fiscal year 1967-68 receiving some form of welfare assistance was

28.82 percent, the highest in the state. Conejos County was fourth
highest with 21.40 percent. 6 A considerable proportion of these
recipients are old age pensioners, reflecting the high incidence of
elderly persons within the general populace." Aid to families with
dependent children also comprises a significant proportion of the
welfare caseloads in the two counties.9" The federal food stamp
program,"' introduced in Colorado in March of 1965, is operative in
both counties with mixed results: For participating families, the
95 The President's Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty observed: "In 1960, about twice
as high a proportion of urban as rural youth were enrolled in college." THE PEOPLE
LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at 41. In 1963, a total of 231 out of 498 graduates from
San Luis Valley high schools attended college. Of those attending college, 165 were
Anglo and 66 were Spanish-American. CoLo. DEP'T OF EDUC., PUPIL ArENDANCE:
COLORADO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1965-66 AND 1966-67, at 4-5 (1967).

The only available

study showing an ethnic breakdown of high school graduates from Valley schools and
tracing the ethnic proportions through college attendance was made of the graduating
clases .f the years 1953-55, The study demonstrated that approximately twice as many
Anglo graduates attended college than Spanish-American graduates. In 1955, for example,
53.59 percent of all Anglo high school graduates attended college while only 28.08
percent of the Spanish-American graduates did so. J. Maestas, Culture and Transition
82-90 (1968) (unpublished master's thesis on file at Adams State College Library,
Alamosa, Colorado). A substantial proportion of each year's graduates of high schools
in the San Luis Valley take advantage of the proximity and low tuition of Adams State
College. Id. at 91-104.
96COLORADO

DEP'T OF

SOCIAL

SERVICES,

DIV.

OF PUB.

WELFARE,

FISCAL

REPORT:

1967-1968, at 63 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WELFARE REPORT]. These figures were
based on an estimated population as of July 1968 of 3,800 in Costilla County and 8,500
in Conejos County. The total number of welfare recipients in Costilla County in 1968
was 1,095; in Conejos County the number was 1,819. Id.
9 The authority for the old age pension program in Colorado is COLO. CONST. art. 2-1,

§§ 1-9, and COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-1-1 to 101-2-4 (1963), as amended (Supp.
1965, 1967, 1969). The old age pension program in Colorado is financed entirely by
state and federal funds and is the major welfare expenditure in Colorado. accounting for
37.20 percent of the welfare dollar during fiscal year 1967-68 and 55.01 percent of the
average monthly welfare caseload statewide. Costilla County has the highest recipient
rate per population in the state, and 79.75 percent of its average monthly welfare
caseload are old age pension cases. Conejos County has the fifth highest rate, and
71.99 percent are old age pensioners. WELFARE REPORT, supra note 96, at 59-63.
98AFDC cases account for 12.77 and 9.09 percent of the average monthly caseloads in
Conejos and Costilla Counties respectively. Conejos County is third highest and Costilla
County sixth highest of all counties in the state in the recipient rate of AFDC per
population. WELFARE REPORT, supra note 96, at 71. For an excellent analysis of aid

to dependent children in Colorado see Note, Aid to Families With Dependent Children
-A
Study of Welfare Assistance. 44 DENVER L.J. 102 (1967).
Other welfare programs in effect in the two counties are Aid to the Needy Disabled,
Medical Assistance for the Aged, Aid to the Blind, Tuberculosis Assistance, Child
Welfare Assistance, and General Assistance. See generally WELFARE REPORT, supra
note 96.
oAuthorized by the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1964).
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pocket-book benefit is obvious;' 00 but bureaucratic red tape has hindered the full deployment of the program among needy indigents.''
As with other indicia of poverty in the region, "the welfare rolls
100 Federal regulations provide that eligibility for food stamps shall be on a household
basis. 7 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a) (1969). The Colorado Superintendent of Social Services,
Division of Public Welfare has set specific standards to be used in determining eligibility, pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 1601.1(f) (1969). For a household consisting of one
person, the net monthly income limit for eligibility in the food stamp program is
$134.00. For a 10 person household, the net monthly income limit is $464.00. "Income"
is defined by the Department as "money you get again and again - like wages, pensions,
unemployment compensation, social security benefits, disability payments, public assistance." Food Stamp Program-facts for families who want food coupons, FS-6A (4/70)
Colorado State Department of Social Services Publication. For fiscal year 1967-68,
total food sales of $150,844 in Conejos County and $107,724 in Costilla County were
made under the auspices of the food stamp program. WELFARE REPORT, supra note
96, at 88.
101During the field survey, the food stamp director of one of the two counties stated that
food stamps were readily available but few indigents took the necessary time to apply
or were ignorant of the program. The application process for food stamps, is defined in
Food Stamp Program-facts for families who want food coupons, note 100 supra,
consists of the following: the head of the household or an adult member of the household
must make the application, in person, at the office of the county department of welfare
of the county in which the household is located. He must give his name and address.
state how many persons are members of the household, indicate whether the household
has cooking facilities (households without cooking facilities are ineligible) and indicate
what income and liquid assets each member of the household has. He is required to
bring the following information with him: personal identification (such as a Social
Security card or driver's license), rent receipts or records of mortgage payments, Benefit
Rate Determination Notice or check of unemployment compensation, letter of award
for social security, names and addresses of employers of each member of the household
plus wage stubs for latest wages paid, letters or notice for workmen's compensation,
veteran's benefits, or pension, bank books for savings and/or checking accounts, and
the number of U.S. Savings Bonds (Series E) held by each member of the household.
Although the Denver office issues food stamps every day, offices in other counties
of the state issue stamps only on certain days of the month, and these dates change
from month to month. For example, one applying for food stamps at the Alamosa office
in June, must appear between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon or 1:00-3:00 p.m.
on June 22, 23, or 29 to be heard. If he applies on different days, he cannot receive any
food stamps. He must buy the food coupons regularly, for if he misses a purchase for
more than one month, new application for food stamps must be made.
The necessity to accumulate a sizeable amount of cash before purchasing a minimum
block of food stamps has been particularly criticized:
Even should families qualify for the stamps, . . . they would then have
to pay an exorbitant amount to get them. For example, a family of six, earning
$150 between them in the previous month, would have to pay $64 for food
stamps entitling them to purchase $106 worth of food. The notion that members
of a family being paid daily or bi-weekly [referring specifically to migrant
labor families] should be able to save $64 out of $150 earned in a month is
absurd.
Chase, supra note 58, at 60. Growing criticism of the administration of the food stamp
program has been felt nationally. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota has
chaired a Senate subcommittee on hunger in America and has advocated distribution
of free food stamps. A pilot program of free distribution was made in selected South
There, All Right, NEWSWEEK, March 3,
Carolina counties in early 1969. Hunger: It's
1969, at 28, 29.
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reveal a high incidence of Spanish-surnames."'0
true of the AFDC program. l03

2

This is especially

E. Community and Professional Services

There is only one attorney residing in and practicing law in
either county, and he is elderly and semi-retired.'
However, an
active bar exists in both Rio Grande and Alamosa counties to the
north. Each county has one local hospital, although neither is large
and both are understaffed. The two-county area is in desperate need
of more doctors and health services-there are three physicians
practicing in each of the two counties- and, in response to this,
concerned residents of Conejos County have initiated a pilot program
of local health clinics providing free medical diagnosis to needy
indigents. The clinics were open for one day each week in different
communities and were staffed by volunteers and doctors from surrounding areas.'
Several VISTA volunteers are located in each
county under the auspices of each county's OEO Community Action
Program office.
F. The Class System

In addition to the statistically documented demographic and
social characteristics which describe the two-county area under study,
the field research revealed that a surprisingly high degree of class
consciousness permeates the small communities in the two sample
counties. Two distinct classes are readily observable, and, for want
of more descriptive terminology, they are denominated here as the
102 ASSEMBLY REPORT,

supra note 39, at 38.

103 In the San Luis Valley, the number of Spanish-American AFDC cases represented 86.17

percent of all cases, involving 89.90 percent of the total children receiving aid. This rate
is significantly higher than the percent of Spanish-surnamed in the population. Id.
Particularly disturbing to the Commission was the evidence that many of the
Spanish-American children receiving AFDC aid through their parent or parents would
themselves become AFDC cases. Id. at 39. See COLORADO DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Div. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN, CHARACTERISTICS OF
SECOND GENERATION CASES, Report No. 63-D-1, June 1963. But, the Commission
specifically refuted the off-heard charge that prolix child bearing among SpanishAmerican women is a result of the availability of AFDC. ASSEMBLY REPORT. Supra
note 39, at 41.
104One attorney resides in Conejos County but practices outside of the county. Another
lawyer residing and practicing outside of the two counties regularly visits in the seat of
Costilla County on a weekly basis.
105The La Jara Gazette, La Jara, Colorado, Sept. 20, 1968, at 1, col. 5. The first free
health clinic was described as a "big success." About 176 persons received free medical
checkups, and one week later, 65 more were examined. Id. In the Lariat community
a free health clinic for local indigents has been sponsored by the Spanish Baptist Church.
By the end of 1968, it was estimated that more than 2,000 indigent residents would be
benefited by the free clinic. E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 148-49.
Neither of these health clinic projects were principally established to provide free
medical care. Rather, they serve as diagnostic centers for treatable disease which, if
subsequently treated by a private physician, could be cured. This rather limited function,
however, is a giant step in the slow march to eradicate the debilitating features of
rural poverty. See generally THE PEOPLE LEFT BEHIND, supra note 3, at 63.
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"establishnent" class and the "poverty' '" ° ' class. The dividing line
between the two is hazy, and the forces propelling an individual into
one class or the other are, at least to some degree, varied and interacting. To be sure, family income is the most significant determinative
factor in the establishment-poverty class dichotomy, but it is not
the only one. Some local residents fall within a moderate financial
range-family income is above, but not comfortably above, the
poverty line. However, few of these residents are not classifiable
within either of the two classes. A truly middle-class in the sense of
the suburban phenomena of the great American urban centers does
not generally exist in the target area communities, even on a reduced
scale and particularly where the Spanish-American culture predominates. One explanation for the absence of a middle class is that the
migration of young people escaping the stagnant economy and dismal
future in their native region has left a population consisting, in the
main, of those unwilling to leave because they are successful (if not
by financial standards, then by stature within the community) and
those unable to leave because impoverished. Additionally, the indigenous population in the target area communities tends to think in
absolute class terms- that is, with a few nondescript exceptions, a
person has "made it" or he has not.
For local residents in the median financial range, factors other
than income are determinative of membership in either class, and
the most pervasive is simply possession of a position of authority
or, in a broader sense, power. This authority may be over people,
such as that held by a county judge, welfare director, CAP director,
policeman, political chieftain, or employer. The power may be over
the marketplace, such as that held by even a small businessman, or
over the conscience, such as that held by a minister or priest. Possession of specialized knowledge or education, such as that held by
doctors, lawyers, or educators, automatically qualifies an individual
for "establishment" membership. Significant also are one's family
connections; simply being closely related by blood to any leading
member of the community has some tangible worth within the SpanishAmerican culture. Finally, in the few communities where both Anglos
and Spanish-Americans reside in significant numbers, the "establishment" class has a disproportionate Anglo membership, thereby adding
an ethnic factor to widen further the hiatus between classes.
In sum, then, the establishment-poverty class dichotomy is beyond
precise definition, but it exists nonetheless, if not by rational classi106 "Poverty" in this sense is not necessarily equated with the term in a strictly economic
poverty-line sense. It isused at this point in contradistinction to the "establishment."
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fication, then by arbitrary normative assignment. It is very much a
state of mind -

an attitude -

the result of both self-recognition and

community recognition, interacting with more tangible factors such
as income, property ownership, cultural group membership, possession
of authority or power, education, age, family ties, and so forth.
For research purposes, the definition of the establishment-poverty
class dichotomy utilized the economic poverty line as a primary basis
for distinction. Nonetheless, it will be assumed for purposes of
analysis that the power/authority differences described above constitute primary elements which differentiate the two classes.
Besides the existence of the class system and the concomitant
power/authority differentials implied thereby, one further ramification
of the class system was observed which provided some insight into the
nature of the indigents legal problems and the manner of their
resolution. This involves the researchers' general observations of the
attitudes of a majority of the members of the establishment toward
the indigents and their legal problems.
It was observed that while the establishment class is aware of the
pronounced poverty conditions in the region, it nonetheless tends to
adopt a stance of ignoring, glossing over, or vigorously denying the
manifest evidence which surrounds them. Exemplifying this attitude is
the statement of Dr. Fred J. Plachy, former president of Adams State
College in Alamosa and a one-time Republican candidate for the
Colorado Senate: "Our people are happy and they are optimistic,
and we have the greatest area in the country here. I don't believe in
all this 'poverty' talk about the [San Luis] Valley - that is just
political talk.'17 A second example of these efforts to hide the

poverty in the two counties was related by several residents in one
of the sample counties. Apparently, the former sheriff of that county
had collaborated several years ago with a reporter from The Denver
Post in an expos6 of poverty and hunger in the county. The subsequent publication of the Post article angered many members
of the establishment. It was felt that the article painted a
biased and untruthful picture of conditions in the county, that the
accompanying photographs of hungry children and dilapidated houses
had been "staged." Consequently, establishment pressure was exerted
on the sheriff. He disavowed any re-election ambition and moved
from the county when his term of office expired.
The attitude of the establishment toward the indigents' legal
problems was also observed. Many of the community leaders interviewed, constituting a fair sampling of the "establishment" class in
the two counties, consider the principal legal need of the indigenous
107Baker,

supra note 46, at 31, cols. 1, 5-6.
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poor to be an education in the use and misuse of money. The county
judge of one of the two sample counties, in expressing the view that
the absence of free legal services is not the legal problem of first
priority for indigents, added. "They [local indigents] bite off more
than they can chew: They need, more than anything else, a course in
economics." The attitude often expressed by these leaders was not
Rather, it
one of paternalism toward the impoverished class.'
assumed an equal application of the establishment's standards of
ability, knowledge, experience, opportunity, and success motivation
to the poverty class, and the apparent failure of the poor to meet
these imposed standards was seen as a lack of inner drive -a
fault
for which the indigent alone was responsible. It is not a compassionate
view which grants appropriate obeisance to environmental factors
beyond the indigent's control; it was, rather the traditional American
free enterprise "bootstrap" view - that is, any man of ordinary
intelligence who starts life at the bottom can "pick himself up by the
bootstraps" and make a success of himself in this country. Thus, in
conversations with establishment members of this genre, periodic
references were made to specific indigents who purchased goods on
an installment basis which were clearly beyond their means, regularly
consumed their weekly paychecks on liquor, dropped out of school
at an early age, or flagrantly disregarded time schedules for work
on a job. By a process of spurious inductive reasoning, these establishment members considered the specific faults of the described indigents as common to the entire Spanish-American poverty class.1" 9
Symptomatic of this reasoning was the establishment's apparent
malaise when it came to hiring the Spanish-American indigent. Few
nonfarm jobs were available to him:
In this valley, Hispanos can work only at farm or manual labor,
with rare exception. Storekeepers and other businessmen are wary of
hiring the Hispano for anything besides the most base labor.
"You just can't depend on them," is the most common reason they
offer for why they don't hire more Hispanos. "You can't trust them,"
comes second." 0
To be sure, there were exceptions to this establishment attitude,
and some community leaders surveyed evinced genuine concern and
108 Even the Catholic clergy evidenced a surprising degree of aloofness from the endemic
plight of their impoverished parishioners, possibly due to the advanced age of the
priests and their long tenure in the several parishes.
109 A marked ethnic factor enters into this attitude ascribing the negative character of a
known indigent as a trait in common with all unknown persons in the same economic
class. All indigent Spanish-Americans are the unstated subjects of this transposition,
first, because there are few Anglo indigents in the region in comparison to the number
of Spanish-American indigents, and second, because the Spanish-American culture is
distinguishable in many respects from the Anglo culture.
n°OHuber, supra note 31, at 7, col. 2. The reference is to the Arkansas Valley on the
eastern plains of Colorado, but the expressed attitude was also manifested among
businessmen in the sample counties surveyed.
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compassion for the welfare of their indigent brethren. These individuals constitute the backbone of the informal "legal" system among
the rural poor,"' and they are probably the contemporary remnants of
the old patron system of paternalism which existed at an earlier time
in Spanish-American culture.' 12
III.

THE FORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM

As a general proposition, it can be said that the members of
the two sample counties do not utilize the formal legal structure
for resolution of most problems bearing legal implication. Instead,
an informal "legal" system has developed which bypasses the lawyer
and the courthouse and uses informal bargaining, self-help, and the
assistance of nonlawyer, local confidants. This informal "legal"
system, the consequence of both Spanish-American cultural imperatives and practical necessity, is discussed in further detail in § IV
infra. This section will be devoted to a development of the reasons
for the absence of attorney utilization by a substantial majority of
the impoverished class and an analysis of the attorney contacts of the
small group of indigents who did take their problems to an attorney.
A. The View from the Bottom
Only about 19 percent of the indigent residents surveyed in
the sample counties had ever used the services of an attorney in
any capacity, including criminal defense." 3 An even smaller percentage had utilized an attorney on more than one occasion. The
two most prevalent types of legal problems brought by indigents
to an attorney's office were domestic relations problems and criminal
matters, generally the more serious misdemeanor charges. 14 Also
mentioned were problems affecting real property (such as drafting
deeds or quiet title actions), time payment purchase agreements,
drafting wills, civil rights discrimination, insurance claims, and
personal injury suits. Most of the indigent respondents felt that the
attorney had helped them with the particular problem, although a
few expressed an opinion that the lawyer had been of no assistance
1

See text, § IV infra.
112 See note 161 infra.
113 The Duke study on the other hand found that in the sample group of 198, 39 Negroes
and 48 whites had used the services of an attorney on one or more occasions. Note,
supra note 9, at 523. It might be suggested that this disparity can be explained in part
by the somewhat more "urbanized" nature of the sample county there under study.
See notes 122 and 180 infra.
114 An independent examination of county and district court records in one of the sample
counties for the period July 1967 to July 1968 revealed that a very high percentage of
defendants on criminal charges were Spanish-surnamed. No misdemeanant during that
period was represented by counsel. Additionally, a very substantial proportion of all
civil cases where one or both parties was Spanish-surnamed was comprised of divorce
or annulment actions. See also note 155 & § III(B) (2) (a) infra.
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Almost all of the indigents were charged some fee

by the attorney, generally in the $5 to $25 range.1 16 Only five respondents stated that they were charged nothing for advice received.
Most of the indigent respondents who had contacted an attorney
said that they had paid or were paying their attorney's bill, often
by a time-payment plan. A few, however, candidly confessed that
they could not or would not pay the full amount."l

Every indigent

who responded affirmatively to the attorney contact question had
been referred to his or her attorney by a third party. Most references
came from friends or members of the family, but priests, local confidants, or the Colorado Civil Rights Commission office in the town
of Alamosa were also named.

Why do most indigents in the sample counties fail to utilize
the services of an attorney when confronted by a legal problem?

The field survey of impoverished residents and conversations with
attorneys in the San Luis Valley suggest three principal answers:
(1) scarcity of resident attorneys in the two sample counties, (2)

inability on the part of indigents to pay legal fees, and (3) failure
to recognize many problems as solvable through legal recourse.

1. Scarcity of Attorneys
At the time of the field research for the project, only one attorney
resided and practiced in either of the two sample counties." 8 Admitted to the Colorado Bar in 1925, this elderly gentleman still
practices law in a tumbledown office behind a store on the main

street of one of the target area communities. He professed to be
115 Several

respondents who apparently had been swindled by fast-talking magazine or
house siding salesmen were informed by attorneys that nothing could be done since the
purchase contract was legally binding.
116 Without exception, however, divorced respondents reported that their attorney required
a minimum fee of $100 prior to bringing suit. The responses from the attorney questionnaire corroborate this almost universal practice of the rural bar in Colorado. A divorce
is viewed as a luxury, and the advance fee requirement is seen as a simple precaution.
As one attorney from the Arkansas Valley in eastern Colorado stated, "when a woman
runs out on you without paying, you don't feel very sympathetic anymore."
117 Seventy-five percent of the attorneys responding to the attorney questionnaire stated
that they approach the matter of charging fees to indigent clients somewhat flexibly,
sometimes charging a small fee - usually $5 - sometimes nothing, depending upon the
client's ability to pay. Very few stated that they always charge nothing, and even fewer
said that they always charge the recommended minimum fee. Most attorneys stated that
at least 60 percent of the indigents pay the total bill, 30 percent pay a portion of the
bill, and only 10 percent never pay. Most of the attorneys - 62 percent- stated that
they collected about as much as they had expected from their indigent clients.
118 A young attorney had practiced for several years in one of the larger target area communities which was surveyed, but he had apparently pulled up stakes and headed for
greener pastures in 1965. Another attorney who practices in Alamosa, has a temporary
office in one of the target area communities, and periodically visits there for a day at a
time. He and his brother, also an attorney, are the most widely known practitioners
among the rural poor, but only a very few of the indigents surveyed were aware of
his periodic visits.
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overburdened with indigent cases, yet of the indigent residents of his
community who were interviewed, only the middle-aged and elderly
consistently indicated knowledge of his existence, reflecting perhaps
the attorney's long tenure as county judge which terminated a number
of years ago. Only a couple of indigent respondents - both over 50
years of age - mentioned that they had recently consulted this attorney regarding a legal problem.
With the exception of this attorney, the nearest lawyers are miles
away from many of the residents of the two county region." 9 The
obvious question for determination was, then, whether distance was
a factor inhibiting rural indigents in the sample counties from seeking
an attorney's aid when confronted by a recognizable legal problem.
From the attorney questionnaire, 58 percent of the attorneys believed
that the answer was "yes" to this question. 2 ' A Spanish-American
attorney in Alamosa reported that he had indigent clients from all
parts of the San Luis Valley, although it is difficult to determine
to what extent his minority ethnic identity had prompted this result.
Among the indigent class interviewed, responses were mixed. Most
of those who had at one time consulted an attorney indicated that
they would have consulted a resident attorney, had one been practicing in their community. For this group, however, distance had not
inhibited an attorney contact. For respondents who had never dealt
with an attorney yet who evidenced a confrontation with a recognizable legal problem at some time, only a very few stated sua sponte
that distance or the lack of transportation was a significant cause for
failure to take their particular burden to a lawyer's office; a more
sizeable number so stated when the question was posed on the initiative of the interviewing team. Only one cautious conclusion, therefore,
can be drawn: When a poor resident has recognized a particular
problem as serious and involving legal ramifications, the distance
factor is only one of several other factors which may cause hesitancy
or failure to consult an attorney. It is a cumulative factor; rarely is
it the sole factor.
The scarcity of attorneys in the sample counties appears also
to inhibit attorney contacts by creating an information or reference
119 For

almost all residents of Conejos and Costilla Counties, the nearest attorney is in the
town of Alamosa, a distance ranging from 20 to 50 miles from the target area communities surveyed.
120 The validity of this majority opinion may be questionable. As will be noted further
§ III(B) (2) infra, very few attorneys think of the class of indigents needing but not
receiving legal services as greatly exceeding the class needing and receiving legal services.
Thus, few are aware of the reasons why indigents may not come seeking their aid, thinking (and sometimes complaining) instead of the "many" who do enter the doors to
their offices. Consequently, the rather large percentage responding affirmatively to this
question may indicate a degree of pure speculation rather than verified observation.
particularly in light of the rather inconclusive responses from indigents themselves.
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gap. One of the student interviewing teams met with 16 members of
the Lariat community action council in the town of Monte Vista
during one of their monthly meetings. The purpose of attendance
by the team was not to question these persons in the same manner
or degree as was done with indigent residents of the target area
communities, 12' but rather to ascertain through conversation whether
significant differences in attitude, knowledge of legal resources, or
proclivity to consult attorneys existed between residents of this community (in which there were more attorneys) and those where the
survey was conducted. One notable conclusion resulted from this
meeting: These particular residents of Lariat possessed a greater
awareness of local legal resources than had the indigent respondents
in Conejos and Costilla counties. Almost all were able to name one
or more Monte Vista attorneys, whereas only a very few in the
target area communities could claim similar ability. 1 2
2. Inability to Pay Fees

By far the principal reason mentioned by indigents surveyed for
their failure to consult an attorney when confronted by a recognized
legal problem was the inability to pay legal fees. This observation
on its face is not at all surprising; poverty, by its very definition,
connotes insufficient income, and procuring legal advice is often
not in the same category of urgency among the rural poor as is
adequate food, clothing, and shelter. Yet underlying this rather
simple conclusion is a more complex observation: The real reason
for the indigent's failure to consult an attorney is that he believes
that he will be charged a fee in excess of the depth of his pocketbook;
he does not know what he would actually be charged. Two specific
findings from the empirical research buttress this assertion.
First, prior experience with an attorney creates a factual basis
upon which the indigent respondent can guage his ability to afford
121 In

fact, no effort was made to learn whether the Lariat residents attending this meeting
were all classifiable as indigents under poverty-line standards. Apparently, though, all
could be described as within the "poverty" class in the larger sense of that term as
distinguished from the "establishment" class.
Similarly, the Duke study found that over 70 percent of the sample group were able to
name at least one of the three lawyers practicing in the county.
Because of the small size of the community and the location of virtually all
services in the county seat, lack of knowledge as to where a lawyer may be
found, or who the lawyers are, does not seem to be much of a problem in the
utilization of legal service. Anyone driving through the county seat on either
of its two intersecting streets would have a difficult time missing one of the
three lawyers' offices. For referral purposes, the state and federal agencies need
only send persons across the street to allow them to choose an attorney from
the entire county bar. This is certainly a significantly different situation from
that experienced in urban areas where anonymity often obscures available
services.
Note, supra note 9, at 525.
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subsequent experiences. Of the one-fifth of the indigents surveyed
in the target area who had ever consulted an attorney, a large proportion had paid all or almost all of the fee charged. Except with
regard to fees charged for divorces, only a vociferous minority felt
that the fee charged for their particular problem was too high. In
these cases, where the fee charged in the first encounter was felt
to be beyond their means, the respondents uniformly indicated
inability to pay as the reason for a later failure to contact an attorney.
In the majority of cases, however, where the fee charged the first
time was viewed as reasonable, inability to pay was generally not
listed as the reason for the later disinclination to see an attorney.
Thus, for those who had a factual basis upon which to determine
what they would be charged by an attorney, only a few listed inability
to pay as a reason for later failure to consult an attorney concerning
a legal problem.
However, a substantial majority of indigents surveyed had never
consulted an attorney. For this group, the factual basis by which to
judge their ability to pay legal fees must be obtained vicariously. Very
few of the respondents in this group possessed even an approximate
knowledge of an attorney's schedule of fees. The few who did based
their conclusion upon the experiences of a friend or family member
who had consulted an attorney. It was this uninformed group - fourfifths of the respondents -which
generally mentioned the inability
to pay legal fees as a reason for failure to consult an attorney when

confronted by a recognized legal problem.
The second specific finding which supports the proposition stated
above comes from the statements made by attorneys themselves. The
minimum fee schedule for legal assistance on an hourly basis is set
by the San Luis Valley Bar Association at $25.123 None of the attorneys interviewed in the Valley charge that rate to indigent clients.
For a one-half hour office consultation, the most commonly stated
charge was $5.24 But, as alluded to earlier, even this sum is not

inflexibly charged. Rather, most attorneys determine their fee based
upon conversations with the poor client concerning his ability to pay.
This flexibility was mirrored in comments attached to the returned
attorney questionnaires. One attorney believed that local impoverished
citizens came to his office in particular because he is "not tough
123

The minimum fee schedule was adopted by the San Luis Valley Bar Association on

December 7, 1967.
124 The minimum fee for transfer of a deed is set at $10.00. The elderly attorney practicing

in one of the two sample counties stated that he regularly charged only $3.50. He further
stated that he regularly cut all recommended fees in half, except for divorce actions,
when an indigent client was involved. See also note 117 supra.
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with them about fees." Another stated: "We make no charge to
Spanish-Americans when they are of the field worker class." To be
sure, when the legal work for an indigent client consists of something
more than simple advice or writing a letter, an attorney charges a
proportionately higher fee, which may inescapably be difficult for
the indigent to pay. Yet, it is apparent that almost all attorneys in
rural areas of the state give the poor man a real financial break in
setting legal fees.
Analysis of the reasons why the poverty class respondents who
had never visited an attorney believed that they could not afford
the legal fees is revealing. With one exception, all of the attorneys
in the San Luis Valley are Anglo. A very high percentage of residents
125
in the sample counties who are impoverished are Spanish-American.
All attorneys are therefore deemed to be members of the elite "establishment" class. Even where respondents confessed complete ignorance
about all attorneys in the San Luis Valley, they invariably assumed
that all attorneys are well-to-do members of the establishment class.
The assumption derives from the pervasive influence of the communication media- radio, television, books, newspapers - which invariably picture an attorney as Anglo, well-educated, and with substantial
income. In so viewing a lawyer's standard of living, it is incomprehensible to members of the poverty class that a "rich" attorney
would charge a small fee for legal services.' 2 6 Among the indigents
surveyed who had a lawyer contact experience, even those complaining
of an excessive charge implied that they did not really expect any less
when initially seeking help. The typical Spanish-American indigent
surveyed expects to be charged a substantial fee for legal advice. He
may complain post facto when he learns that the legal solution was
not particularly difficult and did not involve extensive preparation,
yet this is the consequence of a natural a priori belief that the workproduct of an attorney must flow from intricate and almost mystical
12 See notes 39, 40, 64 & 65 supra and accompanying text.
12 In conjunction with this view, some indigents who were surveyed indicated, albeit

indirectly, that the poor man faces a hurdle in simply entering the clean, ordered, and
expensively furnished office of an attorney - a "rich" man by their standards. This
barrier is probably more imagined than real, and the underlying concerns were difficult
to fathom. Perhaps the indigent is embarrassed by his own poverty. Perhaps it is simply
the culturally inbred fear of the alien environment of an attorney's office. It was apparent
from those interviewed who had consulted a lawyer at one time or another that the
impressive trappings of an attorney's office were of some importance. On the other
hand, the implicit feeling was that when an indigent finally decided that he must see
an attorney, he expected to see a good attorney, i.e., one who dressed like an attorney
is presumed to dress and whose office looked like an attorney's office is presumed to
look, complete with an impressive array of law books. This is certainly an enigmatic
view of attorneys, for, if the lawyer places the indigent at ease by unpretentious office
trappings, he then becomes less of a lawyer in the eyes of the indigent because of the
unpretentious surroundings.
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manipulation of complex laws requiring substantial expenditure of
time and labor.
3. Failure to Recognize Legal Problems.

At least one previous study of the legal needs of the urban poor
concluded that, for some types of problems, poor ghetto residents
frequently fail to recognize the legal implications involved. 1 7 The
same can generally be said of the rural indigent. When any particular problem is not seen as solvable by recourse to traditional
legal resources, the indigent will obviously not consult an attorney
for advice. The most commonly unrecognized legal problems are
denial of welfare or Social Security benefits,1 2 8 inability to repay
a loan when the lender is a finance agency, failure of a landlord
to repair rented premises, 129 requirement of public school children
to pay book fees as a prerequisite to receiving grade cards or passing
from one grade to the next higher, 3 ' ethnic discrimination, refusal
Sykes. supra note 7. Professor Schur asserts that Carlin and Howard ably document
the fact that the poor are often hampered by their failure to realize the possibilitv
of some legal solutions to their problems. E. SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL
VIEW 96 (1968). Compare Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Injustice.
12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381, 424 (1965).
128 See text, § V(B) (2) infra.
129 For resident indigent tenants, solution of problems with a landlord are typically resolved,
if at all, by informal means. See text, § V(B) (3) & text accompanying note 193 infra.
13 The Colorado statutes provide that any resident of the state between 6 and 21 years of
age is entitled to attend public schools in the school district of which he is a resident
without the payment of tuition. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-20-3 (1963). Yet, every
school district surveyed in Conejos and Costilla counties had a book fee requirement
for all children attending public schools. The fees ranged between $3.50 to $13.00 per
pupil, depending upon his or her grade level and the school district. One SpanishAmerican mother of 11 school children stated that she was required to pay as much as
$75 per year in order that her children may be educated in the "free" public schools.
The statutory authority for local school boards to require book fees as a precondition to advancement in school or graduation is certainly vague. Every school board
in the state has authority:
(4) To provide for furniture, equipment, library books and for everything
needed in school buildings, and for the use of the school board.
127 See

(8) To provide books for indigent children on the written statement of the
teachers that the parents of such children are not able to purchase them, and to
furnish free text books for the use of all pupils when authorized to do so by
a majority vote of the district as expressed at any regular or special meeting.
(9) To require all pupils to be furnished with the proper and suitable books
as a condition of membership in school.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-10-19 (1963).
It is certain, from the evidence gathered during the field research, that none of the
impoverished parents or the teachers interviewed were aware that written authorization
from the latter will result in free text books for an indigent pupil. It is safe to say that
if one were to retain an attorney to contest a book fee bill, the school board would
undoubtedly relent, principally because it is on shaky statutory and constitutional ground
in the first place. Through ignorance, however, the rural indigent simply sacrifices
enormously to pay the bill, only to receive another the following year. The practice is
certainly an anathema to the spirit of free public education, and the great concern voiced
about the book fee requirement from the many indigents interviewed should hopefully
be heard in the school board rooms.
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by employer to pay wages, and wage garnishment. The most frequently recognized legal problems are domestic relations problems,
criminal matters, purchase of unsatisfactory goods, and wills.'
Attorneys responding to the attorney questionnaire listed the

most commonly recognized legal problems confronting the poverty
class as domestic relations, creditor-debtor, and criminal problems. As the most commonly unrecognized legal problems, the same
three areas received the most frequent listing, with wills and estates
as a fourth.'

A good example of the nonrecognition of legal problems by
the indigent class surveyed is the wage garnishment or attachment
problem. Several of the indigents surveyed in the target area communities had faced this type of problem; none had seen an attorney.
Frequently, the response to the problem was inaction, or only a conference with the indigent's creditor or with his employer. By an

informal process of give-and-take, a few indigents solved the problem by agreeing to pay the judgment debt on a flexible installment
basis. On the other hand, some of these indigents were unable to
resolve the problem informally, and they suffered serious legal

injuries quite beyond those contemplated by the formal law. Two
of them lost their jobs and had personal property attached and re-

moved; a few others lost portions of their paychecks beyond what
they would have lost had exemptions been filed. Clearly, the legal
process of garnishing wages and attaching property to satisfy a
judgment debt was a highly emotional and very serious problem for
131 For

the last two listed problems, resolution by the indigent who faces such a problem
is often through the informal means developed in more detail in § IV infra, rather
than through an attorney. Thus, while possibly recognizing that these two types of
problems are susceptible to legal resolution, many indigents knowingly choose to resolve
them through other means.
On the other hand, the commonly unrecognized legal problems listed in the text
generally remain unresolved, even when they are recognized. Since these types of problems typically involve a conflict between an indigent and a member of the establishment
or a government institution, the injury which results from nonresolution of these legal
problems is denominated as class injury, and they are discussed as such in detail in
§ V infra.
132 The only explanation for this anomolous overlap between the recognized problems and
the unrecognized ones is that most returned questionnaires from attorneys listed only
one or two problem areas as recognized or unrecognized. And, no consistency was
apparent among the responses, so that one attorney may have listed domestic relations
as a recognized problem area and creditor-debtor as an unrecognized area, while a second
would list the opposite. Hence, the sum total of all responses resulted in an overlap.
Perhaps it can be said that the three types of legal problems most commonly taken to an
attorney by the indigent class are domestic relations, creditor-debtor, and criminal
matters, and a particular attorney's designation of any of the three as generally recognized or unrecognized is predicated exclusively upon his own practice and experiences
with a limited number of indigent clients.
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the residents involved.

3

' Yet with the assistance of an attorney,

much of the financial grief could have been spared.
Under Colorado law, no order of attachment prior to judgment
on any garnished debtor may issue for less than $20. M Wages may
not be garnished until a complaint has been filed, the defendant has
become subject to the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ,
and then only in aid of execution of judgment.' 35 These provisions
protect the indigent consumer against unknown garnishment and
attachment. Furthermore, 70 percent of the "earnings, avails of health,
accident or disability insurance, and the avails of any pension or retirement benefits" due to the head of a family, and 35 percent of
such earnings in the case of a single person are statutorily exempt
from garnishment and attachment.13 6 And, such payments as aid to
the needy disabled, 131 servicemen's pensions, 138 life insurance up
Loss of a job due to service of a garnishment writ on an indigent debtor's employer
is particularly severe. If the indigent is seasonably employed in agriculture, he will
lose wages during the peak earning season-planting and harvest time-which will
be deeply felt during the slim winter months. In addition, the paucity of agricultural
employers in the two-county region, dwindling further each year with increased mechanization, and the close knit informational circle among local farmers, will probably preclude
the indigent debtor from securing another job. Hence, he is unemployed, with lttle
hope of repaying his debt.
However, two factors mitigate against the seriousness of this problem for the rural
indigents as a class. First, one provision of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1674 (1968), effective on July 1. 1970, Id. § 1671, prohibits an employer
from discharging an employee on the ground that his earnings have been subjected to
garnishment for any one indebtedness. In addition, court records from one of the two
sample counties show that writs of garnishment or attachment in aid of execution are
infrequently utilized by creditors, particularly in the county court where the jurisdictional limitation for suit is $500. COLO. REV, STAT. ANN. § 37-13-4 (Supp. 1965).
Two explanations seem plausible: First, the local businessmen in the region surveyed
often know personally most of their customers. The high interrelationship of families
and the sparse population account for this fact. Second, garnishment and attachment are
generally ineffective remedies against an indigent debtor who is unemployed for most
of the year and owns few assets. Although a substantial number of rural indigents own
housing units, see note 75 supra and accompanying test, the valuation of these units
is very low. For example, of the 195 occupied and unoccupied housing units in the
Spanish-American barrio of Lariat, 130 were valued at between $0 and $2,000, 25
between $2,000 and $2,999, 18 between $3,000 and $3,999, 13 between 84,000 and
$4,999, 6 between $5,000 and $5,999, and only three worth more than $6,000. The
approximate real value of the units was calculated by multiplying the tax assessed value
as established in 1965 by the Rio Grand County Assessor's Office by three, the multiple
used by the Assessor's Office. E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 63.
34
1 COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 77-1-9(1) (Supp. 1965).
135 Id. § 77-1-9(2) (Supp. 1965).
136 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-4 (1963). Additionally, Title III of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, enacted on May 29, 1968, exempts from garnishment 75 percent of any
individual's weekly wages or his aggregate disposable earnings minus "the amount by
which his earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wages
prescribed by section 6(a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 in effect at the
time the earnings are payable," whichever is greater. Consumer Credit Protection Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1968). This exemption takes effect on July 1, 1970. Id. § 1671.
See generally Clark, The Revolution in Consumer Credit Legislation, 45 DENVER L.J.
679 (1968); Note, Garnishment Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act and the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CNN. L. REv. 338 (1969).
7
13 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 119-6-15 (1963).
38
1 Id. § 77-2-2(i) (1963).
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to $5,000,' unemployment insurance payments, 140 old age assistance
payments,'
and workmen's compensation awards, 1 42 are statutorily
exempt from garnishment or attachment. However, the defendant
debtor is required, in order to perfect any exemption, to file with
the county clerk a written claim of such exemption within 10 days
after service of notice of the writ of attachment or garnishment.' 4 3
In like manner, homes are exempt from attachment up to a valuation
of $5,000 under the homestead exemption, but only if the owner
has filed such an exemption.'
The filing requirement for exemption from garnishment and
attachment is the rub. 4 ' None of the group of respondents who had
confronted this problem were aware of the advantages of claiming
exemptions. One particular indigent widow asked during the course
of her interview what could be done about a letter she had recently
received from a collection agency threatening suit on an admittedly
unpaid bill. When asked, among other questions, whether she had
a valid homestead exemption on her home, she not only was mystified
by the terminology but also was unsure whether she was the title
owner to her property.
More examples of legal problems going unrecognized by the
rural indigent could be given, but that would only belabor the
point.' 46 The rural poor tend to view the "law" as a tool of the
139 Id. § 77-2-2(m)
140

(1963).

1d. § 82-10-3 (1963).

41

§ 101-1-12 (1963).
142 Id. § 81-13-7(1) (1963). This is relatively unimportant, however, since the workmen's
compensation chapter of the Colorado Code "is not intended to apply to employers of
. . . farm and ranch labor .... ." Id. § 81-2-6(4) (1963). A bill was introduced in the
Colorado House of Representatives in 1969, House Bill 1427, to extend these benefits
to farm and ranch labor, but the bill was postponed indefinitely in committee. Strongly
opposing the proposed legislation were the potato grower interests in the San Luis
Valley. Huber, supra note 31, at 8, col. 1.
'43 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-4-1 (Supp. 1965).
144 In Colorado, a homestead exemption may be perfected either in the deed itself at the
time of the original filing with the County Clerk or by a marginal entry of "Homestead"
written on the recorded instrument and signed by the title owner. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-3-2 (1963). Since very few indigents' housing units are valued in excess of $5,000,
supra note 133, and since a home and perhaps a car are often the only substantial assets
owned by the rural indigent, there would be little for a creditor to attach, assuming that
the indieent had filed a homestead exemption.
145 In a California study, it was revealed that less than 10 percent of the debtors whose
wages are attached ever file exemption claims. Brunn, Wage Garnishmentin California:
A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (1965). Such a revelation
prompted the Director of California Rural Legal Assistance to urge the necessity of a
"determination of a means by which buyers are more likely to file claims of exemption
so that part of their wages can be excepted from the attachment ....
For example, claim
of exemption forms might be served along with the writ of attachment so that the right
to file a claim of exemption is brought to the attention of the defendant." Lorenz, The
Application of Cost-Utility Analysis to the Practice of Law: A Special Case Study of
the CaliforniaFarmworkers, 15 KAN. L. REV. 409, 431 (1967).
146 A methodology for systematically measuring the legal problem recognition capacities
of the poor (among others) was utilized in the Duke study. See Note, supra note 9, at
509-21.
1 1d.
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establishment class. 147 For them, the "law," more often than not, is
thought of only in terms of a policeman or state patrolman, a criminal
charge, a judge and courtroom, a garnishment writ, a set of rules
recited to deny welfare benefits, a bill collection letter, or a repossession of goods. For them, the "law" is always on the other side
in any controversy. The impoverished rural resident is woefully
ignorant of the protections and benefits which the law rightfully
affords to all men, rich and poor alike.' 4 8
B. The Establishment's Legal System: The View From the Top
Members of the rural bar expressed through interviews and returned questionnaires a view of the capability and actual response of
the formal legal system to the legal problems of the rural poor quite
divergent from that expressed by the indigents themselves. The povertystricken are, in a word, cynical of the formal legal system as a means
of bettering their collective lot. The rural bar quite obviously views
the legal system from a different perspective. Before detailing the responses of these attorneys with respect to the actual operations of the
formal legal system which affect the rural poor, however, a few
observations of the general characteristics of the rural bar are in order.
1. General Characteristics of the Rural Bar
The most salient characteristic of the rural bar in the two-county
area under study has already been mentioned- it is severely understaffed.' 4 9 The most salient characteristic of the bar in other portions
Former Supreme Court Justice Fortas, in an address given at a meeting of the Third
Circuit federal judiciary, stated that the law has been an "alien force" to the impoverished class, a "system devised by the establishment - of the establishment - for the
establishment." To this segment of America's population, "the law has been their
enemy." Address Mr. Justice Fortas at the Third Circuit Conference, September 8, 1966.
148 Mr. William Barvick, Director of Legal Services, North Central Region, Office of
Economic Opportunity, capsulized very well the poor man's view of the law:
Ignorance and misunderstanding surround the poor's view of the law. To
them the law has a magical quality, lawyers are the magicians, and the victims
of the lawyer's tricks are the poor. Lawyers are the masters of technicalities and
technicalities stand in the way of fair treatment. They do not see the law as a
reasonable means of resolving disputes or adjudicating rights. Instead, they
view it as arbitrary, capricious, and unrestrained. The law is a policeman, a
magistrate judge, and a welfare administrator, persons with unlimited power,
from whose decisions there is no appeal. This is all part of the hopelessness
associated with being poor.
Barvick, Legal Services and the Rural Poor, 15 KAN. L. REV. 537, 539 (1967). Another
commentary described this duality in treatment by the law as de facto bias.
A third type of bias in the law may be termed de facto bias. On paper the
law treats rich and poor alike, but in fact the correlates of poverty make equality impossible....
De facto bias is pervasive because so many correlates of poverty such as
indigency, ignorance or insecurity can serve as barriers to justice. In essence
it is bias by default. It represents a failure of the law to take into account the
differential capacity of rich and poor to realize the protections and benefits
which the law provides.
Carlin, Howard and Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 9,
21-22 (1966).
149 See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
147
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of the San Luis Valley and rural Colorado is that its members are
solidly entrenched members of the establishment.
These attorneys are, of course, establishment by definition- by
virtue of their possession of a body of knowledge which gives them
authority within a specialized sphere. In addition, most of them are
quite active in the leadership circles of their respective communities,
particularly in the political arena. Most of the respondents to the
attorney questionnaire had held or were presently holding public
office. Of the 51 respondents, 45 were part or full time practitioners.
The remaining 6 were district court judges. Of the 45, only 8 indicated
that they had never held one of the following offices: district judge,
county judge, district attorney, deputy district attorney, city attorney,
or county attorney. 150
Finally, they are employed primarily by other members of the
establishment in the community. As would be expected, most residents
of the sample counties who are classifiable as "establishment" members utilize attorneys when faced with a legal problem. They can
more readily afford the legal fees, and their generally superior
educational attainment creates an awareness of the necessity for
orderly and proper resolution of legal difficulties. The attorneycontact experience of a business woman who owned one of two local
grocery stores in one of the small target area communities surveyed
is typical. With the advice and aid of an Alamosa attorney, she had
recently transferred the entire assets and property of her store into
joint tenancy with her cousin, a move motivated, she said, by the
recent death of a third partner in the business, her brother, when
the inventory of the store was frozen for accounting during probate.
She had, in addition, employed the same attorney for collection of
outstanding debts and for effecting an adoption. She felt that she had
"wised up" to the necessity of utilizing attorneys in the business world,
and she believed that the fees charged were more than fair.
In addition to employing attorneys for personal or business needs,
members of the establishment, as the leadership class, retain attorneys
as counsel for institutional groups. The Boards of County Commissioners for Conejos and Costilla counties each have an attorney
150The high incidence of attorneys holding public office tends to exacerbate the already
difficult problem of lack of attorneys in rural areas. District judges are forbidden by
statute to practice law in any court. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1-14 (Supp. 1965).
County judges of small counties, such as Conejos and Costilla, are permitted to practice
law, but only in courts higher than their own and only in cases which have not been
before a county court. Id. Moreover, a judge cannot have a partner acting as attorney
or counsel in any court within his jurisdiction. Id. § 12-1-20 (Supp. 1965). District
attorneys, their assistants, and their deputies do not, of course, appear as defense counsel
in any court. In addition: "No attorney-at-law practicing law in the state of Colorado
who is a member of a private law firm with which a district attorney, assistant district
attorney, or deputy district attorney is associated may defend any person or persons who
are being prosecuted by a salaried staff member of the office of said district attorney."
Id. § 45-3-4 (1963). See also note 164 infra.
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on retainer as do the town councils for three incorporated communities in the area and the welfare boards of directors for each
county. Incorporated water and sewage districts, at least one savings
and loan association, and a Community Hospital retain attorneys.
Several of these institutional groups have the same retained counsel.
To be sure, the retainers are not large-usually around $200 a
year- and the more difficult legal problems, such as incorporating
a water and sewage district and issuing bonds for the indebtedness,
are taken to the large Denver law firms, with the lawyer on retainer
serving as local counsel. Yet individual members of these institutional
groups have the opportunity to meet an attorney and occasionally
view first-hand the legal process of problem-solving, an opportunity
not presented in similar manner to those of the indigent class.
2. The View of the Rural Bar
The view which the members of the rural bar take of the resolution of the legal problems of the rural poor can essentially be
summarized into three general attitudes which are held by a majority
of them: (1) They all give appropriate obeisance to the attorney's
obligation to represent the poor; 1 . (2) they think that they have as
much indigent work as they can prudently handle; and (3) they
believe that the impoverished class in their region is adequately
served by the existing legal structure. The extent to which these
positions are accurate or justified can be evaluated in terms of some
of the information collected by the attorney questionnaire, reported
below.
a. Criminal Practice
At the time of the empirical research for this project, the sixth
amendment guarantee of the right to counsel for indigents in all
felony cases 1 2 was being implemented in the 12th Judicial districtthe San Luis Valley- and throughout most of Colorado by appointment of counsel.' 3 Since to the indigent the "law" is often thought
of in terms of the criminal justice system, several questions in the
attorney questionnaire were designed to delve into the involvement and
attitude of the rural bar in fulfilling this critical obligation. The 45
151 See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 31.

15 2 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and its progeny extending the right
to counsel to all critical stages of a felony case.
153 As of January 1, 1970, the public defender system became a statewide operation under

the auspices of the Colorado Judicial Administrator. Although funding for the initial
year was sparse, totaling barely more than $1,000,000, plans for the system indicated
expectations of opening 26 offices across the state. The authority for the statewide
system is contained in CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-21-1 to 39-21-5 (Supp. 1969).
Public Defenders practice in both the county and district courts of the State, and
their presence will hopefully eliminate the assigned counsel system for indigent criminal
defendants throughout the State. However, the court on its own motion or upon application of the Public Defender may still appoint counsel for particular cases. Id. § 39-21-5.
For further discussion, see CONCLUSION infra.
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practitioners responding to the questionnaire were assigned 170 criminal
indigent cases in 1967. Of this total, 66, or 39 percent, were reported
tried. Over the period 1965-67, the number of these assigned cases
greatly increased, and the percentage which went to trial almost
doubled. Thus, from the initial data, it appeared that the obligation of
the members of the rural bar to represent indigents in felony cases
was being fulfilled.
However, it was also found that only a few attorneys in the
rural communities were being allotted the responsibility of handling
most of the assigned felony cases. For example, of the 170 cases, seven
attorneys reported that they were assigned 10 or more such cases
during that year. One reported an assignment load of 35 cases. On
the other hand, 16 attorneys reported no assignments for 1967. The
seven attorneys who reported a high frequency of assignments of
indigent cases constituted only 16 percent of those responding to the
questionnaire, yet they were assigned 79 percent of the reported
cases. Even more significant is the fact that 82 percent of the 66
assigned cases which went to trial in 1967 were handled by these
same seven lawyers.
These results provide strong evidence that the assignments of
indigent cases were not objectively rotated among eligible members
of the bar in rural communities. An independent examination of district court records for Alamosa and Costilla counties fully corroborated
this conclusion. Three attorneys practicing in Alamosa were assigned
64.3 percent of all indigent cases for which the two counties disbursed
payments during the years 1965-67. All but eight of the 80 cases were
assigned to six attorneys. Those six represented about one-half of
the legal population of Alamosa and Costilla counties.
Surprisingly, however, 75 percent of the respondents to the
questionnaire, when asked specifically to state their opinion on the
matter, believed that assignments were objectively rotated. Of those
who were assigned less than 10 cases, 83 percent expressed this view,
while those who were assigned 10 or more cases were evenly split
on the question. Although the sample was small, it seemed that the
fewer cases an attorney was assigned, the more likely he was to
believe that indigent felony cases were objectively rotated. The stated
circumstances by which some attorneys avoided court appointments
to represent indigents ranged from claims of conflicting interests
(district and deputy district attorneys) or heavy workloads to such
personal reasons as old age or ill health.
Thus, while the data indicated that the members of the rural
bar were by and large performing the task of representing indigent
felony defendants, some were performing more often than others.
Moreover, the fact that the tasks were being performed does not
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necessarily mean that they were being performed adequately in every
case. When preparation is patently inadequate, the indigent defendant
may very well know it, and this may profoundly affect his particular
view of the criminal justice system. One of the VISTA volunteers in
a sample county related a story of a Spanish-American teenager from
an indigent family who had been charged with car theft. He approached the volunteer one morning seeking transportation to the
district courthouse, a distance of about 13 miles, on the day set for
his trial. While traveling in the volunteer's car, he stated that the
attorney assigned as his counsel had never contacted him about his
case. The attorney and his teenage client met for the first time for
a brief period prior to trial. The trial itself was brief, the boy was
found guilty of the charge, and he was placed on probation. The
volunteer stated that the 'boy was very bitter about the affair, believing that he had been prejudged and that his attorney was only
interested in going through the motions of a defense and then returning to his private office to deal with clients who could pay for
services rendered.
The incident related by the VISTA volunteer may be an abberration; yet it points out the possible consequences of inadequate
preparation by assigned counsel. A majority of the attorneys interviewed in the San Luis Valley agreed that they did not have sufficient
time to prepare adequately some of the more complex felony cases
to which they were assigned. If any trend was discernible, it was that
the younger attorneys who were assigned more indigent felony cases
than the older members of the bar tried more of their assigned
cases and indicated more frequently that they had sufficient time to
prepare those cases assigned to them. Of the seven attorneys who
reported on the questionnaire that they had been assigned 10 or
more cases in 1967, six thought that preparation time was adequate,
while the majority of attorneys who were assigned fewer than 10
cases felt otherwise. Most attorneys - 70 percent of the questionnaire
respondents - believed that compensation allotted them by county
funds for indigent felony representation was generally insufficient,
considering the time and effort expended. Attorneys who were assigned
fewer than 10 cases for 1967 expressed this belief by a 2 to 1 ratio,
while the proportion was 6 to 1 among the attorneys who were assigned 10 or more cases. Thus, the same attorneys who perform their
tasks in the criminal area more often are less likely to feel that they
perform them adequately.
b. Civil Practice
In the civil area, rural attorneys as a group also recognize a
general obligation to serve the legal needs of the poor, charging, if
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at all, more or less according to their ability to pay.'14 However, their
attitudes may vary according to the type of legal problem involved.
For instance, as a general rule, the attorneys interviewed reported
that they would not take a divorce or annulment action until the
minimum recommended fee of $100 was paid-in advance. One
possible explanation for this practice is that domestic relations
problems are the most frequently taken by the rural poor to attorneys.
Divorce, support and alimony, and child custody problem areas
were cited by respondents to the attorney questionnaire respectively
as the first, third, and fourth most prevalent legal problems among
rural indigents. 5' This observation is in accord with statistics from
154 See notes 117 & 124 supra.
155 The following table represents the responses of the attorneys to question 17 of the

attorney questionnaire, reprinted in the APPENDIX infra. The legal problem areas most
frequently encountered by the indigent rural population of Colorado, in the opinion of
the rural bar, are listed at and near the top of the list. The ranking was determined from
the total number of attorneys who responded that either a substantial number or a few
indigents had encountered the particular problem area, rather than none.
Number of
Indigent Problems per
Attorney Responses

S+F
Type of Legal Problem

MARITAL - Divorce
UNSATISFACTORY GOODS - INSTALLMENT
PURCHASE - From Traveling Salesmen
MARITAL - Support and Alimony
MARITAL - Child Custody
DEFAULT - Repossession of Installment Goods
DEFAULT - Payment of Dept.
WAGE COLLECTION - Garnishment, Employer
Not Paying Full Wages
HOUSING - Drafting Deeds & Other
Property Papers
WELFARE- Unable to Get on Rolls
LAW ENFORCEMENT - Probation & Parole
WORKMEN'S COMP. - Job Injuries
HOUSING - Landlord/Tenant
LAW ENFORCEMENT - Atty. for Criminal
Cases Other Than Felonies
COLLECTING MONEY - Loaned by Indigent
to Another
LAW ENFORCEMENT - Posting Bail
LAW ENFORCEMENT - Discrimination by
Local Police or Sheriff
ESTATE PLANNING - Wills
UNSATISFACTORY GOODS - Purchased with Cash
WELFARE - Unable to Afford Appeal
UNSATISFACTORY GOODS - INSTALLMENT
PURCHASE - From Local Businesses
UNSATISFACTORY GOODS - INSTALLMENT
PURCHASE - From Nat'l Chain Stores

Substantial Few

None

Total

29

15

0

44

10

26

5

36

8

20

9

28

3

18

15

21

1

11

22

12
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other portions of the country1 5 and from the district court records
of the sample counties. 5 ' A further explanation for the requirement
of an advance fee rests in the attitude of the rural bar toward a
divorce case. The attorneys interviewed invariably expressed the view
that a divorce is a luxury and should not lightly be countenanced.
Thus, the advance retainer is thought to cull the serious and well-

considered application from the impassioned and improvident request
coming on the heels of a familial quarrel. Finally, the advance retainer
insures the collection of the fee, a recognition by attorneys that
indigent divorcees may be reticent about paying after the court decree
has been issued.
In addition to recognizing, at least in general terms, an obligation to serve the legal needs of the poor in the civil area, the at-

Typeof Legal Problem

Number of
Indigent Problems per
Attorney Responses
S+F
Substantial Few None Total

UNSATISFACTORY GOODS - INSTALLMENT
PURCHASE - From Discount Stores

2

9

24

11

DISCRIMINATION -

1

6

31

7

WELFARE - Forced to Accept Unsuitable Employment
DISCRIMINATION - Housing

0
0

6
5

32
32

6
5

DISCRIMINATION -

0

2

36

2

Job

Voting

In one open-ended question, lawyers were asked to list the five most prevalent legal
problems of the indigent class in their community. The table below shows the responses
to that question. The ranking was determined by assigning point values of 1 to 5 for
the hierarchy of responses, then tabulating the total point values.
Type of Legal Problem

Domestic Relations
Creditor/Debtor

Total Points

197
122

Criminal
Drinking

81
23

Traffic

19

The active judges who responded gave more weight to criminal problems; for them,
criminal problems totaled 22, domestic relations 18, and creditor/debtor 12.
15 From its 1966 Composite Report, the total number of domestic relations cases handled
by the Los Angeles Neighborhood Legal Services Society, Inc., for the calendar year
1966 was 4,550, a total of 44 percent of all cases handled. The second most common
category of problems handled was financial and bankruptcy, totaling only 851 cases or
8 percent of all cases. 1 CEB LEGAL SERVICES GAZETTE 4 (January

1967). "Recent

statistics indicate an extremely high percentage of domestic cases being brought to legal
services offices. . . . [S)uch a caseload only reflects that family problems of the poor
have long been ignored."
DEFENDER Assoc. 2.

1966 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, NAT'L LEGAL AID AND

157 In both of the sample counties, divorce cases comprised a substantial majority of all
civil actions filed, with money demands being second. Almost all of the divorce cases
involved Spanish-surnamed persons. To be sure, the court records do not state the
economic status of the parties, but the frequency of divorce cases involving Spanishsurnamed parties would nevertheless suggest the conclusion made.
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torneys interviewed usually proffered the observation that the
impoverished class in the area was adequately served by the existing
legal structure. The impression was given to the interviewers that no
indigent was "turned down" when he sought legal assistance. In fact,
the attorneys interviewed uniformly stated that they had more indigent
cases than they wanted and certainly as much as they could prudently
handle.
In response to a question concerning their indigent civil practice,
83 percent of the attorney respondents reported that they devoted 10
percent or more of their practice to indigents. Thirty-nine percent
indicated that they devoted more than 20 percent of their time to this
type of client, and this group included a majority of those seven
attorneys who were assigned more than 10 indigent felony cases in
1967. In addition, 48 percent of the respondents believed that,
in their own particular community, poor residents with legal problcnins
generally tend to come to them (or to their firm) more than to other
local attorneys. Forty-two percent felt that indigents consult them
about as often as they do other attorneys. Only 10 percent believed
that they were consulted less often than other attorneys. Also, several
present or former district attorneys reported on the questionnaire that
local indigents viewed them as a sort of all-purpose poor man's
lawyer. One respondent stated: "I was District Attorney 16 years
and people considered I was attorney for the people of the State of
Colorado, and I did not tell them differently, and many of them
still believe I should represent them." Another reported: "Because
of DA status, 'poor' comes [sic] to me as a 'public official' regardless of
the fact that the problem is not criminal in nature." One woman
indigent interviewed in a target area community corroborated this
impression. The woman adamantly believed that the district attorney
is duty-bound to provide free legal assistance to all indigents in the
judicial district, regarding civil matters as well as criminal. The district attorney's refusal to proffer free legal assistance in civil matters
had disturbed a few community residents who held views akin to the
woman interviewed.
The sources of the attorneys' indigent practices were also investigated. Most of the attorneys responding to the questionnaire
stated that fewer than 20 percent of their indigent cases were referred to them by other lawyers in their community. From the field
interviews, it is apparent that the San Luis Valley lawyers receive
few referrals from governmental agencies which deal with the poor.
The Colorado Civil Rights Commission office in Alamosa is a limited
exception. It reported a number of referrals, but only because its
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limited statutory jurisdiction 58 precludes any formal assistance to
the many indigents who come seeking help in some matter other than
employment or housing discrimination. Occasionally, attorneys stated
that they received referrals from the office of the Clerk and Recorder
of the several counties, although they noted that the clerks in both
counties under study were prone to perform the simple legal tasks
themselves." 9
Most of the indigent cases which an attorney handles are either
referrals from nonlawyer individuals in the community or simply
walk-in clients. When asked to speculate from their own community
experience whom the poor first seek out when confronted by a legal
problem, 34 percent of the respondents to the attorney questionnaire
stated a friend or relative, 25 percent said a lawyer, 10 percent
mentioned the police, another 10 percent mentioned a social worker,
and less than 5 percent were reported for each of the following:
minister or priest, district attorney, judge, and mayor. The interviews
with the impoverished class in the sample counties would strongly
suggest that few indigents go directly to an attorney when confronted
with a legal problem. The almost universal pattern mentioned by
those indigent residents who had contacted an attorney was at least
a recommendation, a concurrence, or perhaps a referral to an attorney
by some other individual in the community. Under these circumstances, the reputation of an attorney or firm for helping the poverty
class and the length of tenure of that attorney or firm in the particular community are influential factors in determining where the
indigent will eventually go with his legal problem. One attorney
reported that "our firm has been established 34 years and we feel
158 The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-21-1
et seq. (1963), created the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission, id. § 80-21-3.
with specific authorization to remedy discrimination in employment. Id. § 80-21-6. The
name was changed to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission in 1965. CoLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 80-21-5 (Supp. 1965). The Alamosa office is a regional office of the Commission. The Colorado Fair Housing Act of 1959, id. §§ 69-7-2 et. seq, as amended.
authorizes the Commission to remedy discrimination in housing. Id. § 69-7-5. Finally,
Colorado's public accommodations law was amended in 1957 to bring the enforcement
,fpublic accommodations discrimination within the jurisdiction of the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Commission, since designated the Colorado Civil Rights Commssion.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3-3, 80-21-5 (1963). See generally Penwell, Civil Rights
in Colorado. 46 DENVER L.J. 181 (1969) ; Comment, Investigation Procedures of the
Co!orado Civil Rights Commission, 40 U. Colo. L. REv. 119 (1967).
159One statute provides that any person who is not licensed by the Supreme Court of Colorado to practice law and who does so practice shall be deemed guilt) of contempt.
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1-7 (1963). The predecessor to that statutory admonition
was originally passed in 1905. See genet-ally Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver
Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957), and note 167 infra. Thus, when the
county clerk of one of the two sample counties stated to a student interviewing team that
he had recently quit the practice of drafting deeds because of some unspecified "recent
law," it is more likely that he was responding in light of the law orientation of his
interviewers.
Information from sources other than the county clerks themselves indicated not
only that the clerks and perhaps other county officials are still performing the routine
legal work of drafting simple instruments but that the quid pro quo for such services
is very small - usually about $1.50.
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we enjoy the confidence of the community." Another said, "I have
been in practice many years and I encourage them to come see me."
One final observation may be gleaned from both the personal
interviews with members of the San Luis Valley bar and the data
obtained by the attorney questionnaire survey: Because rural practitioners, almost without exception, felt sated with indigent clients, they
seemed to believe ipso facto that the poor are adequately served.
The number of rural indigents who seek legal advice is equated with
the number of all rural indigents who are confronted by legal
problems. However, the field survey of the rural poor in the two
sample counties belies this assumed identity: A substantial quantum of
legal problems of indigents never find their way to a lawyer's office.
IV. THE

INFORMAL LEGAL SYSTEM

As is apparent from the preceding section, the formal legal
system is not utilized to any great extent by the rural poor because
of their ignorance of the means of access to, and the actual
financial costs of, professional assistance. The small minority of
indigents who do take their recognized legal problems to an attorney
seem to provide the rural bar with all of the indigent legal work
which they feel they can prudently handle. In terms of the resources
of these attorneys, their point of view may be justified. However, the
only types of indigent problems which appear in an attorney's office
regularly are domestic relations problems and criminal matters. From
the indigent's point of view, the substantial majority of their legal
problems - both recognized and unrecognized - are not resolved
through recourse to the formal legal system. The central concern of this study and the subject matter of the instant section
is a delineation and analysis of the avenues of reaction by the
indigents surveyed to the problems which were not taken to an attorney's office. In a very broad sense, research revealed three separately
definable methods by which the rural poor in the sample counties
deal with a legal problem, other than by a lawyer's help. First, the
indigent may seek out a confidant in the community for advice and
assistance. Second, he may employ various forms of self-help and interpersonal dealing, depending upon the character of the particular
problem. Finally, he may, by choice or by chance, do nothing. These
methods are considered seriatim.
A. The Role of the Confidant
When a rural Spanish-American indigent does not recognize
that a particular problem entails legal ramifications, or when, irrespective of recognition, he fails to seek the aid of an attorney for any
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number of reasons, the confidant becomes an important and valuable
secondary source of assistance. The term "confidant" is used here in
a generic sense, referring to persons in a rural community who,
through a unique combination of intelligence, experience, concern,
and public trust, are advisors of their own initiative to the impoverished class.1 60 The continued existence of this kind of individual
with a concern for and involvement in the plight of his indigent
neighbors is probably traceable to the patron traditions of early
American, Spanish, or Mexican settlements.'' Indeed, there is really no
160This not to say that persons acting in a confidential and advisor)' capacity in rural

communities provide beneficial advice and assistance only to the poor. On the contrary,
there are in every rural community surveyed certain "city fathers" whose experience
and expertise have made their judgments revered by the ordinary citizenrythe well-todo as well as the poor. The term "confidant" is used here to denote those persons whose
advice and assistance is particularly coveted among the impoverished class because of
their special rapport with and concern for the problems of that class; the confidant
is a person with whom the rural indigent can identify. That the confidant may advise
and assist his peers among the establishment class is likely, but it is irrelevant to the
purposes of this section,
161The patron-peon system was based on the feudal relationship between a master and his
servant and existed throughout Latin America, including what is now the American
Southwest. The relationship was originally a reciprocal one whereby the owner of the
land (patron) supplied his workers (peones) with tools or food or housing while they,
in turn, owed him a certain amount of labor. Additionally, the patron took an interest
in the personal problems of his workers and their families. It was not infrequent for a
single patron to be a godfather to hundreds of children born to workers on his land.
Without any implication of social equality, then, the relationship was highly familial
and personalistic. To have the protection or backing of your patron was simply to be
in the right. For an account of present patron-peon relationships see, Gillen, Some
Signposts for Policy, in SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA TODAY 36-39 (1960);
J. BUSEY, LATIN AMERICA, 7-8 (1964); W. SCHURZ, LATIN AMERICA 303-07 (1964)
0.

LEWIS, LIFE IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE: TEPOZTLAN REVISITED 111-12

(1951).

The relationship was frequently abused and resulted in a form of economic slavery
known as peonage. The worker would become indebted to the landowner and tied to
the land while the debt existed. The landowner, of course, would see to it that the
peon would never erase his debt thus forcing the peones to live in the deepest poverty.
This practice seemed to be particularly prevalent in Mexico. See, e.g., H. PARKES, A
HISTORY OF MEXICO, 98-99 (1960) ; E. GRUENING, MEXICO AND ITS HERITAGE 118-23,
136-38 (1928).
In what is now the American Southwest, according to Dr. Daniel T. Valdez, the
peones were dependent on the patrones for virtually all aspects of their livlihood.
including the dispensation of "legal" advice and the resolution of "legal" disputes.
In return the peones provided their labor. A tradition was thus established by which
the peones could look at their patrones for the types of legal services now provided by
the legal system.
Two other groups constituted the elite in early Spanish colonial society in the
American Southwest -the
clerical class and the rising merchant class. When the
patrones became unavailable or inaccessible to the peones or other lower classes, the
latter were able to transfer the relationship established by the tradition, and they began
to look to the priests and the merchants for advice. This transference was so complete
in some instances that many members of the lower classes referred colloquially to certain
members of the merchant class as pairones. It is not surprising then that even today
members of the impoverished Spanish-American class in rural portions of the Southwest
look to more elite members of the community for legal advice and counseling. Based
on an Interview with Dr. Daniel T. Valdez, Chairman, Division of Behavioral Sciences,
Metropolitan State College, Denver, Colorado.
For a somewhat lighter, fictionalized, account of how the patron-peon relationship
has survived in the American Southwest, see also N. OTERO, OLD SPAIN IN OUR
SOUTHWEST. 9-38 (1936) ; R. BRADFORD. RED SKY AT MORNING 117-18 (1968). There
has also been some speculation about the impact of the Patron-peon relationship on
modern politics in the American Southwest. See, e.g., Russell, New Mexico: A Problem
of Parochialism in Transition, 30 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 385-87 (1936) ; Russell, Racial
Groups in the New Mexico Legislature, 195 ANNALS 62-71 (1938).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

comparable counterpart to the confidant in the Anglo segment of
the rural area studied; it appears to be uniquely Spanish-American,
at least insofar as it is an established institution in the culture of
rural poverty. 162 The high incidence of Spanish-Americans living in
poverty in the sample counties contributes to the ethnic nature of the
confidant system.
The following is a description of a typical confidant in the two
counties studied. There may be exceptions to some of the described
traits, but there is one essential characteristic common to all community residents who can be called confidants: They have generated
a high degree of trust and confidence among members of the poverty
class. This fiduciary status is the essence of the position, and it in
turn engenders continued reliance by many indigent residents upon
the confidant's considered judgment and advice. A confidant is always
considered to be a member of the "establishment" class in his particular community. Since class distinctions have previously been described as based upon criteria broader than level of income,' 1 3 the
inclusion of a particular confidant within the establishment may be
for reasons other than his income. For example, age, experience, and
excellent common sense were the hallmarks of one elderly gentleman
in a target area community whose advice and judgment were esteemed
among a number of the local indigents who were interviewed. Yet
that confidant lived on his social security check, hardly the calling
card of most establishment members. The reason for this higher class
characterization by the community may be the very fact that his advice
and judgment are esteemed - giving 'him, in a broad sense, an aura
of authority. The characteristics of a person upon whom the poor
man relies - such as knowledge and experience in matters pertinent
to his problems - are essentially the same characteristics which mark
a person as a cut above the poverty class.
Generally, the confidant has a higher educational achievement
level than most other residents of his community, but it is usually a
combination of education and practical experience that marks a person
as a confidant. And the consistent correctness of the confidant's
advice or aid is essential in order to prevent erosion of the indigent
class' confidence in his ability and willingness to help them. The
confidant is often a long-time resident of the community, and his
family ties with a number of other community residents may be
another rung in the ladder of public confidence.
Because of his concerned nature, the confidant is often heavily
involved in local civic affairs. Occasionally he is a political leader,
162

For a comparison between the confidant and the community leaders interviewed in
connection with the Duke study of the legal problems of the rural poor, see note 180

infra.
163Se text, § It(F) supra.
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a priest, a mayor, a welfare official, or even the county judge; "4
often he is a local businessman. He has embarked on an open-door
policy for the indigent community. He is available anytime to counsel
anyone who seeks him out for advice or aid. In short, then, the
typical confidant is Spanish-American, educated, middle-aged, active
in community affairs, has an adequate or better income, is a life-long
resident of the San Luis Valley, and is a person who is more than a
little concerned with the problems, legal and otherwise, confronting
the poor.
One particular confidant in a larger target community was a
jack-of-all-trades. He dealt in realty, was an insurance salesman,
completed tax returns in the spring, and, for a number of years,
drafted deeds and wills for local residents. On three different occasions during the one and one-half hour interview with him, local
Spanish-Americans entered his establishment seeking advice on some
pressing matters. He related some of the recent occasions where he
had been called upon for assistance: they ranged from advice on preparing income tax forms to telephone calls to the welfare office to
find out why a certain person had been refused benefits. Creditordebtor problems are common, he said, and he often tried to negotiate
a more equitable and less burdensome financial arrangement for repaying a loan or purchasing a piece of merchandise where the indigent seeking help is otherwise deserving.
Finally, as was likewise stated by the county clerk,16 this jackof-all-trades claimed to have recently abandoned the practice of
drafting legal instruments. His awareness that the student interviewers
were studying law may well have contributed to his admission. It is likely
that the practice continues: The owner of two bars in a small neighboring community stated that the deeds for his business properties, his
home, and for additional land outside of the community, in addition to his will, were all drawn by this jack-of-all-trades.
1. Drafting Legal Instruments
Not all of those persons in the area surveyed who acted, to
greater or lesser degrees, as confidants to their indigenous poverty
class drafted legal instruments. Indeed, that function appears to have
164 The

county judge is included because, in both Conejos and Costilla counties, the judge
is not a lawyer. In fact, the judge of Conejos county informed his interviewers that he
would resign his position if an attorney moved into the county, so that the new attorney
could be appointed as judge.
The suggestion has been made by several persons independently familiar with social
conditions in southern Colorado that the confidant system, like the earlier patron system,
see note 161 supra, functions on the basis of reciprocal relationships, much like modern
political ward systems. However, for several reasons including resource limitations, this
question was not explored fully in this study. To be sure, many of the confidants were
explicitly hoping for reciprocity in political terms; but the reported cases did not permit
a generalization along these lines.
1' See note 159 supra.
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been assumed by a few confidants whose daily business or trade
brought them into some contact with legal instruments. The service
performed by this subgroup of confidants in drafting simple legal
instruments is surely a boon to their indigent clientele. By employing
printed or sample forms, the lay confidant can provide a service
at a cost, if any, substantially below that charged by an attorney. "6'
Moreover, in the region surveyed, where distances to the nearest
attorney are often great, a particular confidant may be willing and
able to draft a simple deed on a printed form for a poor neighbor
who knows and trusts him.
In 1957 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the preparation
of deeds and other legal instruments relating to realty by a layman
constitutes unauthorized practice of law. 16 7 Yet the court refused
to enjoin the licensed real estate brokers who were defendants in
the suit from preparing, in the regular course of their business and
at the behest of their customers, the described legal instruments,
when so completed as part of a transaction involving real estate. The
court recognized that the realtors were engaged in a lawful business,
that they were required by statute to take an examination before
licensing,' 6 8 that they prepared papers or gave advice only to their
customers without charge other than the usual broker's commission,
and that this was done only in connection with real estate transactions
then being handled by them. The court also recognized that the practice
was not contrary to the public interest but was in fact a desirable and
necessary service accepted and enjoyed by the public for many years
and that the weight of authority in other jurisdictions was split. In one
particular paragraph, the court candidly recognized the very practical
Compare the typical fee mentioned by persons in reference to deeds drafted by county
clerks. $1.50, supra note 159, to the minimum fee for that service as recommended by
the San Luis Valley Bar Association, $10, supra note 124.
167Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n., 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d
998 (1967). The court held that "the preparation of receipts and options, deeds, prommisory notes, deeds of trust, mortgages, releases of encumbrances, leases, notice terminating tenancies, demands to pay rent or vacate by completing standard and approved
printed forms, coupled with the giving of explanation or advice as to the legal effect
thereof . . ." constitutes the practice of law. Id. at 411, 312 P.2d at 1004-05. Previous
decisions of the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the drawing of a will by one not
licensed to practice law constitutes unauthorized practice of law punishable by fine.
whether done for compensation, People ex rel Attorney General v. Newer, 125 Colo.
304, 242 P.2d 615 (1952), or not for compensation, People ex rel Attorney General
v. Woodall, 128 Colo. 563, 265 P.2d 232 (1954) ; People ex rel Attorney General v.
Jersin, 101 Colo. 406, 74 P.2d 668 (1937). See generally 5 V. DITTMAN, COLORADO
PRACTICE § 107.6 annot. (1968). The Conway-Bogue decision went on to state that
a person engaged in the unlawful practice [of law] may be punished for contempt.
and may also be enjoined from further similar unlawful action ....
1"Conway-Bogue
Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 408, 312 P.2d 998, 1003 (1957).
This authority for contempt power lies in CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN, § 12-1-17 (196').
which provides that any person who is not licensed by the Supreme Court of Colorado
to practice law and who does so shall be deemed guilty of contempt. Other than misrepresentation by a layman that he is an attorney and appearance in court by one not licensed
and not acting pro se but as counsel, the statute does not define unauthorized practice of
law. The court in Conway-Bogue further delineated that definition.
68
3 Coo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117-1-1 (1963).
166
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factors which would justify the denial of the injunction sought by the
bar association:
The testimony shows, and there is no effort to refute the same,
that there are three counties in Colorado that have no lawyers, ten in
each of which there is only one lawyer, seven in each of which there
are only two lawyers; that many persons in various areas of the state
reside at great distances from any lawyer's office. The testimony shows
without contradiction that the practices sought to be enjoined are
of at least 50 years uninterrupted duration; that a vast majority of the
people of the state who buy, sell, encumber and lease real estate have
chosen real estate brokers rather than lawyers to perform the acts
herein complained of. Though not controlling, we must make note of
the fact that the record is devoid of evidence of any instance in which
the public or any member thereof, layman or lawyer has suffered
injury by reason of the act of any of the defendants sought to be
enjoined. 16 9
The reference by the Colorado Supreme Court to specific practical

factors to be considered in the practice of law by realtors is particularly apropos to the institution of local confidants in the rural
area surveyed. Their close proximity to those in need of services and

the willingness of some to perform a function which printed or
sample forms have made much simpler for little or no cost fills a
necessary void in the relationship between the impoverished class and
the technicalities of the law. And the student interviewers could find
no evidence - from the confidants themselves, their indigent clientele,
or the attorneys aware of the legal services performed by some con-

fidants-that any indigent or member of the public had been injured by the lay legal services.
2. Dispensing Information
Confidants form the backbone of the informal "legal" system
for the rural poverty class, not so much because of their drafting of
legal instruments, but principally because of the other more common
forms of assistance they provide. The most common is undoubtedly
dispensation of information upon request. One undeniable feature
of penury is the low educational level of those persons trapped w..ithin
it."' Thus, problems having a legal flavor which may be complex to
the businessman may be bafflin. to the indigent. But the businessman,
9

Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n. 135 Colo. 398. 415, 312 P.2d
998, 1007 (1957). Other commentaries on the legal profession have noted the absence of harm to the public when an experienced layman drafts legal instru'ents.
Professor Quintin Johnstone of Yale Law School has written: "Nor are there many
instances of persons being harmed from having laymen do their legal work." He adds
that there is a "public benefit from much of the lay competition that now exists. La'

16 Conway-Bogue Realty

legal services often are performed at lower cost than if the work were done by 'awyers."

Q. JOHNSTONE, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 194 (1967). In his controversal book
criticizing the legal profession, Murray Teigh Bloom states: "For several months I tried

to find serious instances of such injury and loss suffered by the public [due to the
unauthorized practice of law by laymen in filling out printed legal forms]. I couldn't.
I finally stopped trying . . . " . BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 112 (1968).

170 See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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if asked, may fully explain the nature of the problem to the indigent
so that the latter can deal with it. A good example of the type of
problem to which this explanatory service is especially germane is
the income tax return. Although an indigent may have to pay little
or no income tax, he is still required to file a return if his gross
annual income is $600 or more.171 The jack-of-all-trades referred to
previously stated that he is generally beseiged around late March
and early April of each year by persons, many of whom are poor,
asking that the proper procedure for completing their income tax
forms be explained to them. To be sure, he actually completes returns
for some persons, charging an appropriate fee. For residents who are
poor, however, his standard procedure was to explain how to complete the simple Form 1040A, to let the indigent do all or almost all of
the figuring and writing, and to charge nothing for his aid.
A complete list of all subjects of information which were mentioned by confidants or indigent residents interviewed in the target
area communities as having been discussed as part of this very
valuable and informal process of aiding the poor through the confidant's dispensation of information would unduly lengthen this
discussion. Moreover, the subjects vary with the competence and
expertise of each particular confidant. An explanation of the meaning
of the small print on an installment sales contract may be the subject
of inquiry to a long-time businessman-confidant in the community; an
explanation of the proper procedure for an indigent woman to apply
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children may be made by a
sympathetic caseworker out of the county's welfare office; an explanation of the practical meaning and effect of a proposed city
ordinance may be given to an indigent concerned with his franchise
by a local political party chief or one of his informed Indians; an
explanation of the means of obtaining federal food stamps may be
asked of an Anglo VISTA volunteer who has been at least partially
accepted into the tightly-drawn circle of trust within the Spanish17 2
American poverty community.
3. Dispensing Advice
Confidants also serve in an advisory capacity to the indigent
class. This function is to be distinguished from the explanatory service
just discussed. For example, a confidant may explain the meaning
of 1954, § 6012. However, with certain exceptions, for taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1969, a return is not required of an individual with a
gross income not in excess of $1,700, nor from one who is entitled to make a joint
return when the joint income is less than $2,300. Id. § 6012(a) (1 ).
172 Provided, however, that the VISTA volunteer understands the procedure. See n, ze !01
supra.
171 INT. REV. CODE
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and ramifications of the express warranty terms of an installment
sales contract for a clothes washing machine purchased by an indigent. Or he may go further and advise the indigent purchaser, on
the basis of given information, if the machine has inexplicably malfunctioned within the warranty period and the seller has refused to
recognize his contractual obligation, to contact the seller again and
try to obtain the necessary repairs, but if all else fails, to stop making
payments on the machine until the warranty is honored. 78 When a
confidant thus assumes the cloak of an advisor to the rural poor,
he steps out of the shoes of neutrality and into the shoes of advocacy.
In so doing, he is functioning much like an attorney in the impoverished
community. The confidant, however, is more likely to advise at a preventive or near-preventive stage of the indigent's problem, while
field discussions with members of the impoverished class would
indicate that an attorney, if sought at all, is usually consulted as a
matter of last resort when the principal task is to recoup losses.
In the washing machine example, the indigent is not likely to consult
with an attorney, if at all, until his refusal to make payments has
precipitated the seller's repossession of the machine.
The subject matter of problems taken by indigents to local confidancs and the scope and direction of advice that is given is quite
varied. At the heart of many problems is the lack of or mismanagement of money. Just previous to an interview with a businessmanconfidant in one of the larger target communities, an indigent woman
had approached the confidant with a problem -she
could not live
within her means. The woman's husband had apparently run off and
left her with five young and hungry children. Her only means of
support was her welfare check through AFDC. She was heavily in
debt to a local grocer-coal supplier. After a full discussion, the
businessman-confidant advised the woman to take her welfare checks,
immediately upon receipt, to the grocer-coal supplier, allow him to
deduct a portion for her account payable, and then apply the remainder to her credit. The confidant sensed that money burned holes
in the woman's pocket and that the best solution for her was to put
that money beyond her immediate reach and to good use.
Occasionally, the problem brought to the attention of a confidant has nothing to do with money. A minister-confidant related to
the interviewers a recent and rather unusual incident where he successfully resolved a child custody dispute between collateral relatives,
173 The example is based upon an experience related by one of the indigent residents in

a larger target area community. When the intransigent seller refused to honor the
warranty, demanded payment, and threatened repossession, the confidant interceded on
behalf of the indigent purchaser and persuaded the seller to make the necessary repairs.
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an area wherein the final arbiter is normally a court of law. In this
case the child's father had deserted the family, the mother was an
alcoholic and had left the child with an aunt in order to live with
another man, and other relatives wanted custody of the child. The
minister was asked to advise on the matter; he arranged a practical
solution, and, he said, all parties were apparently satisfied.
The confidants who were interviewed expressed an acute awareness of the limits of their own advisory capacity. When a particular
problem was complex and possessed substantial legal overtones, most
of the confidants who were interviewed stated that they were loath
to proffer any advice other than that the indigent should consult with
an attorney. Yet that in itself is beneficial. Confidants are an integral
part of an unguided screening process that inures to the benefit of
both the formal legal system, by resolving less complicated problems
outside of the system, and the impoverished class, by providing an
inexpensive, accessible, and generally accurate source of advice for
some law-related problems. Most of the attorneys who were interviewed in the San Luis Valley acknowledged that a few individuals
well known and respected within the Spanish-American culturethe confidants-were instrumental in referring a number of indigents with legal problems to their offices. And 75 percent of the
respondents to the attorney questionnaire believed that the poor
generally seek out someone other than an attorney when first con1 74
fronted with a legal problem.

4. Affirmatively Interceding
Finally, a confidant may do even more than simply explain or
advise -he
may affirmatively intercede on behalf of the indigent.
It is in this respect that the institution of local confidants is most
effective in aiding the rural poor through problem resolution. When
a confidant, a member of the community's establishment class, sides
with an indigent in a dispute or problem involving another member
of the establishment, equity is more readily done. Two examples
bear discussion.
The Colorado Civil Rights Commission established a regional
office in Alamosa in 1966, covering the territory of the San Luis
Valley, the San Juan Valley, and the Western Slope regions of Colorado. Although limited in jurisdictional authority to remedy discrimination in employment, in housing, and in public accomodaticns.'7 5 the resident director of the office-a Spanish-American
reported that many indigents from all parts of the Valley came
74

1 See text, p. 133 supra.
17 5

See note 158 supra.
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to the office seeking advice or help in problems beyond his purely
statutory jurisdictional authority. The director stated that he would
exert influence whenever possible to help these indigents, often by
simply making a phone call and inquiring into an alleged incident.
One young man took his badly dented car to a garage for repairs.
The car was not repaired for more than two and a half months, even
though the youth had paid money in advance. The director of the
Alamosa office, when told of the story, simply called the garage and
inquired about the incident. The youth received his repaired car
within the week. As with the conception of the District Attorney,
the indigents who expressed an awareness of the Alamosa Civil
Rights office 7 believed its function to be similar to that of an
ombudsman for the poor; thus, the director reported that more time
and energy were expended by him and his staff on matters not
directly involving ethnic discrimination than on matters regarding
which the office could file a complaint. A number of more complicated problems brought in by indigents were referred to local
attorneys, and the director would sometimes recommend a particular
attorney when asked by an indigent. Unquestionably, the director of
tilc Alamosa Civil Rights office is a confidant to the poor, albeit
not a typical confidant.
The county judge of one samp'e county admitted to being
something of a credit adjuster in the spate of unpaid grocery bill
cases that come to his attention. When an indigent comes to the
judge, sometimes prior to but generally after a complaint has been
filed by a creditor, and asks for help, the judge -a Spanish-American
- consults with the creditor and attempts to settle the problem without
formal court action, usually through negotiating a different installment
plan by which the consumer can feasibly repay the debt. Inasmuch as a
solution other than judgment for the creditor is obviously beneficial
to the indigent debtor, the judge's informal intervention marks him
as a confidant within a limited sphere.
Other examples of intervention by concerned confidants into
the legal problems of the rural poor were uncovered during the
field survey: A doctor may telephone the county welfare office and
convince them that a particular indigent is in fact eligible for welfare
disability assistance; the director of the Alamosa office of the Colorado Migrant Council1 77 may go into the fields at harvest time to
176 Only about one-fourth of the indigents who were interviewed in the same counties were

aware of the Alamosa office of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The fairly recent
opening of the Alamosa office may account for lack of widespread knowledge of its
existence.
177 See note 59 supra.
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insure that no underage children are performing agricultural work17
and that the living quarters for the migrant laborers comply with
the regulatory standards; 1 79 a businessman may help a debtor to
renegotiate an outstanding loan; and an employer may advance funds
to provide bail for his employee charged with a crime. To be sure,
confidants are not universal panaceas for the minor legal problems
of the rural poor in the area surveyed. Some confidants are more
effective in their assistance than others, depending upon their knowledge, experience, and standing in the community. Yet, in large
measure, the willingness of a number of established community
residents to assist those of lesser means has diminished both the
quantity and severity of legal problems confronted by the impoverished
class as a whole. I80
17 8

§ 80-6-3 (1963). Both
parents and employer who knowingly violate the minimum age requirement are subject
to punishment. Id. § 80-6-12 (1963). Both parents and employer who knowingly
violate the minimum age requirement are subject to punishment. Id. § 80-6-12 (1963).
From interviews with several farmers, it is apparent that occasional violations do occur,
although the farmers rigidly maintain that the parents are the ones who put the children
to work. The farmers take advantage of the scienter requirement of the statute.
Since the earnings of a migrant family are the result of a total family effort, the
parents will take their young children with them to the fields rather than leave them
unattended at the labor camps. To alleviate this burden, the Colorado Migrant Council
has established infant and child day care centers in the regions of the state which have
a considerable influx of migrant workers, including the San Luis Valley.
There are two infant and child care centers in the San Luis Valley presently in
operation: one in Fort Garland, in Costilla County, and one in Center, in Saguache
County. Each center has a staff of 13. Both local and statewide centers have been
extremely successful in achieving their objectives.
179 See notes 213-15 infra and accompanying text. Although the director has no power
himself to enforce the health and housing regulations for migrant laborers, his presence
and concern have an effective influence on the farmers with whom he deals.
180An interesting comparison can be made between the confidants as described in this
study and the community leaders and service agency personnel interviewed in connection
with the Duke study of the legal needs of the rural poor, supra note 9, at 562-93. As a
general observation, it appeared that the leaders interviewed in that study were consulted
somewhat more infrequently than the confidants by indigents with whom they had a
prior, formal, advisory relationship - as opposed to a more personal, informal,
community relationship. It also appeared that the types of problems brought to their
attention were closely related to the advisory capacities which they performed in their
occupations or which they performed by virtue of their positions in the community.
For instance, welfare case-workers proffered information and advice to their clients
primarily concerning other govenment agencies, as well as their own -although
the
caseworkers, more than other groups, were consulted by clients regarding collateral
problems such as domestic relations or consumer problems. Similarly, members of the
Agricultural Extension Service were consulted by members of the farming community
concerning landlord-tenant farmer disputes, crop damage from neighbor's insecticides,
and consumer problems regarding farm equipment. The Farmer's Home Administration
agent reported that very few persons who were not FHA benefit recipients sought his
advice on anything but loans and "dollar-down" house or repair problems. Finally, landlords and employers were most frequently consulted about money problems by tenant
farmers or employees requesting loans and, occasionally, assistance in minor criminal
matters. In short, the advice giving function reported in the Duke study was primarily
related to a prior, formally structured role relationship or the "leader's" occupational
advisory function.
In contrast, the nature of the confidant's function appeared to be much broader.
notwithstanding several significant similarities. They were often consulted by persons
whom they knew or who knew them as members of the community. Although many
The minimum age is set at 12 years. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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B. Self-help and Interpersonal Dealing
Many of the law-related problems which are resolved by indigents
are resolved through their own initiative and resourcefulness. The
technique is one of self-help and involves a direct and frontal assault
on the particular problem without reference to auxiliary aid - attorneys or confidants included. The indigent deals directly with his
adversary or the source of his law-related problem using whatever
means he can command. In order to fully understand this ad hoc
approach to problem resolution, it is beneficial to understand the
culture of the impoverished class in the southern portion of the
San Luis Valley.
The oldest town in Colorado is San Luis, in Costilla County,
having been settled by the Spaniards in 1651.181 Thus, the SpanishAmerican culture in this region has a long history. Add the high
degree of interrelatedness among Spanish-American families in the
area18 and the distinguishing ability of most as bilingual, 8 and
the result is a basically proud people, though that pride has been
deeply shaken by the pathos arising from economic stagnation. In
the male members of the Spanish-American culture, that pride finds
expression in machismo- or manliness.' 8 4 The fist is a symbol of
that concept, and the defense of one's character by means of a street
fight is as much an integral part of existence within the SpanishAmerican poverty class' 8 5 as are the close ties that bind large families
together. Thus, when Spanish-American indigent deals with SpanishAmerican indigent and a law-related problem is involved, resolution
is not accomplished by resort to abstract rules; rather, the more
domineering and stronger of the two personalities is likely to dictate
of the contacts undoubtedly stemmed in part from some prior business or other relationship with the confidant, this did not appear to be the primary basis of the contact, nor
did it limit the scope of the contact. Rather, the confidant's reputation in the community
for his willingness to help- generally out of a sense of noblesse oblige or a feeling of
cultural identity with his fellow Spanish-American -was
the primary basis for the
contact. Also significant was his reputation for having knowledge or experience in a
certain area- which may or may not have been identical with his occupational function.
In short, the confidant relationship appeared to be a relationship institutionalized
on the basis of the confidant's general standing or status within the agricultural community. On the other hand, the government functionaries described in the Duke study
generally performed a more specialized assistance function, based primarily on their
occupational status within the larger societal context - essentially, the federal scheme
of government largesse.
181 H. Skogland, supra note 34.
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See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
184 See note 22 supra.
185 It was observed by the researchers for this project that Spanish-Americans wvho by
education, intelligence, and a keen entrepreneurial nature, had become reasonably successful members of the establishment class were likely to be "Anglicized"; that is, they,
like the Negro "Uncle Tom," had, to varying degrees, abandoned some of the distinct
cultural traits of the lower class of Spanish-Americans. Thus, resort to fisticuffs is
almost anathema to the successful Spanish-American businessman; the same cannot be
said for the seasonal farm laborer.
183

VOL. 47

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

the solution, by physical force if necessary. A few examples will
illustrate this self-help process.
The indigent residents of each target area community surveyed
almost unanimously agreed that ineffective law enforcement was the
number one problem of a legal nature in their respective communities.
Juvenile delinquency was said to be rampant. Youth gangs had free
rein of the towns after sunset, it was said. Since only one of the four
186
target communities was incorporated at the time of the field survey,
only one community maintained any local police force, and that town
had but one city policeman. The obligation to keep the peace and
preserve law and order thus falls upon each county sheriff and his
single assistant or upon the Colorado Highway Patrol. The Patrol
maintains a regional office in the town of Alamosa, but the patrolmen
are only minimally effective in keeping the peace since they have a
wide geographical area to cover and simply cannot be in all places
at all times. The same can be said for the sheriff's department of
each county; in addition, the sheriffs in both counties are considered
to be incompetent by many of the residents.'" 7 Also, many indigents
surveyed in one county complained that the county judge was far too
lenient in meting out punishment to law violators.'
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In summary, then, many of the citizens of the two sample counties stated that, for various reasons and causes, a serious crime
problem - particularly juvenile delinquency - exists in the region,
much of which goes unpunished and unreported because of ineffective
law enforcement. From the many criminal incidents related by various
indigents and other residents surveyed, it is apparent that a substantial
186 Within the year following the field research, another of the target communities incorporated by referendum of the community residents.
187 At least in Costilla County, the complaints voiced by many of the indigents surveyed
against the local sheriff, were well-founded. The sheriff resigned on July 10, 1969,
in the face of a 9-count information filed against him in the state district court in
Alamosa, charging him with malfeasance and perjury. The Denver Post, July 11, 1969,
at 4, col. 3. One of those counts accused the sheriff of neglecting his duty to keep and
preserve the peace and quiet and to "suppress all affrays" on certain dates in his county.
The Rocky Mountain News, July 12, 1969, at 44c, col. 4.
188 For further discussion of the operation of the judicial process in the region surveyed
see text, § V(B) (3) infra. Judicial leniency was said by a number of residents surveyed
to be particularly acute when members of juvenile gangs are the charged parties. In one
incident, a local merchant in a county seat was severely beaten by a gang of youths.
When the instigator of the beating was brought into county court, presumably on
charges of assault, he was fined $18 plus court costs. Another citizen of the same
community reported serving on a jury in a felony case where the defendant was found
guilty and fined a mere $10. The county judge of that county, a charter member of
the community elite, was rarely spoken of in positive terms by the poor residents of the
community. Whether the alleged leniency of the judge was the sole reason for the
opprobrium cast upon him or not, the voters of that county decided in the November
1968 election against retention of the county judge after his term of office expired in
anuary of 1969. La Jara Gazette, Nov. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 6. This negative method
ywhich the public weal is brought to bear upon an incompetent state or county judge.
as opposed to direct election of judges, was made possible by a 1966 amendment to
the Colorado Constitution which removed all judicial officers of the state from partisan
politics. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25, as amended (Supp. 1967).
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basis in fact exists for these claims. 1 89 Faced with this problem, some
residents resort to the self-help technique. As one member of the
Outreach Advisory Council to the county's Committee Action Program
remarked, "You have to take the law in your own hands around here."
Given the machismo character, it is not surprising that a victim of a
beating, the brother of a girl raped, or the owner of a badly vandalized car prefers a personalized vengeance, an eye for an eye, rather
than the more impersonal and dilatory formal system of justice. Many
of the minor crimes, both against the person and against property, are
resolved in this manner. Certainly, in some cases the solution is as
reprehensible in a pristine legal sense as is the crime. Nevertheless,
it is a resolution of a problem within the Spanish-American cultural
ethic.
Undoubtedly the greatest demonstration of the self-help technique against crime on a community-wide basis occurred on Halloween eve, 1968. Fearing a particularly heavy toll in vandalized
property, approximately 30 residents of one target community donned
warm clothing and patrolled the town streets in small groups until
the early morning hours. In consequence, a bare minimum of vandalizing occurred.
Another example of the self-help process occurs when an indigent
widow, widower, or divorcee dies intestate, leaving a few meager
assets possibly including a house and a small plot of land. In a sub189 Among the many incidents of criminal and delinquent conduct related by residents of
the sample counties to the student interviewers are the following from one particular
target community:
A group of juveniles wreaked havoc one evening in the town's only theater. They
set off firecrackers inside the building, threw bottles into the audience, and slashed the
screen with knives. The theater manager called the sheriff's office. The sheriff came to
the theater and "lectured" the boys outside of the building, warning them not to go
inside and do any more damage. As soon as the sheriff had left, having taken no further
action, the juveniles went back inside and continued their spree. Drag racing down the
single main street of the community is a common occurrence, even when the sheriff is
in town. The local residents complained of broken windows in their homes and cars,
slashed tires, and even gang beatings. The local Catholic priest stated that the poor box
in the church had been robbed so many times that it was removed. A VISTA volunteer
reported that one particularly notorious gang of youths had severely vandalized seven
cars in one evening, including the VISTA volunteer's Volkswagen. One auto was towed
out into the surrounding prairie and set afire.
Some blame for any high rate of crime and vandalism in the two-county region
must be laid at the doorsteps of the very residents who complain. Few of the local
citizens report crimes, vandalism, or acts of violence, and even fewer notify the district
attorney or file complaints. One county judge cited this fact in support of his statement
that "there is nothing serious going on around here" in the nature of crime. There are
several hypotheses for explaining this apparent lack of formal citizen action in fighting
crime. One, of course, is that utilization of self-help in dealing with those perpetrating
acts of crime or vandalism, heretofore discussed, precludes any necessity for reliance
upon the formal agencies of law enforcement and justice. However, recourse to formal
agencies and even use of self-help is inhibited on occasion by fear-fear of recrimination. This is particularly true of a few notorious and vicious youth gangs. The leader of
one such gang, reputed to have had arrest warrants issued from 4 different counties in
the San Luis Valley hanging over his head at one time, had continuously averted
conviction when brought to trial because the victims of his terrorism were loath to
testify against him and other members of his gang, or because the parents of the
defendants had sworn to and supported their questionable alibi defenses.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

stantial majority of cases, the distribution of the property is not made
through a probate court according to Colorado's statute of descent
and distribution.1 9 ° Instead, the assets are divided among family
members on a purely ad hoc basis, important factors usually including
age and intelligence. That is, the oldest or smartest child is likely to
get everything, or at least that which he wants. There is no rule of
thumb to guide the distributor, as there would be under the statute.
The process is ad hoc and, given the minimal assets involved, is
believed by most indigents surveyed to be the easiest and probably
the best method of distribution. The ad hoc, self-help process, it is
contended, takes cognizance of differentials among children in their
needs and desires for available assets.
Still another example can be found in the landlord-tenant area.
Most of the housing units in the rural poverty pockets in the San Luis
Valley are owner-occupied. 9 ' Landlord-tenant relationships, where
they exist, are often between members of the same ethnic groupSpanish-Americans. The prevalent condition is that a Spanish-American
member of the establishment owns a housing unit and rents it to a
member of the poverty community for a small monthly charge. Exorbitant rental charges are uncommon. In fact, the low rental charges
are often used as an excuse by the landlord for his failure to repair
deterioration in the rented premises. Many tenants accept this as the
quid pro quo for low rent. In the urban slum, rent paid for a typical
slum dwelling is not greatly dissimilar to that paid for more desirable housing.' 9 2 In the rural poverty pockets surveyed, monthly
rent for what would be an uninhabitable dwelling in an urban ghetto
is much less than rent for more desirable housing. One woman in
a target community reported that she paid rent of $25 per month
on a house which badly needed new roofing. She reported that the
upkeep cost is not figured into the rental cost, and that she was
aware of this prior to entering upon the premises. Although disturbed
0

REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-1 (1963). This section provides, inter alia, that all
assets of an intestate survived by children but not by a spouse are to be equally divided
among the children. Under the self-help, nonjudicial method of intestate distributions
so common within the impoverished class, equality of distribution among descendants
is rarely accomplished.
It should be noted here that almost all indigents in the area surveyed die intestate.
An independent examination of the probate records for the district court in one county
revealed that no wills were probated from 1966-68 wherein the testator was Spanishsurnamed. Rather, the assets of all but two of the Spanish-surnamed estates were
distributed under Colorado's small estates provision. That stautory provision provides
for distribution, upon verified petition, of estates left by intestates not exceeding the
value of $5,000 without the necessity for a court-appointed administrator and with much
quicker completion. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-7-4, as amended (Supp. 1967).
On the other hand, the majority of estates where the deceased was not Spanish-surnamed
involved wills and were fully probated.
191 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.

19 COLO.

9

1 2 G. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: 1965, at 13 (1965).
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with the substandard condition of her dwelling, she felt she had
received what she had bargained for.
The indigent tenants in the region surveyed uniformly stated
that they would take a grievance involving the premises or the landlord-tenant relationship directly to their landlords. If nothing developed, they might withhold all or a portion of their rent in order
to compel the landlord's recognition and solution of the particular
problem. Indeed, a few tenants stated that they had used this very
technique with success, and several more stated that they had instead
moved from the rented premises in the face of an intractable landlord. In any event, resolution of the particular problem- usually, a
failure by the landlord to maintain the premises in habitable condition-was accomplished without resort to an attorney or the ac19 3
coutrements of legal process.
Another type of self-help may be the indigent's "common law"
divorce. Faced with an unsatisfactory marriage relationship and an
inability to raise a minimum $100 retainer to hire an attorney for
a legal divorce, an indigent husband may simply leave his wife and
take up residence elsewhere, perhaps in the same region and even
with another woman. Since common law marriages are recognized
in Colorado 4 and since such marriages are apparently fairly common
in the region surveyed, putative spouses often assume that mere
separation of a common law marriage is tantamount to a legal
divorce.195 Thus, two poor residents may begin a marriage relationship by consent, beget children, and then simply pack up and go
their separate ways. It is, of course, possible that knotty legal problems
may later arise, including bigamy, child custody, distribution of assets
from a deceased spouse, and so forth. Yet, a self-help de facto termination of a marriage relationship may just as possibly give rise to
no manifest legal problems later on, and, in that event, it cannot be
gainsaid that the "solution" of the problem was effective.
One final example of use of self-help is significant, for it can
be a prototype for future actions by impoverished rural citizens. It
13 The self-help methods are notably inadequate

in landlord-tenant matters where the
tenants are migrant farm laborers. The housing units provided them by the hiring
farmers are often most unsatisfactory. See notes 213-15 infra and accompanying text.
Yet, the migrants simply have no bargaining power with which to improve their lot.
Their nomadic life severely limits their housing option, and their pitifully low wages
takes them out of much of the rental market. Thus, all of the bargaining power is on
the side of the farmer; hence, he need not maintain the migrants' housing units in
proper state of repair.
194 Graham v. Graham, 130 Colo. 225, 274 P.2d 605 (1954).
195 Divorce, however, is accomplished by a judicial act, established by legislative grant.
The public policy is to promote marriage as the foundation of society. See Gilpin v.
Gilpin, 12 Colo. 504, 21 P. 612 (1889). See also James v. James, 97 Colo. 413, 50 P.2d
63 (1935) (in which decree of annulment was upheld upon proof that marriage took
place while wife was undivorced from a man with whom she had contracted a common
law marriage).
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is self-help en masse. A group of Spanish-American poverty class
nilembers residing in the community of Center in Saguache County,
located about 12 miles north of Monte Vista, recently organized a
consumer cooperative. The cooperative purchases food in large
quantities from wholesale dealers outside of the San Luis Valley,
taking orders and payment in advance from its members. The participating members of the cooperative were quite pleased with its
success in obtaining less expensive food. In the fall of 1968, the
cooperative sought to increase its membership with a campaign to sell
the idea of less expensive food prices through group action to local
leaders of the Lariat barrio at Monte Vista. Although no similar cooperatives were found among indigent residents of either Conejos or
Costilla County, the success of the Center cooperative venture may
very well motivate its use in the latter two counties.19 6
Any objective evaluation of the self-help and interpersonal
method of resolving law-related problems must begin with the
premise that solutions effected by these processes, outside of the legal
arena, may not be equitable or valid within the legal definition, nor
for that matter may they even be denominated within the legal lexicon
as a "solution." But the researchers for this study concluded on the
basis of the many interviews with both indigents and community
leaders that a price of penury which the rural poor are willing to pay
is the absence of a formal and proper legal solution to most legal
problems. Rural indigents surveyed often define a "solution" of a
legal problem in lesser terms than those the formal law may impose.
Therefore, throughout this study, "solution" has been defined very
liberally to include any significant improvement in the position of an
indigent vis-a-vis his legal problem, but falling short perhaps of a
clean, neat, equitable, and final solution, whether or not legally
obtained. So viewed, the self-help process, when it involves an
indigent qua indigent, is often effective albeit often inequitable.
Although he may have been legally liable, for example, an indigent
may resolve an auto accident problem in his favor, simply because his
size, strength, or tough veneer causes the other driver to cower and
accede to the first's proposed solution. In a few instances, it is
arguable that the self-help solution may be preferable to a legal
solution. Perhaps the law of descent and distribution would effect a
far different distribution of family assets of a deceased than that
which normally occurs, yet the actual ad hoc solution may be the
best way to prevent interfamilia bickering and argument. Perhaps
a tenant could legally force his landlord to repair the rented premises,
19 For an excellent article on consumer cooperatives see Miller, Organizing the Consumer
Cooperative, in THE LAW AND THE Low INCOME CONSUMER, N.Y. UNIV. SCHOOL OF
LAW, PROJECT OF SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 392 (Supp. No. 2, C. Katz ed. 1968).
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yet a disproportionately low rental rate may be the best solution for
all concerned. In one significant area, law-related problems are not
easily susceptible to the self-help processes of indigents. When the
indigent's adversary is a member of the establishment class or a functionary of a governmental agency, there is a greatly increased probability of actual failure to resolve the problem by any definitional
standards which would assess actual benefit to the indigent. Welfare
refusals, credit demands, failure of employers to pay correct or
minimum wages, and the entire procedural gamut of the criminal
justice system are but a few typical examples of law-related problems
where the indigent is simply without effective bargaining or persuasive power.
C. Inaction

On occasion, inaction on the part of the indigent may well be
an effective resolution of the problem. An illustrative instance is
the absence of wills among many of the impoverished class surveyed.19 7 Whether by choice or by chance, the failure of an indigent
to specifically provide for disposition of his property effectively works
a solution either by reason of Colorado's statute of descent and distribution or by the self-help process described above.
By choice or by chance, an indigent debtor will sometimes find
that he will not need to pay a bill he owes or is alleged to owe simply
because he has never taken the affirmative action to pay the bill.
One of the leading citizens and political leaders in a target community reported that he then had outstanding $17,000 in unpaid bills
from his all-purpose hardware and appliances store. He stated that
he hoped to collect $7,000 at the most. One woman had owed him
$38 for six or seven years. He had never brought legal action to
effect collection, and he now felt that there was little hope that he
would ever obtain the money. A number of the debts may now be
legally unobtainable by virtue of Colorado's 6-year statute of limitations for an action on a debt.1"' Thus, some debtors have resolved
the problem of their debt, albeit inequitably and unjustly.
V.

CLASS INJURY: THE SYSTEMS FAIL

An analysis of the types of problems which are susceptible to
effective resolution by informal means reveals that these are more than
likely to involve conflicts arising among and between members of the
poverty class. For instance, self-help and interpersonal methods of
dealing with indigent legal problems seemed to be most effective in
197See note 190 supra.
'
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§ 87-1-11(2)

(1963).
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resolving such matters as juvenile delinquency and the less serious
crimes committed by and against the indigent class, many domestic
relations problems, problems of intestate succession, and, to some
extent, landlord-tenant problems. Similarly, the drafting of a simple
deed or contract by a confidant did not generally involve the interests
of a member of the establishment: Where establishment members were
involved, as in the case of installment contracts, they were likely to
provide the legal forms of expertise themselves.
While the informal problemsolving methods are often successful
when the law-related problem is between two members of the poverty
class, they are less likely to effect a satisfactory solution, if at all, when
the problem is between members of different classes - and even then
only within a limited sphere. For instance, confidants can occasionally
be of some aid when an indigent confronts the establishment by offering
active assistance or by giving appropriate advice at a preventive stage.
However, the effectiveness of any active efforts by a confidant will
depend upon several variables. If the particular problem is still germinal,
or in any event has not reached a critical or emergency stage, then the
intercession by the confidant is more likely to bear fruit. And, when
the indigent's adversary is a member of the local community establishment, the chances for resolution are obviously greater than when the
adversary is not a local citizen or agency. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, the degree to which the member of the establishment has
a vested self-'interest in the matter will substantially affect his willingness to resolve the problem through negotiation and compromise, rather
than through the rigid avenues of legal process.
In the absence of these factors, when a member of the poverty
class is confronted with a legal problem and the establishment (individually or collectively) or the impersonal forces of government and
law are arrayed against him, he is rarely able 'to deal with his adversary
on anything approaching an equal basis. Consequently, the result is
almost foreordained - the legal rights of the indigent are not fully
vindicated. In many instances the legal problem is not successfully
resolved for the indigent, even when that term is given a liberal
meaning. This type of legal problem is denominated herein as class
injury and is the most serious kind of legal problem facing the rural
poor in Conejos and Costilla counties. With some forms of this class
injury, the indigent would benefit greatly from the advice and assistance of an attorney; with other forms the pressing need is an alteration
of the law 'itself. The remainder of this section will outline and document some of the difficult class injury legal problems related to the
researchers by indigents interviewed in the sample counties.
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A. Conflict With the Establishment
When the adversary of the indigent is the establishment- either
individually or collectively -some
of the difficult class injury problems related to the researchers were ethnic discrimination, consumer
injury, and landlord-tenant relationships.
1. Ethnic Discrimination
To the extent that the poverty class is composed primarily of
Spanish-Americans, ethnic discrimination by a member of the establishment against a Spanish-American indigent can be denominated
as class injury within the operational definition of that term as set
forth in this study and, -by its very nature, cannot be remedied through
informal means. Heritage and cultural identity cannot be altered or
compromised.
While the pervasiveness of this kind of class injury could not
be precisely ascertained, there was evidence that ethnic discrimination
did create a significant legal problem for the rural poor. For example,
the director of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's regional
office in Alamosa stated that his office receives a substantial number
of citizen complaints of ethnic discrimination.' 9" Upon investigation,
some of these are determined to be unfounded; others are determined
to be well-placed and result in the filing of a formal complaint. To
illustrate, employment discrimination charges were pending against
the local offices of the Rural Electric Association and the Colorado
Public Service Company at the time of the interview with the
director, Charges were also pending with regard to discrimination
in the hiring of Spanish-American teachers in one school district in
Rio Grande County.
It also appears that migrant farm laborers are even more subject
to subtle and not-so-subtle discrimination than are the more permanent
indigent residents. Both the director of the Civil Rights office and
the local director of the Alamosa office of the Colorado Migrant
Council indicated that it was not uncommon for city police from
incorporated towns in the San Luis Valley to harrass migrant workers
with numerous parking violations for those with cars and charges
of vagrancy for those without. 20 0 Sources of information in one
199 For a brief outline of the jurisdictional authority of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, see note 150 supra.
200 However, it is interesting to note that, unlike conditions extant in many urban ghettos,
bitter animosity between the permanent indigent residents and law enforcement personnel
does not exist in the area studied. At least one reason is obvious: The number of city
policemen (where a community is incorporated), sheriff's office personnel, and highway
patrolmen is relatively small and the geographical area which must be covered is relatively large. Hence, there is not a continuous opportunity for real or imagined instances
of police discrimination to boil up into a groundswell of Spanish-American rancor.
Furthermore, the few city policemen and sheriff's deputies in the two sample counties
are virtually all Spanish-American. The citizen complaints of law enforcement which
were related to the interviewers centered more on charges of incompetency and ineffectiveness of the police rather than on charges of ethnic discrimination.
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target connunity reported that prices for many grocery items were
raised slightly when the influx of the migrant workers into the
area was at its peak during the potato harvesting season in early
September. The stated view of the permanent residents who employ
or condone such discrimination is that the migrants are just plain
"bad" for the area. Reflecting a distinctly parochial attitude, particularly when outsiders are impoverished nomads, the permanent
community residents (with the exception of the employing farmers)
would prefer that the migrants never again enter the Valley.
2. Consumer Injury

As consumers, the rural poor are often brought into relationships
with members of the establishment, such as a creditor or a large
sales firm, and these relationships often result in problems. It was
concluded from the field interviews of indigents in the target communities that a substantial number of the poor have suffered some
sort of consumer problem. The legal ramifications of these problems
vary in pervasiveness, in seriousness, and in causation.
For example, a problem minor in seriousness but frequent in
occurrence was unsatisfactory merchandise. Of the 100 or so indigents
surveyed, about one-third related instances of consumer purchases
which were unsatisfactory in some respect. The principal complaint
was that the goods were in poor condition and not totally functional.
More serious in nature and, perhaps, wider in scope were problems of high prices and credit which were created both by the geographical and social context of the rural communities and by nonlocal members of the establishment. To illustrate, prices on many
commodities, particularly food, tended to be higher in the two sample
counties than in the towns of Alamosa or Monte Vista. At least one
of the factors contributing to higher prices- the necessity for extending credit- is inherent in the nature of local conditions. Since
the agricultural economy is seasonal and so many of the indigents
are engaged in agricultural or related occupations, it is quite difficult for cash-only stores to exist in most places, according to the
testimony of interviewed business leaders. Thus, almost all retail
concerns deal in credit in the off-season; the large, cash-only retail
chain food stores, such as Safeway, Inc. (a nonlocal member of the
establishment), which could maintain lower prices have not established outlets except in Monte Vista and Alamosa.
Given the higher prices in these rural areas, the necessity for
extending large amounts of credit, and the not infrequent inability
of the poor to pay their debts, creditor-debtor problems often arise
between the poor and the establishment. For example, the study
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found that there were several instances of overcharging on the total
price for a commodity bought on credit.
When the seller is a local businessman, indigent respondents
were sometimes successful in rectifying consumer problems through
informal processes. The principal method was self-help- taking the
matter directly to the seller. Some indigents threatened or actually
refused to continue payments on defective credit purchases; the desired result

-generally

repair by the seller-was

effected in a

majority of cases. Confidants were also utilized. One woman who
had previously been advised by a confidant to hand over her monthly
welfare paycheck from AFDC to her local grocer-coal supplier to
apply to her grocery credit2 °1 discovered some months later that the
grocer had tabulated a bill in excess of $1,000. Bewildered by this
staggering figure, the woman again consulted the confidant, who
apparently was able to sizeably reduce the indebtedness. Only three
indigent respondents reported that they consulted an attorney when
confronted by a consumer problem. In two of the instances, a sizeable
credit purchase had been made, exceeding $300 in each case, and
the indigent was being dunned by the seller after full and reasonable
payment, according to the indigent, had been made. The third case
involved a contract dispute with a very small construction company
which had failed to adequately install a new bathroom in one
indigent's house. In all three instances, resort to legal advice proved
advantageous to the indigent.
The businessmen, in turn, resort to informal methods to collect
unpaid bills. Either by letter or personal confrontation, the businessman lets his debtor know he is expected to pay his just debts.
Businessmen surveyed indicated this was a reasonably effective collection technique. With more intransigent debtors, some businessmen
have resorted to pseudo-legal collection techniques. The debtor is
dunned by formal letters, threats, or referral of the matter to collection agencies, all of which connote use of "legal" process to the
indigent but which are really short of that. Finally, the creditor may
retain an attorney and bring suit on the debt. Apparently, this is
infrequently done, and the records of the county courts in both counties, where small claims would normally be brought, are surprisingly
void of collection suit cases which have gone to judgment, default
or otherwise. The size of the individual debts are apparently too
small to deserve full use of the panoply of legal process, and, like
the hardware owner who reported $17,000 unpaid bills outstanding,0 2
most merchants stop short of bringing debtors into court. At most,
the collection suit is used as an informal weapon in the creditor's
01

2 See p. 141 supra.
202
See p. 151 supra.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 47

arsenal of coercive means to deal personally with debtors. The simple
recognition is that if the indigent debtor cannot find sufficient liquid
funds to pay the debt, a default judgment is not going to alter that
fact, but will only allow the cumbersome and time-consuming process
of execution to run its course.
Perhaps a much more difficult consumer problem is pervasive
and concerted consumer fraud. The purveyors are invariably nonlocal,
transient vendors,10 a since communities are too small and interpersonal
relationships too tightly drawn for blatant fraud to be performed by
local merchants. In each of the target communities surveyed, indigent
respondents related tales from their own or their neighbors' experiences
concerning a Denver firm dealing in house siding whose traveling
salesmen fleeced local homeowners. Although the interviewers requested in each instance the name of the firm and a copy of the typical
contract, such documents could not be obtained. But, the modus operandi
of the firm appeared to be as follows: The salesman confronts the
homeowner and informs him that his home has been selected as a model
showcase for new house siding. The siding will be sold at minimal cost,
and the owner will reap a benefit in small commissions when other
homeowners view his house and, as a result, subsequently purchase
siding for their own houses. Naturally, the homeowner does not have
the ready cash to pay the "minimal" cost, so he signs a lengthy contract
(which he does not read) and the salesman graciously "lends" the
money to the homeowner, taking a note in return. The note is then
sold to an urban bank or finance company at a discount. In some actual
and reported instances, the siding is never placed on the house. Even
when it is properly attached, the buyer discovers that he has had to
pay more for it than he had bargained for. Further, the buyer never
receives the purported commissions. Yet if he defaults on the notewhether in protest for faulty construction, for no construction, or for
lack of necessary funds - the urban bank or finance company can sue
04
as a holder in due course and generally recover.1
Some divergence of opinion concerning the extent of transient vending done in the
sample counties was apparent. Local businessmen tended to pooh-pooh contentions of
extensive consumer fraud by traveling salesmen. Their logical view was that the economy
of the region was depressed, the people were poor, and a salesman simply could not
find enough buyers to justify peddling his wares. From discussions with many indigents, however, it was apparent that the practice is common. Thus, the unsubstantiated
ut logically inferred conclusion is that the fly-by-night salesmen prey only on the poor.
204The Uniform Commercial Code protects a financial institution that buys negotiable
consumer paper as a holder in due course against all defenses of any party to the
instrument with whom the holder has not dealt except "[s]uch misrepresentation as has
induced the party to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms." COLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 155-3-305(2)(c) (Supp. 1965).
Realizing that it is almost impossible for a defrauded consumer to prove that
a financial institution had actual notice of his transaction with the dealer,
courts have recently been withdrawing the holder in due course protection from
203
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Although not reported as often as the siding company incidents,
similar complaints were voiced against transient sellers of fire extinguishers, baby albums, roofing repairs, magazines, sewing machines,
and encyclopedias. The indigent consumer, lacking the necessary legal
understanding of simple contract law, is in a disadvantageous position
with respect to the seller. Contracts of adhesion are common; the
indigent signs a printed form prepared by the seller, which is often
unduly lengthy with an excessive amount of fine print, rather than
bargaining with the salesman about the terms of the contract.20 5 Additionally, when the buyer speaks only Spanish, the contract written
in English is obviously unintelligible, allowing the salesman to misrepresent the terms thereof.2 °6 In one instance, the notorious siding
company salesman obtained the signature of a woman on a contract
which was not explained to her; she didn't read it because of very
bad eyesight, and she subsequently went to an attorney when the
company demanded $900. She had signed the contract with the understanding, orally expressed to the salesman, that it would not be binding
until her husband had also signed. The attorney informed her that
nothing could be done because the particular contract was good and

binding.
When the indigent consumer protests to the home office of the
dealer about an obviously illegal demand, as did one woman who
signed a subscription to a magazine for $4 and was later billed for
$50, he might be able to obtain a favorable result. It is unfortunate,
financial institutions which "should have known" the underlying transaction
was fraudulent....
Courts are also restricting holder in due course protection in areas where
banks and finance companies are adopting a 'see no evil' stance. Often in these
cases discount rates are marked down significantly, and a dealer might receive
only fifty percent for his paper....
While cases narrowing the scope of the holder in due course protection
do provide some aid to the innocent consumer, these decisions leave unaltered
the practices creating the need for defenses against the financial institution,
conditions which will be corrected only by consumer protection legislation.
Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 415-16 (1966) (footnotes omitted). For an
accurate summary of the type of practice done by the siding company, the following
is classic:
Failure of consideration is a basic defense which is generally pleaded where
the article is never delivered; but the consumer paper is nonetheless sold to the
financing agency. It is not as often present since usually the dealer makes some
attempt to perform. He generally desires to bilk a number of customers in a
short period of time, sell the consumer paper, and disappear from the jurisdiction to greener fields before the sheer weight of complaints cuts short his
activities.
Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective
Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48, 63 (1966).
2o5 See, e.g., Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach,
50 VA. L. REV. 1178 (1964); Lorenz, supra note 145, at 429. See also Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
M See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
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though, that too few indigent consumers take any form of positive
action. The most common response to a fraudulent purpose from a
traveling salesman was a complaint by the indigent to his neighbors
and friends, but little else.20 7
The rural indigent consumer needs, more than anything else, the
equipment to deal with the larger business community on relatively
equal terms. 20 1 What is needed is a practical knowledge and understanding of the business world and the techniques by which it operates.
It is, for example, the knowledge that a particular money lending
company in one of the target communities, regardless of its open door
policy, friendly atmosphere, and enticing advertisement, 9 regularly
charges the highest possible interest rates allowable by state law when
making loans to indigents.2 10 The poverty class itself, by limited educational achievement and business experience, does not generally
possess this knowledge. The void, then, must be filled, if at all, by an
ally. Confidants are helpful. Better Business Bureaus, traditional watchTerms which on their face are illegal are nonetheless included in sales
contracts and are complied with by buyers who are unaware of the illegality of
the provisions. Here, a suit for recission may be insufficient to deter the seller
from continuing the practice. An action for punitive damages or criminal proceedings may be in order.
Lorenz, supra note 145, at 430.
206 The law has now provided a remedy in theory for the indigent consumer who has
suffered injury by a fraudulent sale disguised in legal trappings: the provision of the
Uniform Commercial Code granting power to a court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-2-302 (Supp. 1965). In practice,
however, that provision is worthless unless (a) the drawer of the contract has been
unable to obtain his payment or consideration under the unconscionable contract terms
by all other means, (b) the drawer brings suit against the indigent on the contract,
(c) the indigent still does not pay under pressure of the pending suit, (d) the indigent
consults with an attorney, (e) the attorney decides to accept the case and defend the
indigent, (f) the attorney interposes § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code as a
defense, and (g) the court finds the contract to be unconscionable. As a practical matter,
this set of conditions will be rare indeed in the rural area under study.
2- One form of advertisement must have been uniquely tantalizing to an indigent
consumer in need of immediate cash. The company sent out form letters in November
of 1968, some of which were received by indigents interviewed, which advertised its
new offices and enclosed a draft for $302.29 "which can be immediately converted to
cash simply by bringing it into our office." The monthly payment was stipulated as only
$19.00, but the total number of months required for repayment and the interest charges
were not specified. "Your signature is all we require to credit worthy people on a loan
of this size." The letter urged the recipient to "bring the enclosed Draft to our office
today. Better yet, phone first - [phone number given] - and the money will be ready
for you to pick up when you stop by the office."
210 Under the Colorado Consumer Finance Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-3-1 el seq.
(1963), which regulates lenders making loans of less than $1500 at interest rates equal
to or exceeding 12 percent per year, the rate ceiling of interest for loans up to $300 is
3 percent per month, for loans between $300 and $500 is 1 and 1/2 percent per month,
and for loans between $500 and $1,000 is 1 percent per month. Id. § 73-3-14(1) (a)
(1963). The Act allows disclosure of interest as a percentage per month, Id., but Title I
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, Truth in Lending, requires disclosure of the
finance charge as an annual percentage rate for all consumer loans. Consumer Credit
Protection Act, § 127, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
207
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dogs for unsuspecting and unknowing consumers, are nonexistent in
the two sample counties. The Chambers of Commerce in the two
counties have swept the problems under a rug.2 11 Offices of the Community Action Program in each county have been helpful; a citizen's
advisory council to one county's CAP office has an uncohesive and
faltering program to fill the knowledge void. In short, minimal efforts
are being made to arm the indigent class with the weaponry of knowledge and understanding of business practices - and, surely, some
effort is better than none-but until and unless these efforts are
vastly expanded, consumer problems, particularly with nonlocal businessmen, will remain a very real source of class injury.
3. Landlord-Tenant Relationships
Surprisingly, the class injury legal problems which arise in landlord-tenant relationships between the poor and the establishment are
perhaps the least significant of the problems examined by the study
in terms of frequency of injury. While such difficulties do occasionally
arise, e.g., when a landlord fails to repair rented premises, they are
not pervasive because many of the impoverished residents of the
sample counties own the homes in which they reside.2 12 The home may
be small, old, and worth very little, but it is nonetheless owned.
Further, those rural indigents who do rent their housing units often
have a relative as their landlord. Due to such circumstances, the study
found little evidence of a counterpart to the urban slumlord within
the counties surveyed.
More serious landlord-tenant problems exist, however, among
migrant laborers who must rent their living quarters. The migrant
housing is often owned by one or several farmers who hire the laborers
to harvest crops. Often the housing is decrepid and unsanitary. The
Colorado statutes authorize the Department of Health to establish
and enforce sanitary standards for such labor camps, 2 13 yet the regulations which have been promulgated pursuant to this statute 214 are
not being enforced because the legislature has not provided for effective
sanctions for violators. 15
In the Arkansas Valley on the eastern plains of Colorado, local Chambers of Commerce
have extended some efforts to inform the poor of the predatory practices of transient
vendors. The techniques have been public meetings and the dissemination of printed
information among indigents.
212 See note 75 supra. See also notes 191 & 192 supra and accompanying text.
211

2 3
1 COLO.

REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-1-7(14) (1963).
214 Sanitary Standards and Regulations for Labor Camps, Colorado Department of Health
Regulations (June 18, 1968).
215 Chase, supra note 58, at 73.
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B. Conflict with Governmental Institutions
When a member of the poverty class is confronted with a legal

problem and the impersonal forces of government and law are arrayed
against him, he is rarely able to deal with his adversary on an equal
basis, and class injury is likely to occur. Some of the difficult problems
in this area were found to include laws which created distinct inequities
for the rural poor; denial, reduction, or termination of welfare or
other benefits; and the procedures used in administering a system of
criminal justice.
1. Inequitable Laws

To a significant extent, federal and state laws have effectively
segregated much of the rural impoverished class, especially migrant
laborers, 210 from positive benefits conferred by the law on others.
For example, the agricultural worker is excluded from both the National
Labor Relations Act2 17 and the Colorado Labor Peace Act.21 8 He is
thereby unable to form a union with his fellow agricultural workers
in order to obtain better wages, hours, and working conditions through
effective collective bargaining. Further, the agricultural worker is
excluded from coverage under laws regulating both unemployment
insurance 21 and workmen's compensation. 220 These exclusions invoke
significant hardship on the rural poor since farm mechanization is
increasing in the rural areas under study; for not only do machines
displace agricultural workers, leaving them without a source of income
until they can secure another job, but machines also increase the risk
22
of injury to those workers who do manage to find employment. '
216

Parkinson & Harper, The Law and Migrani Agricultural Workers, 38 DICTA 341, 347
(1968). A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held for the first time that the protective regulations regarding housing and working conditions for migratory farm workers who are recruited for domestic agricultural work by
state employment systems under the provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, 28
U.S.C. §§ 49 et seq. (1964), are enforceable by the migrants when such regulations are
violated. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
217 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964). See Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 391 (1953).
218
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-4-2(3)(a) (1963).
219Id.

§ 82-1-3(8) (a) (1963).

2201d.

§ 81-2-6(4) (1963). See note 142 supra.

221

Several indigents particularly complained of the danger of losing fingers or even a
hand in working on a potato sorting machine during the fall potato harvest in the
Valley. The sorter consists of a conveyor-like series of rollers upon which is dumped
the material dug up by a separate potato digger machine - potatoes, a few dirt clods,
and some potato vines. The job of a potato sorter consists of standing over this conveyorlike series of rollers as the diggings pass by and manually removing all dirt clods.
vines, and rotten potatoes before the remaining potatoes are dumped into trucks. In the
meantime, the entire sorter is being pulled by a tractor along the length of the field.
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At the same time governmental institutions have effectively excluded the agricultural worker from the protective penumbra of certain
social legislation, they often have also precluded him from exercising
channels in which he might affect a change in such conditions. The
migrant laborer, because of his nomadic travels following the crops,
is denied the right to vote not only in state elections 2 2 but also in
presidential elections.2 2 Residency requirements have also precluded
migrant laborers from the benefits of welfare assistance, 4 but a
Supreme Court decision 'has declared such requirements constitutionally
infirm2. 5
Class injury inherent in the specific content of certain laws may
arise in more subtle ways. For example, in the field of education, particularly among youngsters in primary grades, a persistent problem
is the language difference between the Anglo teacher2 2 6 and the
Spanish-American child. Indeed, "[w]hereas most immigrants largely
replaced their mother tongues with English in one or two generations,
the Mexican-American has clung to Spanish for three, four, and five
generations. ...Many unfortunate classroom situations have arisen

because schools and teachers have refused to recognize that Spanish is
2

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-3-1 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1965) & (Supp. 1969).
This section provides:
Basic qualifications(1) (a) Every person who, on the date of the next
ensuing election, will have attained the age of twenty-one years, possessing
the following qualifications, shall be entitled to register to vote at all general,
primary, and special elections:
(b) He shall be a citizen of the United States;
(c) He shall be resided in this state one year immediately preceding
the election at which he offers to vote, in the county ninety days, and in the
precinct twenty days ....
223 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-24-1 (Supp. 1969). This section provides:
Eligibility of new resident to vote - Any citizen of the United States who
shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, who shall have resided, next
preceding the election at which he offers to vote, in this state and in the county
or city and county not less than two months, and in the precinct not less than
fifteen days, and shall have been duly registered as required by the provisions of
this article, shall have the right to vote as a new resident for presidential and
vice-presidential electors.
The validity of this particular statutory provision was challenged and held valid
in Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968), vacated as moot, 396 U.S. 45
(1969).
22 The Colorado statutes setting residency requirements for welfare assistance are: COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 101-1-4 (1963)
(Old Age Pension) ; Id. § 22-11-4 (1963) (Aid
to Families with Dependent Children) ; Id. § 119-6-6 (1963) (Aid to the Needy
Disabled); Id. § 16-2-5 (1963)
(Aid to the Blind); Id. § 119-2-8 (Supp. 1967)
(Tuberculosis Assistance); Id. § 82-1-3 (1963) and 82-4-7 (Supp. 1965) (General
Assistance).
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2-6 Even in Costilla County, having the greatest proportion of Spanish-American population
in the state, the schools employ substantial numbers of Anglo teachers.
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the social language of their Mexican-American students. ' 2 2 7 In the
rural area surveyed, the native language still spoken in almost all
Spanish-American homes has been appropriately described as follows:
"A rustic version of Spanish is the predominant language spoken by
most Hispanos in rural Colorado. It includes idioms and mismash
of Spanish and English terms to the point where many Hispano school
youngsters fail in Spanish language courses in school as well as
English."2 2 Many very young Spanish-American children know no
other language but this "rustic version of Spanish." In fact, the study
of the Lariat barrio reported that children of 44 families could not
speak English before entering the first grade.2 29 The problem arises
because the laws of Colorado provide as follows:
Instruction in the common branches of study in the public schools
of this state shall be conducted through the medium of the English
language. During the time that the public schools of the district in
which he is resident are in session, no child of school age who has not
completed the eighth grade shall be permitted to attend any school
where the common branches of study are not taught through the
medium of the English language. 230
27Bernal, Anita Insists .

228
229
23 0

. . I am Mexican-American, 58 TODAY's EDUCATION 51 (May,
1969). The following is a particularly poignant example from this same article of an
"unfortunate classroom situation":
"Traes un lapiz?" Ector had leaned over to Juan for a pencil. "I've
warned you about speaking Spanish in my class," the teacher said sharply.
"Go see the vice-principal right now, Ector. I can't have any more of that
murmuring in Spanish."
Mrs. Jones was irritated. Too many of her students kept lapsing into
Spanish. There was a school policy against the use of Spanish and she had a
vague idea that there was a law against speaking Spanish in the schools of
Texas.
Ector, a six-foot varsity tackle, was active in all school activities and
popular with his peers.
"I didn't do anything wrong," Ector kept repeating to himself as he
made his way to the office. "I get A's in Spanish class but when I use Spanish
to whisper to a friend in Mrs. Jones' room, I get sent to the office."
Ector arrived at the vice-principal's office. After explaining why he was
there, Ector sat through a 15-minute lecture on why it is very American to speak
English.
Mr. Neill's lecture, which he had often delivered before, mentioned the
vague law that prohibited the use of the Spanish language in the schools.
"Well, Ector, you can take three licks and go back to class or go home
and bring your parents," Mr. Neill stated after the lecture.
"I know I'm as good an American as he is," Ector thought to himself.
"My brother is in Vietnam and I'll probably be going, too. Why does Mr.
Neill have to tell me about speaking English and being an American? I can
speak it, and I was born in the United States...."
"Well, Ector, will it be three licks or your parents?" Mr. Neill asked.
"The three licks."
Id. at 51. The three licks that Ector received is apparently mild punishment, as compared to some of the stories related by Spanish-Americans in the two sample counties.
Huber, supra note 16, at 7, col. 1. See also LA RAZA, supra note 28, at 5-24.
E. Ahrens, supra note 27, at 87.

CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-21-3 (1963).
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Therefore, even if teachers in this area wanted to teach in the idiomatic
Spanish which their students could understand, the law would not
permit it.

Another subtle way in which the rural poor are subjected to
inequities in the law, albeit somewhat differently, is by the nonenforcement of statutory remedies. For example, the state's sanitary
housing code for the protection of migrant laborers in agricultural
camps is largely unenforced, causing migrant agricultural laborers to
live in somewhat squalid conditions.2" 1
2. Denial, Reduction, or Termination of Welfare or Other
Benefits
The class injury which results when the rural poor face governmental functionaries which dispense public assistance can be substantial
and pervasive. For example, the incidence of persons receiving welfare,
social security, or food stamp benefits in Conejos and Costilla counties
is very high in comparison to the total population.132 Over half of
all indigents surveyed were receiving or had just recently received some
form of benefits, indicating that denying, terminating, or reducing
such benefits would invoke hardship.
Yet a substantial proportion of subjects interviewed had suffered
just such injuries. The explanations given for the actions by the appropriate governmental agencies varied. Several elderly persons were
denied old age pension benefits because they were unable to adduce
accurate proof of their ages, since no record was made at the time
of their births. Insufficient proof of physical disability for Aid to the
Needy Disabled, family earnings purportedly being too high for
continuance or inauguration of AFDC payments, and untimely application for food stamps 23 3 were mentioned, among others. Several of

the indigents attempted, a few successfully, to remedy what they believed to be unjust agency action by informal methods. Confidants
were sometimes helpful in encouraging the welfare office to reexamine its previous position vis-a-vis the indigent seeking benefits.
None of those injured sought legal advice from an attorney, apparently
on the assumption that the welfare agency had the law on its side.
Sporadic instances of direct and interpersonal dealing with the welfare
caseworkers or director were somewhat fruitful for some indigents.
The most disconcerting aspect of the welfare program in the two
counties studied was the manner in which agency decisions were made
231
232

See notes 213-15 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 96-103 supra and accompanying text.

233 See note 101 supra.
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and indigent applicants were informed. The director of the welfare
office in one county, for example, has held the position for over two
decades. She is Spanish-American, a member of the community's establishment class, distrusted and disliked by most, and excoriated and
castigated by a few impoverished residents of the town. She is a
domineering woman who runs the county welfare office in autocratic
fashion and who very obviously views it as her personal fiefdom.
Extensive regulations and interagency directives serve not only to
define the boundaries of the decisionmaking process but also to
camouflage the director's personalized discretion. Possessing a thorough
knowledge of the rules and regulations governing qualifications for
welfare disbursements, the director is able to justify to an applicant
almost any agency action taken. As is true in the field of consumer
injury, the poor do not have adequate knowledge, nor, at least wirh
this particular director, do they even have access to the source of such
rules and regulations themselves.2 3 4 Without such
knowledge -the
access, many of the indigents interviewed who had dealt with this
county's welfare office assumed that subjective agency decisions were
final and legal. Virtually none of the decisions are appealed to the
state welfare department.2 35 Further, procedural due process is apparently ignored when a recipient of welfare aid has his claim denied
or his benefits reduced or terminated: none of the indigents with this
experience reported any objective a priori hearing to determine the
In the summer of 1968, a VISTA volunteer working in the community stated that he
had requested the volume of welfare rules and regulations for brief examination, but
the director had pre-emptorily denied the request. A young caseworker in the office added
that he had removed the volume overnight without the director's knowledge. She later
discovered this fact and severely castigated him, saying that the volume was never to
be removed from the office again. The volume was then stashed away for safekeeping
in her private office. Two of the student researchers for this study went to the director's
office, asked to examine the volume, and were denied the request. The director was
told that the Colorado Open Records Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 113-2-1 to 113-2-6
(Supp. 1969), then recently passed by the General Assembly, applied to the requested
writings and that the law provides that "all public records shall be open for inspection
by any person at reasonable times . . .""Id.§ 113-2-1 (Supp. 1969). She expressed
no knowledge of the law, evinced unmistakable distrust of the gringo interlopers, and
steadfastly declined to part with the volume for even a moment, suggesting instead that
the two obtain a copy of the rules and regulations from the state welfare headquarters
in Denver. These events raise a serious question whether any local indigent would be
allowed to examine the rules and regulations in order to double check the authority
which allegedly justifies the agency action adverse to the indigent's application for or
continuation of benefits.
s35
No appeals were lodged with the State Hearing examiner for the years 1966 and 1967
from either county. In 1968, 3 were lodged (with 2 subsequently withdrawn); in
1969, 1 was lodged (and subsequently withdrawn) from Conejos County. No appeals
were lodged from Costilla County. Conversation with Donald Fisher, Hearing Officer,
State Welfare Office, Denver, Colorado. Appeals to the state welfare department are
authorized by statute. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 101-1-13 (1963) (Old Age Pension)
id.§ 22-11-9 (1963) (AFDC); id. § 119-6-16 (1963) (Aid to the Needy Disabled);
id. § 119-7-6(2) (a) (Supp. 1965) (Medical Assistance for the Aged) ; id. § 16-2-14
(1963) (Aid to the Blind) ; id. § 119-2-13 (1963) (Aid to Indigent Tuberculars).
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verifiable facts and the justifiability of agency action.2" At least one
consequence of all this is that some applicants resort to prevarication
and deceit in order to bypass the bureaucratic wasteland and subjective discretion of the welfare office in that county, according to
one of the office's caseworkers.
The present need is for an effective counterbalance to any unbridled subjective discretion by the director in agency decisionmaking.
The welfare directors are not necessarily guilty of misfeasance in the
performance of their duties. Rather, pressed by serious poverty conditions in the two-county region and limited by funding available from
county, state, and federal sources, some close factual decisions are
apparently resolved against the applicant simply because the coffers
of the welfare state are not bottomless.2" 7 Class injury occurs when
the eligibility of indigents is not open to disputation on the facts and
yet benefits are denied by "stretching" the well-hidden rules and regulations. At the least, decisions should comport with agency rules and
regulations, and, as the experience of legal aid lawyers elsewhere in the
country has shown, 2 8 some of the rules and regulations may be directly
attacked as being at variance with the larger scheme of constitutional
rights for the impoverished class. Scrutiny or the threat of scrutiny
of welfare case decisions by competent attorneys could well dampen
personalized discretion and enhance agency objectivity. Hence, this
field of class injury is a particularly fertile one for legal aid.
3. The Administration of Criminal Justice
When an indigent is charged with a criminal offense, his ad-

versary becomes the state's formal legal system, negating informal
problem-solving processes and forcing reliance on institutionally de-

veloped procedures which are designed to protect the rights of
Federal law requires that a state's welfare plan "'provide for granting an opportunity
for a fair hearing before the State agency to an individual whose claim for [old-age or
medical] assistance is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness; .... "
42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(4) (1964). Similar provisions apply to, among others, AFDC
benefits, id. § 602(a) (4) (Supp. IV, 1969), and assistance to the permanently disabled,
id.§ 1352(a) (4). Even though the Colorado law is in conformity with these requirements, the administrative "appeal of right" has remained largely unused. In Colorado
for a recent 12 month period, only 165 persons out of 12.611 whose public welfare
benefits were terminated even requested fair hearings. Wickham, Public lWelfare
Administration: Quest for a Workable Solution, 58 GEO. L.J. 46, 70 (1969). See also
Note, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L.J. 1234
(1967).
237The director of the Alamosa Civil Rights office reported that he has little influence in
assisting indigents who ask his aid in obtaining welfare assistance in Alamosa County,
simply because the Alamosa welfare director has told him bluntly that there are just
not enough funds to put all who need assistance on the welfare rolls.
238 For a monthly listing of the more significant cases filed by legal aid attorneys in Cali.
fornia, including California Rural Legal Assistance, during the years 1966 through 1968
see generally I-II
CEB LEGAL SERVICES GAZErrE 1-367 (1966-68). For a brief summary
of the guidance which the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, located at Columbia
Law School. has given to judicial and administrative attacks on specific areas of public
assistance law, see Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Office - OEO's Special Grants in
Legal Services, 56 GEo. L.J. 742, 756-60 (1968).
236
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suspects. When the procedures fail to fully protect the rights of indigents, then class injury occurs, according to the definition of this study.
In the counties investigated, informal and subjective procedures were
found to exist which did not fully protect the rights of suspects, most
of whom were indigent,"' 9 creating problems for the rural poor and
causing them to be on a less than equal 'basis with their institutional
adversary.
For example, the practice of assigning counsel in indigent criminal
cases in the district court is not found at all in the misdemeanor cases
in the county courts. 2 40 While this situation is not unique to these
courts, it is the observation of the student researchers that the informality and subjectivity involved in litigating such cases in the counties
surveyed was more severe. At least a partial explanation for this
observation is the fact that the district attorney's office, unlike most
other areas, is rarely represented in the two county courts. Consequently,
the county judge - a layman in both counties - becomes prosecutor,
defender, and jury. The typical courtroom scene for a misdemeanor
'trial" (which usually involved a traffic violation) was observed
as follows: A law enforcement officer - city policeman, county
sheriff's deputy, or state highway patrolman - arose and presented
to the judge the evidence and circumstances concerning the charge
against the defendant. The defendant then arose and presented his side
of the controversy. All relevant evidence was allowed; no one mentioned anything called a "hearsay" rule. The judge questioned both
parties as to the facts. The officer and the defendant heatedly argued
on the same matter, with the judge vainly attempting to maintain
proper judicial decorum. The judge finally accepted at least the
principal claims of one side -

the officer's -

and passed judgment

on the defendant.
The county judges who were interviewed seemed to be quite
aware that injustice was wont to creep into their courtrooms. One
239 The majority of criminal charges filed in district courts in rural areas of Colorado are

against indigents who are unable to afford an attorney. This was the collective conclusion
of district judges who were interviewed or who replied to the attorney questionnaire.
One district judge in the San Luis Valley (the six counties in the San Luis Vall e
constitute the Twelfth Judicial District of Colorado which has two judges) estimated
the proportion of indigents to be between 75 and 90 percent of all criminal cases. And,
at least in the sample counties surveyed, a very high proportion of defendants on district
court criminal dockets are Spanish-surnamed. An examination of the dockets in these
two counties revealed that almost 90 percent of the defendants were Spanish-surnamed,
over three-fourths of these pled guilty to their charges, and all but a very few of the
remainder were subsequently found guilty after a brief trial. The two most common
crimes with which Spanish-surnamed individuals were charged were theft and malicious
Mischief. A district judge estimated that 99 percent of all indigent Spanish-Americans
charged with crimes before him are found guilty or plead guilty. For the period 19521962, there were 305 Colorado State Penitentiary inmates sentenced from the San Luis
Valley. Of this total, 222 or 72.8 percent were Spanish-surnamed.
240 For the years 1965-67, neither Conejos nor Costilla counties paid out any sums for
assigned counsel except in the district court. Both county judges, as expected, stated
that they had never appointed counsel in their courts.
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expressed the view that a number of indigents who had been found
guilty would have been acquitted with the aid of counsel. For many
of the poor, the defense of a charge in these county courts will be their
only experience, if at all, with the criminal justice system. As presently
existing, a wrongfully charged party may well be left with a bitter
taste of injustice in 'his mouth - "the policeman is always right in a
court of law, even when he's wrong."
This informality and subjectivity does have one mildly redeeming
feature for indigent defendants who are in fact justifiably determined
to be guilty as charged: The county judges of both Conejos and
Costilla counties tend toward leniency in meting out punishment. For
example, violations that are invariably met with $15-$30 fines in the
Denver County Courts are met with fines of $5-$10 at the most in
these county courts. Several factors are apparently responsible for
this leniency. First, the system of criminal justice in the county courts
is highly subjective; that is, given the sparse population and the large
circle of acquaintances and interrelatedness of families, it is much
more common for all parties involved in a criminal violation to know
all other parties. Thus, the judge is more likely to mete out punishment
based upon his personal knowledge of the defendant. Second, it seems
to be a strong feeling with the two county judges that a jail sentence
is not a viable alternative to a fine, so that if the defendant were unable
to pay a high fine, a jail sentence would not be an effective means to
curry respect for the law. Therefore, it is believed better to levy a
small fine which will, in any case, hurt the pocketbook of the indigent
than to send him to jail. Finally, the lesser fines are thought to be
proportionately effective, considering the lesser standard of living in
the Valley due to a depressed economy. But the absence of any set
scale of fines established by all judges in the Valley still results in a
highly personalized system of criminal justice.
CONCLUSION

The formal legal structure remains largely alien to the poverty
class of Conejos and Costilla counties. Few indigents who were interviewed in the two counties had ever seen an attorney concerning a
legal problem, and fewer still had ever been in court. The manifest
evidence is that the poor become entwined in formal legal processes
only when they are shocked into the system. Legal assistance is only
sought as a last-gasp defensive measure when the indigent himself is
under formal legal pressure from some outside party or force. Hence,
the poor are invariably the defendants in court cases. They are sued;
they rarely sue. They are charged with crimes; they are rarely the
complaining parties. Records from courts of both counties clearly
reflect that character. In the district court, Spanish-surnamed persons
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were not parties-plaintiffs in any actions during the year 1967 other
than divorce suits, one foreclosure action, and two quiet title suits;
in the county courts, a few petitions to change the plaintiff's name
appeared. Many attorneys reported, either on returned questionnaires
or during personal interviews, that the legal problems !brought to them
by indigents require for the most part defensive action, and that such
problems have usually been exacerbated by inaction to such a level that
any remedy beyond camouflaged capitulation is difficult to obtain
at best.
Poverty class members in the two counties do not utilize the law
and the legal processes as positive tools to improve their lot individually
or to correct manifest class injustice.
[Ain essential ingredient of legal competence is a propensity to take
action. This requirement is especially critical in the American legal
system since a major assumption built into the operating philosophy and
structure of our legal institutions, particularly those concerned with
civil matters, is that aggrieved parties will take legal initiative. This
assumption may hold for the rich under most circumstances; there is
considerable reason to believe that it does not hold for the poor. Such
data as exist suggest that the poor suffer many legal wrongs
but
that they rarely attempt to redress their grievances through law. 241
Various explanations have been advanced
'by legal commentators, 24 2 by community leaders interviewed, and by the poor themselves - for this distinct failure of indigents to utilize attorneys and
courts. There is no one single factor. The high cost, or the fear thereof,
that the contemporary system demands to invoke the full protective
gamut of legal machinery is a prime prohibitive factor. But it is just
one of many. Failure by indigents to take cognizance of the legal
character of a disturbing problem, paucity of resident attorneys in the
area surveyed, long distance to the nearest attorney, hesitancy due to
ethnic, language, or class barriers, and other factors certainly compound the assumed simplicity of the "no-money" explanation. Moreover, some explanations are uniquely individualized to the particular
circumstances in which an indigent may find himself.
All of the explanations for failure by the rural poor to resort
to formal legal institutions are geared to an analysis at that point in
time when an indigent has allowed his legal problem to swell to
critical proportions. If, at that point, a particular indigent fails to
consult an attorney, the chances are very strong that his problem will
be resolved on terms adverse to his own interests by imposition from
the other party. The empirical data from the survey reveal that many
241 Carlin, Howard & Messinger, supra note 148, at 71. See also D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR
PAY MORE 171-72 (1963).
242 See, e.g., Willging, Financial Barriersand the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEO.
L.J. 253 (1968). See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, PUBLIC PROVISION FOR COSTS
AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL LITIGATION (1966); Carlin, Howard & Messinger, supra note
148.
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indigents actually resolve their legal problems prior to that critical
point where delay -the
instinctive and natural response to a legal
problem- can no longer be tolerated by adverse forces and all will
be lost without the aid of an attorney and little will be salvaged in
any event. An informal and unstructured system of local confidants,
the present remnants of a Spanish-American cultural imperative, has
been surprisingly effective in aiding the rural poor to resolve their
law-related problems without the intervention of formal legal institutions. Many more indigents have successfully ameliorated if not
resolved such problems by direct personal confrontation and dealing
with the irritating source.
Significant legal problems, however, are notably immune from
informal solution. These are called class injuries, since by design or
by effect, they are limited to common occurrence within the poverty
class and are engendered or created in the first instance by the establishment class, individually or collectively. For example, the poor woman
who is denied AFDC benefits with a cursory and peculiarly vague
explanation; the man who is dunned by a nonlocal collection agency
,,,hen the house siding he was persuaded to purchase has never been
installed; the migrant farm laborer who is expected to lodge his
working family in a woefully inadequate, unsanitary, and decrepid
house provided by an unconcerned farmer interested only in profit
margins; the indigent mother of seven who takes a job as a potato
sorter during the harvest season in order to bring in desparately needed
money and who receives a badly mangled hand as the result of defective
farm equipment only to discover that workmen's compensation is unavailable; and the indigent charged with a felony cannot benefit materially from informal processes. It is in the area of class injury that
legal aid and affirmative legislative action would prove to be most
beneficial to the rural poor. But, with the single exception of the
criminal justice system, the research data indicate that class injuries
remain largely unremedied. And, what is more reproving, the clearly
expressed attitude of the substantial majority of community leaders
surveyed, constituting a fair sample of the indigenous establishment
class, was that the ethical duty of legal largesse to the poor at public
expense was fully satisfied by assigned counsel in felony cases. Most
attorneys in the San Luis Valley were quite willing to render their
share" of legal aid to indigents entering their offices. But, for reasons
previously mentioned, many members of the rural poverty class are
quite reticent about consulting an attorney, and, in turn, most of the
attorneys are sublimely oblivious of the extent and the character of
legal needs of the rural poor which are never laid bare in the sanctum
of a law office. Furthermore, too few attorneys evinced any inclination
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to take up the banner of class injury and storm the bastions of the
establishment. Such an assault would most assuredly render needed
service, but just as assuredly it would realistically threaten the economic
security of the attorney by biting the hand that feeds him and would
cast aspersions upon his standing among the pillars of the community - the businessmen, landowners, well-to-do ranchers, doctors,
government officials, politicians - in short, the establishment.
In summary, then, the empirical evidence garnered by this study
points to a definite need for free legal services for the rural poor in
the area studied. The occurrence of two recent events may in due
time alleviate much of that need. The Office of Economic Opportunity approved a sizeable grant in July of 1969 which authorizes the
establishment of a legal aid office in Alamosa, among other rural
locations in the state of Colorado.24 3 In the criminal area, the Colorado
General Assembly passed a bill during its 1969 session including a
section creating a statewide public defender's office which began
operations in January of 1970,244 to "replace the existing local public
defenders and court appointed counsel. 24 5
It is still too early to gauge the effectiveness of the new legal aid
and public defender systems in the region surveyed. It is fairly certain,
however, that the rural bar of Colorado will not be unanimous in
approving the new institutions. From the attorney questionnaire, 55
percent of the respondents were opposed to the establishment of free
legal aid in their particular community, and the opinions expressed
in personal interviews by members of the San Luis Valley bar were
equally split. Opposition centered upon the belief that legal aid was
not necessary, that it couldn't work because of staffing and funding
hurdles, or that fiery radicals would come into a small community,
indiscriminately attack established practices, generate community dissension, and create one large and continuous brouhaha. Proponents,
including the directors of the Alamosa offices of the Civil Rights Commission and the Colorado Migrant Council, cited the pressing need.
One attorney, upon learning of the OEO grant, expressed the view that
he could now, with impunity and no deviation from ethical norms, turn
away all indigent cases and send them packing to the legal aid office.
Only a bare majority of attorneys responding to the questionnaire - 59
percent - had favored a local public defender system, and those in
apposition were generally the same ones who opposed legal aid.
243 Office of Economic Opportunity, Grant No. C.G. 6055 (1969).
244
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-21-1 to 5 (Supp. 1969). See also note 153 supra.
245 COLORADO STATE ADMINISTRATOR, JUDICIAL PERSONNEL AND FISCAL ADMINISTRATION:

PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (May, 1969). The public defender responsible for the San
Luis Valley has his office in Alamosa and has a staff of one attorney, one investigator,

and two secretaries. Conversation with Harry 0. Lawson, Judicial Administrator, State
of Colorado.
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Another and equally significant conclusion is compelled by the
gathered evidence. The informal "legal" system which is employed
to varying degrees by indigents of the two counties can be a viable
adjunct to effective legal aid in the Valley. Resort to these informal
processes should be positively encouraged and supported, where appropriate and not plainly adverse to the substance or spirit of the law.
The local confidants can particularly serve a valuable function by
screening problems at an informal stage, referring to legal aid only
those which are suited to resolution by that manner. To be sure, confidants will handle law-related problems brought to them in ways
which may not insure the full protection or vindication of the legal
rights and remedies of the indigent. But to discourage and discredit
the confidant institution on that account alone would engender greater
problems: Either more problems of indigents would be caught up in
the adversary legal process, thereby widening the hiatus of distrust
and animadversion between the establishment and the poor, or the
poor would suffer more legal wrongs without recourse. Either result
is probably less satisfactory than the ad hoc, spasmodically successful,
yet personal, informal, and compromising processes of extra-legal
problem resolution which now exist.
The confidant as legal scrivener performs a valuable function.
Theoretically, the practice is fraught with the danger of legal error,
but in practice that danger appears more imaginary than real, as the
Colorado Supreme Court once recognized.24 If not encouraged, this
practice should at least not be discouraged until and unless shown to
be a genuine hazard to the legal interests of unsuspecting indigents.
The legal problems of the rural poor are not greatly disparate
from those of the urban poor.2 4 7 The differences are not in substance

but rather in degree; landlord-tenant problems, for example, are much
less frequent and not as emotionally vociferous in rural communities
as in the great urban centers, and, in turn, problems attributable to
ownership of real property, whether in substantial quantities or not,
are more frequent among the rural poor. The really significant difference is one perhaps not endemic to the culturally parochial region
studied. 2 That difference is in the methods by which the similar
legal problems are handled and resolved by the rural poor

-

through

the informal "legal" system.

246 See

text accompanying note 169 supra.

247 Compare, Duke Study, supra note 9 and the

present study with Pe-oria Survev, supra

note 8. and Sykes, supra note 7.
248 Although not directly considered and discussed in their article, the authors of the Duke
Study, Note, supra note 9 make frequent reference to the use by North Carolina indigents of the problemsolving technique denominated herein as indigent self-help and
interpersonal dealing
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APPENDIX
ATTORNEY QUESTIONNAIRE

(1)

What Colorado State Judicial District are you practicing in?

(2)

What is the nature of your present legal practice?
Please check one.
a. Sole practitioner
b. Partnership - 2 members
c. Partnership - 3 members
d. Partnership - 4 members
e. Partnership - 5 or more members
f. Retired or semi-retired

(3)

Have you been or are you presently holding a public office?
If so, please specify years held.
a. District judge
b. County judge
c. District attorney
d. Deputy district attorney
e. City attorney
f. County attorney
g. Other (please specify)

(4)

In how many cases have you acted as court appointed counsel in criminal
matters involving indigents in the past three years?
Number
1967
1966
1965
How many of these cases actually went to trial?
1967
1966
1965
Does your schedule permit you to spend adequate preparation time for
assigned cases ?
YES_
NO

(5)

In your opinion, is compensation to the attorney for assigned counsel cases
adequate?
YES__
NO-

(6)

Is the assignment of counsel for indigent defendants in your judicial
district objectively rotated among the available lawyers in the area?
YES_
NO

(7)

Under what circumstances are the attorneys in your area able to avoid
accepting court appointed cases?

(8)

Would you favor the establishment of a public defender program in your
judicial district?
YES
NO
COMMENT:
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IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, PLEASE LIMIT YOUR ANSWERS
TO CASES AND LEGAL SERVICES OTHER THAN COURT APPOINTED
CRIMINAL CASES.
(9) How much time do you presently devote in your legal practice to legal
services to indigents?
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(10)

When providing legal services to indigents, which of the following general
categories would you say you apply when considering fees?
Please check one.
a. Always charge the recommended minimum fee.

b. Generally charge the minimum fee, but will sometimes
charge a lower fee.
c. Always charge at least some fee.

d. Sometimes charge a small fee, sometimes nothing,
depending upon clients ability to pay.
e. Always charge nothing.
(11)

If you charge fees for legal services to indigent clients:
a. What percentage of the clients pay the total bill?

b. What percentage make only a partial payment?
c. What percentage never pay?
(12)

Considering the total amount of fees charged to indigent clients, do you

receive in collection:
a. More than you expected?
b. About as much as you expected?
c. Less than you expected?
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS DEAL WITH YOUR OPINIONS REGARDING LEGAL SERVICES AND THE POOR.
(13)

In your community, do poor people with legal problems generally tend to

come to your firm:
a. More than to other attorneys in the community?
b. About as often as to other attorneys in the community?
c. Less than to other attorneys in the community?
COMMENT:
(14)

Do the poor persons in your community generally tend to go to any
particular attorney or firm?
YES_
NOIf yes, please explain.

(15)

From your experience in your community, who do the poor people first
seek out when confronted with a legal problem?
a. Lawyer
b. Minister or Priest
c. Relative or friend
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d. Police
e. Social Worker
f. Other (please specify)

(16)

What percentage of indigent clients who come to your office are referred
to you by
a. Lawyers?
b. Other persons in the community?
%

(17)

The following is a list of legal problem areas which the poor may or may
not confront in your community. We would like to know if in your
practice or experience in the community you think the poor people in your
community are faced with these problems. In other words, we want to
know the types of problems with which the poor people who come to you
or other attorneys are faced. If a substantial number of indigents have
encountered a problem area, please write an S in the space provided. If
only a few, please write F; if none, please write N.
a. Wage collection problems (garnishment, employer
not paying full wages, etc.).
b. Welfare benefit collection problems (Unemployment compensation, medicine, A.D.C., general
county assistance, etc.)
1. Unable to get on welfare rolls.
2. Unable to afford an appeal from welfare board
decision.
3. Forced to accept unsuitable employment in lieu
of welfare payments being continued.
c. Purchase of unsatisfactory goods with cash.
d. Purchase of unsatisfactory goods on installment credit
1. From local businesses.
2. From traveling salesmen.
3. From discount stores.
4. From national chain store outlets.
e. Default on installment payments and repossession of
goods purchased.
f. Default on payment of debt.
g. Uncollectibility of money loaned by indigent to
another.
h. Housing problems.
1. Landlord - tenant problems (no written lease,
disrepair of dwelling, eviction, etc.).
2. Discrimination in buying house.
3. Drafting deeds and other papers relating to
property.
4. Other (please specify)

i. Martial problems.
1. Divorce.
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2.
3.
4.
5.

Child custody.
Support and alimony payment problems.
Wife-beating.
Other (please specify)

j. Job injuries and workmen's compensation payments.
k. Discrimination in voting.
1. Job discrimination.
m. Estate planning and writing wills.
n. Law enforcement problems.
1. Differential law enforcement, discrimination by
local police or sheriff's office in enforcing the law.2. Employment of attorneys for criminal cases other
than felonies.
3. Inability to post bail.

4. Probation and other parole problems.
o. Other (please specify)

(18)

What would you say are the five most prevalent legal problems of the
poor people in your community?
Please rank them.
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

(19)

From your experience, what are the legal problem areas which the poor
people tend not to recognize as legal problems?
1.
2.
3.

(20)

In your experience, what are the legal problem areas which the poor people
do generally recognize as legal problems?
1.

2.
3.
(21)

Would you say that those indigents who do not live in a community which
has a lawyer, that is, those who live in areas that are distant from an
attorney's office, are more likely not to come to an attorney when they have
a problem because of the distance?
YES_
_
NO

(22)

Would you favor the establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in your community or area?
YES_

NO

176

(23)
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What problems do you see in establishing a Legal Aid Clinic or a Public
Defender's Office, or a set-up that combines both in your community or
area ?

IF YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS
RELATING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE,
PLEASE ATTACH THEM.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND INTEREST.

